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Criminal Law
University of Washington School of Law
Anderson, Helen A.

H. Anderson
Criminal Law
Spring 2006

CRIMINAL LAW OUTLINE

I) GENERAL MATTERS AND THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT
a. Crime:
i. Anderson Def: when and under what circumstances the state can use force to punish an actor.
ii. Bryan Garner Def: Any social harm that the law defines and makes punishable. The same act may be both a crime and a civil wrong.
b. Criminal Procedure Overview:
i. Process of Proof and Guilty Plea
1. vast majority of cases end w/ a guilty plea. Makes sense esp. when issue is degree of guilt, self-defense, etc.
2. Cannot be helped when the issue is the identity of the person.
3. Guilty Plea: Must be knowing, intelligent and voluntary. D waives constitutional rights SCOTUS upheld voluntary and not unconstitutionally coercive when involves high stakes of jail time.
ii. Trial
1. Jury must weigh the credibility of the D, each witness
2. Evidence: much is based on eye-witness or other witness testimony.
3. Evidence Rule 401: Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable than not.
a. Means: fact must be material/matter to the case; AND fact must be probative, meaning the evidence must make the existence of the fact more probable than not.
b. Character evidence is inadmissible, as is any evidence that could inflame the jury.
c. No evidence of prior crimes b/c may prejudice the jury.
d. BUT, if D takes the stand then the past crimes may be introduced to show D may not be credible. Perhaps do not want to allow Ds to exploit the fact that character evidence is not admissible.
4. Zackowitz, 1930, p. 22
a. Narrow Holding: The Trial Court erred in admitting evidence that the D owned three pistols and a tear gas gun, which he kept at his home, when the D did not use the weapons nor were they brought to the scene of the crime, b/c though Evid. Rule 403 would allow them to be introduced, as a matter of policy the evidence should not have been allowed in b/c the D should be judged on what happened at the time rather than any prior acts
b. Anderson’s Narrow Holding: Yes, the trial court erred b/c evidence that a D owned other weapons that were not used in the crime nor brought to the crime scene is not admissible to show criminal disposition.
c. Broad: Evidence is not admissible only to show a criminal disposition.
5. Even w/ Limiting Instructions it is very difficult for a jury to distinguish evidence used to impeach a D, cast doubt on his credibility and not judge D as guilty b/c has dangerous weapons or committed past crimes.
iii. Burden of Proof—D only convicted if P proves guilt BARD for every element of the crime
1. Acquittal is not a judgment of innocence—leads to inconsistent findings in civil and criminal cases for the same matter.
2. BARD
a. Cannot be quantified in a numerical value
b. Only has to be enough that a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
c. Judge’s role to determine whether enough evidence to go to the jury. Need only conflicting facts, witnesses, even if only 1 witness against 3 that’s enough to go to the jury and jury must determine based on credibility.
3. 2 Components of Proof
a. Burden of Production + Burden of Persuasion
b. Usually P bears both, but can be separated as in some self-defense cases where D bears burden of production and then P bears burden of persuasion to disprove D acted in self-defense.
4. Patterson v. New York, 1977, SCOTUS, p. 38
a. Narrow Holding: It is constitutional w/in DP clause for NY’s statute to require that a D charged w/ 2nd degree murder must bear the burden of proof in his affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance b/c P’s burden is to prove BARD the elements of the crime—actus reas of death, mens rea of knowledge/intent, and causation—not required to disprove D’s aff. Defense b/c extreme emotional disturbance does not necessarily negate the intent element of the crime, would be different if stateute similar to Maine and D’s defense was heat of passion upon sudden provocation which necessarily rebuts the P’s intent element of malice aforethought.
i. Difference here is nothing presumed or implied against Patterson, extreme emotional disturbance only a mitigating circumstance.
ii. Turns on the fine drafting issues whether it is constitutional
b. Broad Holding: It does not violate a D’s Constitutional rights to due process for a state to require s/he bear the burden of proof for his/her affirmative defense when it does not negate an element of the crime that the Prosecution must prove BARD.
iv. Role of the Jury
1. Duncan v. Louisiana, SCOTUS, 1968, p. 55—Right to Jury Trial
a. Narrow Holding: D has a constitutional right to a jury trial in state court when charged w/ a crime punishable by up to 2 years in prison. (D convicted of criminal battery punishable by up to 2 years in prison and $300 fine, but only allowed a jury trial when punishment is hard labor or death.)
b. Broad Holdings:
i. The right to jury trial must be provided in trials for all but the most petty offenses.
ii. The right to jury trial need only be provided where the crime charged is punishable by a substantial term of incarceration.
2. Jury trial
a. Common wisdom is judges are harder on Ds and less likely to believe defenses, b/c hear it all the time.
b. Juries and judges disagree in 25% of cases and difference in assessing evidence in close cases plays a significant role.
c. D has right to waive jury trial and may want a bench trial when it is a particularly sympathetic victim, esp. if D has a very technical legal defense.
d. Whether there is a right to a jury trial makes a difference in what types of crimes are charged and on which ones the Ps can get convictions.
e. Unanimity not required in state criminal trials under the Const. rights of DP and jury trial (6th AM.)
f. CT says not a petty offense if carries a sentence of up to or more than 6 months, then const. right to jury trial whether or not prison sentence likely to be imposed.
g. Juries have an equity dispensing function, allowed to have jury nullification to protect against unjust punishment perpetrated by the gov’t not just unjust conviction
i. But, cannot be informed of the right b/c juries cannot be told of the severity of the sentence at stake
ii. U.S. v. Powell allows inconsistent jury verdicts in the same trial to stand b/c of jury’s equity dispensing function, and that defense of contributory negligence not allowed but juries may find a D not guilty if find there was under nullification.
h. United States v. Dougherty, D.C. Cir., 1972—Don’t Ask, don’t tell for jury nullification
i. Narrow Holding: In a trial for malicious destruction arising out of a political protest, it was not error to refuse the Ds’ proposed jury instruction that the jury had a right to acquit w/o regard to the law and evidence nor was it error to refuse the D’s request to so argue to the jury.
ii. Broad Holdings:
1. The jury has right to nullify the law, but the D has no right to so inform the jury.
2. It is error to argue to the jury that it may refuse to apply the law.
i. Blakely v. Washington, SCOTUS, 2004
i. Narrow Holding: A sentence of more than 3 years above the 53 months statutory maximum of the standard range for kidnapping, based on judge’s finding of deliberate cruelty violated the D’s Sixth AM right to a jury trial
1. similar to Duncan that every element of the crime must be proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, Washington can’t just make one of the facts ‘sentencing facts’.
ii. Broader Holdings:
1. D has the right to have a jury find BARD every fact that will increase the maximum sentence available to the sentencing judge.
2. Where a standard range sentence can only be exceeded by finding of additional facts, the jury must make the fact determination.
iii. NOT—Too Broad: Every fact that influences sentencing must be found BARD by the jury.
1. b/c the judge can impose a sentence w/in the range using any facts admitted by D, prior convictions do not need to be proven BARD b/c they are already in the record.
2. Also, it would be different if the Legislature changed the judge’s sentencing authority b/c the scope of the constitutional right is defined by the statute.
iv. New Statute in WA—incorporates the holding of Blakely, if P wants an exceptional sentence must allege and prove the facts of what the statut

minal who calculate the costs and benefits of committing the crime.
b. Fleisher—Some do not act rationally, crime may be all they know and is a default career choice.
5. Certainty of punishment is more important than severity. Better to catch more criminals than to make the sentences longer, but it is much cheaper to increase severity than certainty. But, increasing severity increases pressure on CTs to grant lesser sentences and undercuts the legitimacy of the system.
iii. Incapacitation (Restraint)—while imprisoned a criminal has fewer opportunities to commit acts causing harm to society.
iv. Rehabilitation (Utilitarian)
1. imprisonment provides the opportunity to mold or reform the criminal into a person who, upon return to society, will conform her behavior to societal norms.
2. But, this may result in an unjust result where the punishment is out of proportion to the crime, 10-15 years for shoplifting a candy bar. ‘makes it easy to inflict treatments and sentences that need bear no relation to the desert of the ofender’ p. 127.
3. Paternalistic state. Concerns for liberty esp. b/c seems to punish a criminal for a crime they might commit in the future. Perception of the system would be that it is not legitimate
4. Plus, wide-spread belief that Rehabilitation doesn’t work, but does that really mean the program was under-funded, experimental, had a wide-range of criminals so broad?
5. NOTE: WA statutes are heavy on retribution to make the criminal justice system accountable and proportionate. Some aspects are Rehabilitation to protect public, offers offender an opportunity to improve him/herself.
v. Cases
1. Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, Queens Bench, 1884, p. 135
a. Narrow Holding: When there was no appreciable chance that 4 shipwrecked men in a lifeboat would survive, it was nevertheless murder when two men killed and ate another man (boy) who was near death already.
b. Broader Holdings:
i. The killing of an innocent person, who is not threatening the killer, is not justified even if necessary to save the killer’s life.
ii. The killing and eating of the weakest member of a starving, shipwrecked crew is not excused despite the harsh circumstances and great temptation.
2. United States v. Bergman, S.D.N.Y., p. 140
a. Narrow Holding: Imprisonment is necessary to serve the purpose of recognizing the seriousness of the crime and to show society that this crime will not go unpunished, even though this D has been an upstanding member of the community.
b. Broader Holdings: (SK)
i. Punishment is necessary to serve the retributive and general deterrence functions of punishment, even when the individual D is not in danger of re-offending nor does he need rehabilitation.
3. State v. Chaney, SC of AK, 1970
a. Narrow Holding: The trial court imposed a much too lenient sentence for the D, a soldier, who picked up a woman, forcibly raped and robbed her when the jury convicted the D, yet imposed the minimum of one year for each of the three counts served concurrently b/c this sentence fails to serve the purpose of retribution necessary for serious crimes, does not send the right message to D of his blameworthiness nor to deter him from committing crimes in the future.
i. NOTE: CT of App simply expressed their disapproval w/ the TC judge’s sentence, but could not impose a longer sentence b/c sentence cannot be increased.