Professor Heeren
Con Law II
1st Amendment Freedom of Speech starts at page 15
I. The Separation of Federal Powers: Limits on the Federal Judicial Power
A. Justiciability Limits: The two types of justicibility limits are (1) constitutional (cases and controversies based on Article III), and (2) prudential (prudent judicial administration).
The following five justiciability doctrines determine which matters the federal courts can hear and decide:
1. Prohibition of Advisory Opinions
a. Advisory opinions are opinions that give advice about particular legislative or executive action when no party before the court has suffered specific injury. Federal courts are prevented from issuing opinions on abstract or hypothetical questions.
b. Cases that are to be tried in federal court must meet the following requirements:
1. There must be actual dispute between adverse litigants
2. There must be a substantial likelihood that the court’s decision will bring about some change or have some effect.
c. The following are reasons why advisory opinions are prohibited: (1) advisory opinions can blur the lines between the court and legislature, and (2) the judicial role is limited to actual disputes, not giving advice to Congress or the President.
d. An example of the Supreme Court denying an advisory opinion is the following: Thomas Jefferson, as Secretary of State, can’t write to the Supreme Court and ask for informal advice on a treaty with France.
e. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. (1995) – Congress passed legislation allowing cases on which the federal courts had rendered final decisions to be re-opened in some situations. The Supreme Court held the legislation was unconstitutional because congress can’t undue the finality of the judiciary since the previous decisions regarding this law were already made. Thus, the legislation passed by Congress would make the first decisions advisory opinions.
f. Declaratory judgments are when the court is requested to state what the legal effect would be of proposed conduct by one or both parties. Declaratory judgments must be concrete questions or controversies; thus, they are justiciable.
2. Standing
a. Standing is the determination of whether a specific person is the proper party to bring a matter to the court for adjudication. There are two types of standing: (1) constitutional, and (2) prudential.
b. The following three elements are constitutional requirements for standing:
1. Injury
a. Plaintiff must allege that he has suffered an injury
b. The injury must be actual or imminent; not conjectural or hypothetical
c. Procedural injuries do not exist (i.e. the government violating a procedure)
2. Causation
a. Determine if the defendant caused the injury
b. The injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and not the result of the independent action of a 3rd party not b/f the court
3. Redressability
a. Asks whether or not the court can provide a remedy
c. Examples of constitutional standing requirements
1. Allen v. Wright (1984) – Parents of black students attending public schools did not have standing because the injury was not direct (the fact that discrimination was aided in the IRS’s standards for determining whether a school was discriminating wasn’t strong enough). Also, the injury was not fairly traceable and redressability was unlikely (getting rid of tax exempt statute might not stop discrimination). This case demonstrates that standing will not usually be found where a litigant claims that tax incentives have caused a third party to injure him, since the causation component will be too attenuated.
2. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992) – Plaintiffs claimed a right to sue the secretary of the interior. The court ruled that the plaintiffs did not standing, and the injury can’t just be a special interest. There was no direct injury here and the citizen suit provision didn’t allow the suit because general claims and general results are not allowed. Also, there was no imminent injury; thus, redressability would not be available.
d. The injury requirement
1. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons (1983) – Plaintiff challenged the use of choke hold but did not have standing because he did not successfully show a real and immediate threat that he’d be stopped and given an illegal choke hold again (wanted damages and an injunction to stop the practice of the choke hold).
2. United States v. Hays (1995) – A challenge of districting as racially discriminating didn’t have standing because the plaintiff did not live within the district. Thus, the challenge was just a generalized grievance, and not a direct injury.
3. Federal Election Commission v. Akins (1998) – The Court ruled that Congress could create a right to information, and that denial of that right was an injury sufficient for standing (injury was the inability to obtain information).
e. The causation and redressability requirements
1. Linda R. S. v. Richard D. (1973) – No standing for mother who wanted illegitimate father prosecuted for failure to pay child support. The court ruled that it wasn’t certain that the prosecution wouldn’t cause him to pay the support; thus, it’s not redressable.
2. Warth v. Seldin (1975) – No standing for people wishing for exclusion of zoning rules since they wouldn’t be able to live in the area at issue anyway. Also, redressability wouldn’t occur because it’s too specific of a claim.
3. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization (1976) – Plaintiffs that weren’t allowed medical service by tax exempt hospitals challenged the revision of the revenue ruling. The court ruled that they did not have standing because the ruling wasn’t responsible for the denial of care. There was no causation.
4. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc. (1978) – Court determined that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge Congress’ Price-Anderson Act that limited the liability of utility company to encourage nuclear reactor building. The court determined that but for the nuclear reactors, the cause of action would not be present. Most likely, the Court wanted to hold the act constitutional, so they allowed standing.
f. Prudential Standing
1. The requirements for prudential standing are different from constitutional requirements of standing because congress, by statute, can overrule prudential standing requirements because these requirements are not derived from the constitution. In addition to showing injury, causation, and redressability, the following two elements are requirements for prudential standing:
2. Prohibition of third-party standing
a. A plaintiff can assert only injuries that he has suffered and cannot present the claims of third parties who are not part of the lawsuit
b. There are two exceptions to the prohibition of third-party standing: (1) If the third party is the closest party to the relationship then suit can be brought on that party’s behalf, and (2) if there is an obstacle to the injured party to bring the suit. If there is an obstacle, then it needs to be determined whether the third party would be able to sue on their own behalf.
3. Plaintiffs can’t sue as taxpayers
g. Examples of third-party standing:
1. Singleton v. Wulff (1976) – Abortion doctors sued for compensation on abortions they performed that were not medically indicated. The Court focused on the relationship b
, the delay wasn’t relevant.
6. Lake Carriers v. Macmullan (1972) – This involved a ripe challenge to a state law that banned discharge of sewage from boats. The law was ripe because the law would be enforced and boat owners would have to install new facilities.
4. Mootness
a. A case is moot if it raised a justiciable controversy at the time the complaint was filed, but events occurring after the filing have deprived the litigant of an ongoing stake in the controversy.
b. If the claim is for an injunction, it’s possible to go away, so damages may preclude mootness. Thus, a live controversy is needed at all times.
c. There are three exceptions to the mootness doctrine:
1. Capable of repetition (as to this plaintiff), yet evading review
2. If the defendant voluntarily ceases the allegedly improper behavior, but is free to return to it at any time. The party asserting mootness has a heavy burden to show that the challenged conduct will not arise again.
3. Class action suits (A properly certified class action may continue even if named plaintiff’s claims are rendered moot)
d. Examples of wrongs capable of repetition, yet evading review
1. Moore v. Ogilvie (1969) – The Court ruled that a challenge to an Illinois law that set forth requirements for nominating candidates for a new political party wasn’t moot because the election was over by the time the controversy reached the court. Future elections would be controlled (the election process was too short to have one controversy heard before the election was over).
2. Roe v. Wade (1973) – Women challenging the abortion ban weren’t precluded because of mootness (pregnancy was over) because the length of pregnancy would result in repeated situations of mootness. The pregnancy was a significant part of the litigation.
3. Defunis v. Odegaard (1974) – Law school applicant’s claim was moot because the university had to let him attend while the case was pending and said it would allow him to graduate after the case went through the courts. Thus, the case was moot since he’ll never go through the application process again, but if he had asked for damages, there might have been a different result.
e. Example of the defendant voluntarily ceasing the allegedly improper behavior
1. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw (2000) – The Court ruled this case wasn’t moot even though Laidlaw shut down its facility that violated mercury discharge limits because Laidlaw’s actions were a disputed matter and it still had it had the permit to discharge; thus, it wasn’t clear they wouldn’t violate the limits again.
f. Examples of the class-action exception
1. United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty (1980) – The Court denied certification for a class action suit where the class was a group of inmates on appeal. The controversy was still live even though the named class member was released (other inmates still had a personal stake).
