Criminal Law Outline

Washington & Lee School of Law 2012
Professor Shapiro
Book: Dressler
 
 
 
I. Theories of Punishment
 
Utilitarianism: punishment is only justified by its consequences. Bentham believes the purpose of all laws is to maximize net happiness of society. So, the purpose of punishment is basically deterrence because you are preventing more pain than you are causing with the punishment. Punishment should be no more than is required to deter crime.
a.      General deterrence: (Primary goal) D is punished in order to convince the general community to forego criminal conduct in the future. D’s punishment teaches what conduct is impermissible and instills fear of punishment into would-be violators of the law.
b.      Specific deterrence: (Secondary goal) D is punished in order to prevent D himself from committing more crime. Accomplished initially because he is incarcerated and later because he is intimidated of being incarcerated.
c.      Rehabilitation: (another form of utilitarianism) Advocates of this model prefer to use correctional system to reform wrongdoers rather than intimidate them. Examples of rehabilitative “punishment” include:  psychiatric care, therapy for drug addiction, or academic or vocational training.
 
Retributivism: punishment is justified when it is deserved. A wrongdoer should be punished whether or not it will deter crime. It is morally fitting for a wrongdoer to suffer in proportion to his crime. 2 different forms
 
II. Proportionality of Punishment
 
For purposes of punishment, utilitarianism and retributivism look at things differently
a.      Utilitarian: punishment linked to predictions of future harm and extent to which future harm is deterrable
b.      Retributivists: seek to proportion punishment to the offense already committed, without consideration of future harm
 
Constitutional Requirement of Proportionality
 
The 8th Amendment prohibits ‘cruel and unusual punishment.’ The Supreme Court elaborated that “punishment for the crime be graduated and proportioned to the offense.”
a.      Death Penalty: Question of whether the death penalty can be used for crimes where no one died.
                                             i.      Coker v. Georgia (S CT): D escapes prison (he was already serving for murder and rape) and rapes woman in front of her husband. Jury was instructed that it could impose the death penalty if at least one other aggravating factor was present. They could consider rape committed by a person with a capital felony record or rape committed during the course of another capital felony, armed robbery. They were also told they did not have to impose death penalty even with the aggravating factor because of mitigating circumstances. Jury imposed the death penalty finding both aggravating factors present. Conviction and sentence were confirmed by GA supreme court. Supreme Court reverses saying death penalty for rape of adult woman is cruel and unusual. Reasons:
1.       Looked at public’s attitude: Only a few states authorized capital punishment for rape and even in GA, few rapists were sentenced to death. Thus, death for rape was not socially acceptable.
2.       Retributive analysis (i.e. D’s dangerousness was ignored and deterrence not considered): Decided that rape was not as harmful as death because no one dies so the punishment is disproportionate.
3.       CONCUR/DISSENT: plurality shouldn’t make sweeping claim that death penalty is always disproportionate to the crime of rape. The court should limit is to circumstances like this case.
4.       DISSENT: Rape is not a minor crime so the S. Ct. should not interfere with GA’s right to punish it with death. It is not as simple as ‘eye for eye’- we must engage in a higher level of weighing punishment.
5.       NOTES: disproportionate application of death penalty depending on race probably was a factor in this decision. Also, S. Ct. later ruled that death is also grossly disproportionate to the rape of a child.
b.      3 Strikes law: Is an increased punishment after a 3rd felony grossly disproportionate to the crime?
                                             i.      Ewing v. California (S CT): On March 12, 2000, Gary Ewing, a serial offender with a long history of criminal convictions, was arrested for stealing three golf clubs, each worth $399. At the time of his arrest, Ewing was on parole from a 9-year prison term for convictions in three burglaries and one robbery. Under California's three strikes law, another felony conviction would require a sentence of 25 years to life. Ewing was charged with and convicted of one count of felony grand theft for the incident at the golf course. During sentencing, Ewing requested the judge in the case exercise discretion permitted under California law and reduce the conviction to a misdemeanor. The judge declined and sentenced Ewing in accordance with the three strikes law. On appeal, Ewing argued the sentence of 25 years to life was grossly disproportionate to the crime and therefore a violation of the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishments. The court, reasoning that the three strikes law served the state's legitimate interests, rejected this claim. Supreme Court affirmed. In a 5-4 plurality decision authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court, relying heavily on its decision in Rummel v. Estelle (1980), concluded that Ewing's long history of legal offenses justified his conviction. In Rummel, the Court had ruled that a sentence of life with the possibility of parole was valid for three convictions of fraud, check forgery, and theft. In that case, the Court gave great deference to legislatures in mandating sentences for repeat offenders. Justice O'Connor writes that, as in Rummel, Ewing's conviction reflects “rational legislative judgment” and “is justified by the State's public-safety interest in incapacitating and deterring recidivist felons.”
c.      Burden of Proof in Sentencing
                                             i.      Apprendi v. New Jersey (S CT): D confessed to shooting into a house because the occupants were ‘black in color.’ Apprendi pleaded guilty to weapons possession charges. Each of these counts carried a sentence of between 5 and 10 years in prison. As part of the plea bargain, the prosecution reserved the right to seek an enhanced sentence on the basis that the crime was committed with a biased purpose. Such an enhancement would have doubled the sentence otherwise imposed for each of the crimes. The trial judge found “by a preponderance of the evidence” that Apprendi's crime was motivated by the race of the victims. He sentenced Apprendi to 12 years in prison—2 years above the maximum sentence authorized for the weapons charge apart from the race enhancement. Supreme Court reversed this sentence and decided that, to accord with due process, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory minimum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt (Apprendi Rule).
d.      Rule 35:
                                             i.      Revolutionized Criminal Law
                                           ii.      Escape hatch from sentencing guidelines. If D provides substantial assistance in pursuing or prosecuting another criminal, the government can request that their sentencing be lower. The prosecutor is the only one who can file a “rule 35” motion on behalf of a defendant so it is up to their discretion.
                                          iii.      This provided a huge incentive for D to cooperate and plead guilty
                                         iv.      In a way this rewards people who are more culpable because the most culpable people are the most helpful to the prosecution. People who weren’t as involved know less and thus are less helpful.
e.      Life without parole for minors
                                             i.      Miller v. Alabama (S CT): In one case that came before the court, Kuntrell Jackson was 14 when he and two other teenagers went to a video store in Arkansas planning to rob it. He stayed outside, and one of the youths pulled a gun and killed the store clerk. Jackson was charged as an adult and given a life term with no parole. In the second case, Evan Miller, a 14-year-old from Alabama, was convicted of murder after he and another boy set fire to a trailer where they had bought drugs from a neighbor. He too was given a life term with no parole. Court held that mandatory sentences of life without the possibility of parole are unconstitutional for juvenile offenders. Reasons:
1.       Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features — among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences,” Justice Kagan added. “It prevents taking into account the family and home environment that surrounds him — and from which he cannot usually extricate himself — no matter how brutal or dysfunctional
2.       Lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility
3.       More vulnerable to negative influences
4.       Limited control over their environment
5.       Child’s character is not as well formed as adults
 
III. Statutory Construction & Legality Principle
 
Legality Principle: no crime without law, no punishment without crime
·         Common Law – A person may not be punished unless his conduct was defined as criminal at the time of commission of the offense.  This prohibition on retroactive criminal lawmaking constitutes the essence of the principle of legality.
 
3 corollaries of the legality principle:
1.       Criminal statutes should be understandable to reasonable law-abiding persons. A criminal statute must give “sufficient warning to men of common intelligence as to what conduct is unlawful.”  A person is denied due process of law if he is convicted and punished for violation of a statute that lacks such clarity.
2.       Criminal statutes should not delegate basic policy matters to police officers, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis. 
3.       Judicial interpretation of ambiguous statutes should be biased in favor of the accused (lenity doctrine)
                                             i.      MPC – The Model Penal Code does not recognize the lenity principle. Section 1.02(3) requires instead that ambiguities be resolved in a manner that furthers the general purposes of the Code and the specific provision at issue.
 
Interpreting a Statute
a.      When interpreting a statute, court will consider legislative intent through legislative history of an act, circumstances surrounding its adoption, earlier statutes on the same subject, the common laws as it was understood at the time, and previous interpretations of the same or similar statutes.
b.      When a statute contains a common law term, the presumption is that such a term retains its common law meaning, absent a statutory definition to the contrary.
c.      EX: Keeler v. Superior Court California- because murder statute said ‘human being’ which legislature intend