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International Organization and Public Health
Wayne State University Law School
Hammer, Peter J.

International Organization and Public Health- Fall 2011 [Professor Hammer] Key things to think about: 1 transparency 2 accountability 3 legitimacy
Start with prob
Basis of coop
How do we get effective cooperation? Perceived self interest.
States 
Security interests help nations to come to the tables
Health as development (World bank)
NGOs and other Orgs
Health as a human right (World Health Organization)
Health as a humanitarian concern (sally struthers)
Health as a public good – externalities (subsidize positives ie vaccines. Tax negatives ie pollution)
 
Tools avail
Strategy
Themes :
hard v soft law
advantages of soft law
1.      quicker and more flexible; easier to implement
2.      questions of adaptive efficiency
3.      bottom up
 
advantages of hard law
a.       has the greatest potential and produces the most far-reaching results
b.      it is more durable, more predictable, and usually, more transparent
c.       it is very demanding, and, if abused or otherwise goes wrong, putting things right is very difficult
State v non-state
Future of state
Dynamic v static
Horizontal v. Vertical
Top down v Bottom up
Cooperation:
humanitarianism can also be a very strong framework for public action, but there are drawbacks such as the tendency to be donor driven and the fact that it is less likely to move actors
Institutional Economics and Questions of Governance
Notes 
                                                               i.      Neoclassical economics drives the IMF and the WB
1.      0 transaction costs
2.      individuals act to maximize their welfare
3.      individuals are rational actors
4.      individuals have full information, i.e. know all prices and market options
5.      actors can identify and exploit unexploited gains of trade
                                                             ii.      Coase’s theory
1.      if there are no transaction costs, full information, and no strategic bargaining, then legal rules will not affect the efficiency of resource allocation
2.      there are positive transaction costs, i.e. if you make a K, you have to enforce it
3.      we live in a world with incomplete information
4.      people will act strategically
5.      implication is that transaction costs matter
                                                           iii.      institutional economics
1.      moving to personal forms of exchange where everything is relational to impersonal forms of exchange where you are interacting with strangers
2.      personal trade with small scale production—fear of dealing with other s
3.      Adam Smith: the benefits of specialization of labor; in a primitive economy, no division of labor, so limited sets of commodities
4.      LAW MATTERS!
a.       Property rights
b.      Contracts
c.       Judicial independence
5.      how different
a.       likely to be multiple sets of possible equilibrium, all of which are imperfect
b.      while repetitive decisions do exist, many are non-repetitive
c.       people cannot always identify better alternatives
d.      competition can exist, but it is often muted
                                                           iv.      questions that interest an institutional economist:
1.      If institutions matter, then why?
2.      Why does the form of economic organization differ from one to another?
                                                             v.      Core concepts
1.      institutions matter
2.      if I believe that there are no transaction costs, then institutions are irrelevant
3.      institutions take many different forms
4.      institutions are interchangeable
5.      comparativ

Nation states must adopt the treaty to be effective -Member states have to take action to either accept or reject within 18 months & report why
                                    3 non-binding recommendations
Participation gap – neglects civil society
                                                               i.      the framework convention on tobacco control
1.      Since nations are increasingly unable to maintain a firm hold on the economic and social conditions in their countries, states are increasingly developing international regulations, either at the global or regional level. At the international level, these regulatory frameworks take the form of international conventions, which require the voluntary ratification of the contracting states
2.      the term framework convention is used to describe a variety of legal agreements which establish a general system of governance for an issue or area, such as global tobacco control
3.      Framework conventions, unlike most treaties, do not attempt to resolve all significant issues in a single document. Rather, they divide the negotiation of separate issues into separate agreements. States first adopt a framework convention which created an institutional forum in which states can co-operate and negotiate for the conclusion of separate protocols containing detailed substantive obligations or added institutional commitments. The framework convention protocol approach is, in essence, a dynamic and incremental process of global law making