Constitutional Law Outline
Prof. Teachout
Spring 2017
Justiciability
Judicial branch only hears cases and controversies (Art. 3, §2, cl. 1)
Standing
3 prong test (Lujan v. defenders of wildlife)
injury in fact
actual and imminent
concrete and particularized
causation
redressability
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l – introduced the cascade of speculation – cannot grant standing based merely on speculation of a possible injury.
singleton v. wulff – can have standing to raise 3rd party rights – physician on behalf of women’s rights to choose
must show they are inextricably connectred and the person before the court likely to make a good argument
the ability of the 3rd party to assert rights – are there obstacles to 3rd party bringing the claim. (imminent mootness, protection of privacy).
Judicial review est. by McCulloch v. Maryland – court has power to review ats of executive and in certain limited cases to order exec. To act.
McCulloch v. Maryland – B/c constitution ratified by 2/3 vote of the states, it is supreme to the state legislatures. Enumerate powers come with implied powers as well. Told to regulate interstate commerce, a bank would do that. Therefore it was implied in the constitution.
Court cannot hear generalized grievances
Taxpayer exception (Flast v. Cohen)
Taxpayer must show logical link between status and type of legislation
Taxpayer must show nexus between the status and precise nature of constitutional infringement.
Ripeness
Statute not ripe for constitutional challenge unless it is enforced by the state enacting the statute. (Poe v. Ullman)
Unless there are upfront consequences of a statute being passed that would allow it to proceed (Abbott Labs v. Gardener (pharmaceutical branding case)).
Mootness – bringing the case too late after the effect of the controversy or case has ended. Abortion is one of these examples – woman only pregnant for 9 months.
Political Question Doctrine
Federal courts don’t review the merits of a case if political question
Baker v. Carr outlines elements that should be present
Constitutional commitment of the issue to a specific branch
Lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it
Impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
Commerce Clause: A1:§8:3 (regulate commerce w/ foreign nations, several states, Indian tribes)
Gibbons v. Ogden – Congress has power to pass law relating to the trade of commodities among states and over navigable waters between states. Also, Commerce power is plenary when used to regulate interstate commerce.
Pre 1937
Champion v. Ames (lottery tickets) – Congress has plenary power over IC.
Hammer v. Dagenhart– reg. of goods made by kids is really reg. of production, not covered by CC.
Carter v. Carter Coal – Con. can’t regulate anything inherently indirect (local).
Post 1937
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin – The real world impacts overruled the dichotomy between production and IC. If labor stopped, lack of production would affect chain of commerce – Congress can regulate even though production. (unionizing the workers)
US v.Darby (overturns Dagenhart) – Not a huge co. like J&L, so would be regulating local production. manuf. is not commerce, but shipment is, so prohibition of shipment using substandard labor practice is regulation of commerce. Congress can regulate things that aren’t IC if substantially affects IC. (Labor act put in min. wage and max hours, ∆ violated them).
Wickard v. Filburn – Congress can reg. any activities that cumulatively have a substantial economic effect on IC. Got rid of direct and indirect; Carter Coal no longer used. (Ag. Law said that everyone has to grow a certain number of crops, Filburn wanted to make more. Said cumulative effects are what matter).
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. US – court relied on congressional methods and overwhelming legislative records showing impact. If a business activity affects IC, it is reached by the CC. (discrim in hotels)
Katzenbach v. McClung – Congress can regulate commerce local activities if there is a connection to national commerce. est. the rational basis test – Cong. has to have a logical basis for finding reg. scheme necessary to protect commerce. (discrim in restaurants.)
Intergovernmental Immunity – Con. regulating state governments and officials.
NLC v. Usery – had a 3 condition test to determine if state sovereignty was violated: Direct regulation of states, over traditional state functions, or impair the states ability to structure integral operations in areas of traditional functions. Not applicable today.
Today there is a minimal sovereignty limitation. If national political process is functioning, then only minimal limits on congressional power apply. (Garcia)
Garcia v. San Antonio – If Cong. has not found a workable standard or there is no workable standard, have to go through political process to change law. The exception to this rule is impermissible commandeering – federal govt. cannot commandeer state legislative and executive branches.
NY v. US – states took title provision of radioactive waste unless dumping ground established. Congress can’t make states enforce a regulatory program because of impermissible commandeering.
Printz v. US – to own a gun, have to go through a background check done by local sheriff. Falls in sliver exception in Garcia b/c the sheriffs would take the brunt of the abuse. If a case resembles Printz, then it is deemed unconstitutional.
Reno v. Condon – Distinguished from Printz and Garcia b/c doesn’t regulate state agencies, just state databases. Prohibits states from doing something, not inciting them to do something. Therefore, doesn’t fall within the exception.
Judicial Limitations on Federal Commerce Power
Applies to Private, not just State, actors.
US v. Lopez – Court restricts Congress to actually prove that certain activites impact IC. If no commercial connection, they can’t regulate. Can’t rely on rational basis test either b/c Congress didn’t do research or mention in Act. Institutes a three prong test as to what Congress may regulate:
the channels of interstate commerce,
re
“only slight and dubious;” 2) no heavy economic interest b/c owned & operated by private sector; 3) slight safety interest but likely more accidents would happen if trains are shorter because there will be more trains on RR
Bibb v. Navajo Freight: “total effect of the law is so slight or problematic” as not to outweigh burden
Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways: state did not present adequate evidence of safety interests to show burdens outweigh costs.
Non-Transportation: Categorize the law, then apply the test
Even handed: pike test: burden on challenger
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.
MN v. Cloverleaf Creamery (no more plastic milk jugs) plastic resin co. are all out of state residents. Argued protectionist, S. Ct. uses even handed b/c creamery was instate resident. 1) no prevent Out of State Comp; 2) states econ & envi interest; 3) state benefits outweigh the burden on IC
Exxon v. MD (gas chains had do divest stations or must extend voluntary allowances equally. Stretch to use even handed approach
Discriminatory in Effect: Hunt Test: Burden on State (Hunt v. Apple Commission)
2 prongs
benefits must outweigh the burdens
unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternative
Discriminatory on its face: Hughes Test (Hunt test & strictest scrutiny): applies to laws that define a clear geographic boundary (state line, radius, etc.)
Dean Milk v. Madison – Look for discrim in statutory language;Main taylor – no alt
Protectionist: invalid per se (Philidelphia v. N.J.)
West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy (All milk sold to dealers taxed, then that taxed used to subsidize in state dairy farms.
Exception: state as a market participant or express authorization by congress(no longer dormant if congress acts).
If the state is not regulating activities, but acting as a participant in the market, then they can make choices as they see fit. (White v. MA- boston construction worker ½ of boston employees on site) (Reeves inc. v. Stake – cement)
The state cannot regulate where the goods go, however, after they are sold. That falls under regulating. (South Central Timber Devel. v. Alaska).
