Administrative Law Outline

SEPARATION OF POWERS: The Uneasy Constitutional Position of the Administrative Agency

– Legislative Control of Agencies

o Enabling Statutes:

§ All agency action begins with a statute, provided by Congress

§ But, the non-delegation doctrine says that Congress may not delegate all of its powers away.

o The Legislative Veto

§ Defined:

· a power that is granted to Congress by themselves (in a statute) to nullify and override agency action.

§ Legislative Veto is Unconstitutional

· LVs are not subject to bicameral passage (both houses) and presentment to the president

o Bicameralism and presentment are necessary to preserve separation of powers b/c if Congress wants to repeal its own laws, it has to make new legislation doing so.

§ Detecting LVs (INS v. Chadha)

· There is a statute

· It delegates veto power to the Congress outright, concurrent with the delegation of power to the agency

· The action must be legislative in nature.

o An action is legislative if:

§ The veto changes the legal rights and duties of persons outside the legislative branch

§ The alternative way(s) to accomplish the same goal is to pass legislation repealing the law

§ It is not listed in the Constitution as one of the times when Congress may act on its own

· The action does not go through presentment and bicameral passage

· Anything else is not a legislative veto, even if the actions of Congressional members would suggest otherwise

o Permissible means by which Congress can override administrative action

§ Pass “report and wait” statutes:

· Congress delegates authority to agency, but decision can’t go into effect for a certain amount of time (e.g. 45 days), so if Congress doesn’t like the agency decision, it can pass legislation to override it

§ Override by ordinary legislation

§ Write more specific statutes

§ Pass appropriation rider statutes:

· specific statutes that say that no money can be spent on enforcing the agency’s position

§ Consultation requirements:

· statutes say that before the agency can act, it has to talk to the chairman of the committee in Congress

§ Oversight by Congress:

· hold hearings with the agencies to keep tabs on what they are doing

– Executive Control of Agencies

o President is not usually considered an “agency” for purposes of the APA- this is a rebuttable presumption

o When dealing with the validity of an employee or officer of a federal agency, ask 3 questions:

o Was the person properly appointed?

§ Officer or Employee? First, determine if the person is an officer, or just an employee. (Buckley v. Valeo)

· Test: Whether the person exercises significant authority on behalf of the US w/out someone else telling them what to do.

o So, if the person exercises this significant authority, and doesn’t have someone telling him what to do, he is an officer

o Employees are persons who are subordinate to officers- they take orders and don’t have much responsibility.

§ Principle or Inferior Officer? If the person is an officer, determine if he is a principle or inferior officer (Morrison v. Olson)

· Inferior Officers:

o Are subject to removal by higher executive branch official other than the President

o Can perform only certain, limited duties

o Do not formulate policy

o Office is limited in jurisdiction- scope of power/authority is defined

o Have an office is limited in duration/tenure

§ i.e. just until the investigation is complete-position will only exist for only a certain purpose/amount of time

§ This does not mean a term limit. A term limit does not necessarily make someone an inferior officer- not same as limited duration

o Appointment Procedures- Congress MAY vest the appointment power in

§ The President

§ Courts of Law, OR

§ Heads of Departments

o Advise and Consent Unnecessary

§ For these officers, advise and consent of the Senate is unnecessary

· Principle Officers:

o Are officers that are NOT inferior

o Appointment Procedure:

§ Principle officers MUST be

· Appointed by the President

· Confirmed by the Senate

o No Vote From House Allowed

§ This means that the House should NEVER have a voting role in appointing a principle officer. If they do, the appointment is invalid b/c it doesn’t follow the requirements of Art II, §2 (Appointments Clause)

§ House or Senate CANNOT give the President a short list of candidates to choose from for appointment

§ But, Congress can set minimal requirements on who can be appointed without affecting Presidential power to appoint

o Unitary President Theory

§ If you subscribe to this theory, the President should have NO restrictions on who he may appoint.

o Was the person properly removed?

§ By implication, the President also has the power to remove the officers he appoints (although no express Constitutional Language)

· Congress Can Only Remove by Impeachment:

o Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of officers charged with the execution of the laws EXCEPT by impeachment (Bowsher v. Synar)

§ it is ALWAYS unconstitutional to provide the House or Senate with a voting role in removal of an officer performing executive functions, regardless of whether the officer is principle or inferior (extends also to employees)

· though there is no case that addresses this issue for ordinary employees, Bowsher language is so strong that it probably wouldn’t be okay in this context

§ if this is done, the removal is invalid

· Congress Can Limit Authority to Remove for Good Cause:

o Congress can, however, limit the President’s removal authority with respect to certain officers

§ Vital Officers Exempt:

· If the officer is so important, so vital, and so close to the president that restricting his removal power would frustrate his ability to faithfully execute the laws, Congress cannot place ANY limits on the President’s removal power.

§ Other Officers:

· If the officer is not this important, Congress MAY limit President’s removal power of that officer for specific causes which must be enumerated in the relevant statute.

o This includes heads of agencies, such as the FTC (Humphrey’s)

§ Common specific “for cause” reasons include

· malfeasance in office

o never been determined that declining to follow an executive order (by President is malfeasance)

· neglect of duty

· inefficiency

§ Whether an officer’s refusal to obey the President constitutes cause for removal has not been definitively answered.

· (see next section)

o How much control may be exerted over the person?

§ President has Power to Prevent Illegal Acts:

· The President ALWAYS has the power to prevent the officer from doing illegal things, (require him to do things that the law compels, and prohibit him from doing things the law forbids.)

o This is b/c the President has to “faithfully execute the laws”

§ Problems with Officer Discretion:

· The problem arises when the law gives discretion to the officer to pick one legal option over another- in this case, its not clear whether the President may order the officer to pick a certain option (tell him how to do his job)

o When courts are determining whether the President has the power to review an agency’s decision through Executive Order, look at whether: (Youngstown Sheet & Tube- Jackson’s concurrence)

§ statute authorizes Presidential action

· more likely that Presidential action will be upheld

§ statute is silent

· look at whether the President has been visibly exercising the power publicly for a long time, and Congress has silently let him do it. If this is the case, it is doubtful Congress will be able to prohibit Presidential action.

· The is a question as to whether Congress talking about doing something but never doing it is still letting him do it.

§ statute prohibits Presidential action

· Remember that Congress can’t always prohibit Presidential action (i.e. if President gets his power from the Constitution)

· Unlikely Presidential action will be upheld here

· The following factors suggest that the statute prohibits Presidential power [these agencies are considered “independent”]

o “for cause” removal restrictions

o long terms

§ The following do not raise questions about control issues

· If the Constitution gives power directly to the Pres & he delegates that power, he still can control the delegate

· If Congress delegates power to the agency by statute, the President can still remove the agency head if he does something illegal- this is b/c the President has the Constitutional duty to “faithfully execute the laws”

– Providing For Agency Adjudication (Article III claims)

o Congress can assign disputes to be adjudicated by agencies; but whether and what kind of review is necessary depends on whether the dispute is a public right or private rights dispute and what kind of review (if any) is provided for (Crowell v. Benson)

o Presumption of Reviewability:

§ Judicial review of administrative actions is presumptively available, but the presumption is rebuttable if the statute says otherwise or leaves the matter to agency discretion (Overton Park)

§ Public Rights are disputes between an individual (citizen or corporation) and the gov’t

· Congress may assign public right disputes to be adjudicated exclusively by admin tribunals.

· It is unclear whether or not judicial review needs to be specifically provided in a statute for public rights claims, but if there is an opportunity for a review, it goes against a person’s claim that his Art. III rights were violated.

§ Private Rights are the liabilities of one individual to another individual (disputes between 2 private parties)

· Claims Must be Reivewable:

o Congress may assign private rights disputes to be adjudicated by admin tribunals, but they MUST be reviewable by an Art. III court. Otherwise, the party’s Art. III rights have been violated.

§ This is subject to ripeness, finality, and exhaustion

· Authority Must be for Specialized Claims:

o For these to be valid, Congress must have delegated narrow, specialized adjudicative authority to the agency

o An invalid grant of administrative adjudicative authority would be one that is too broad, and encompasses too many topics or cases.

· Standards of Review Differ:

o There are different standards of review, depending on whether the dispute is over findings of fact or law. These satisfy Due Process also

o Findings of law vs. Findings of Fact:

§ Law- De Novo: must be reviewable by an Art. III court under De Novo standard; this satisfies article III- makes sure individuals are afforded art. III protection, which is judicial independence

§ Fact-Substantial Evidence (Deferential): must also be reviewable, but standard is deferential. This satisfies the…

· Substantial Evidence Test: There must be evidence on the record to support the agency’s finding. If the record displays evidence that could allow a court to decide either way on the facts, then the court must affirm the agency’s decision.

o But, the agency MUST make a record to show that their conclusion is supported by the evidence.

· This is permissible b/c it has always been traditional to allow various bodies to help the court. Thus, the agency acts as a judicial helper for findings of fact, as long as the right of judicial review is present as a safeguard.

o Although it’s a substantial evidence test (and thus deferential) its good enough

AGENCY ADJUDICATION

– Informal Adjudications

o These are not covered by the APA (NO set of procedures- APA still recognizes it, but you must look to another statute, or the Mathews test)

§ Frequently, there are no statutory hearing rights. Thus, always do the 3 step due process analysis under Mathews here. (See below)

o Ex Parte Contacts

§ Completely banned here under §§556, 557

o Disqualification of the Decision-Maker

§ Gibson v. Bennyhill: when the decision maker has a financial interest or conflict of interest in the case, this is a violation of Due Process, and the decision-maker has to be disqualified.

o Morgan Doctrine

§ Just b/c the agency doesn’t hear the case, doesn’t mean he can’t still decide it.

· The head can have an ALJ or employee compile the record and give it to him for a final decision

· The head can have an ALJ or employee hear the case, make a recommended decision, and base his decision on the ALJ’s decision (Morgan Doctrine)

o Exception: Agency Head May Be Deposed: the decision maker was required to make findings and did not make any on the record- then the court can find out what his findings and reasonings were by allowing the private party to depose him (Overton Park)