Criminal Procedure Dix Fall 2015
Chapter 1: The Exclusionary Sanction
Defendant seeking suppression must prove:
1. A search or seizure occurred
2. Search or seizure was “unreasonable”
3. ∆ has standing to rely on this search or seizure
4. Challenged evidence obtained as a result of that search or seizure (“fruit of the poisonous tree”)
A. Adoption of the Federal Constitutional Exclusionary Sanction
1. History
a. Traditional Rule: legality of manner in which evidence obtained doesn’t affect admissibility à Adams v. New York (1904)
i. Justifications for traditional rule:
1. Need to have all available relevant evidence bearing on important issues in crim litigation
2. Costs imposed on judiciary (inconvenience, disruption, etc) by having to conduct inquiries into manner in which evidence obtained
b. Weeks Rule (1914): in federal prosecution, 4th A bars use of evidence obtained in violation of 4th A
i. Problem = not bearing on states b/c 4th A not yet incorporated
c. State v. Lindway (1936)
i. Intermediate appellate court held warrantless search req’d exclusion
ii. OH Supreme Court reversed à rejected Weeks position; exclusion not req’d under Constitution
d. Wolf v. Colorado (1949): 4th A enforceable against states through DP clause of 14th, BUT not bound by Weeks rule
e. Rochin v. Calfornia (1952) pg. 68, 77
i. DP bars state use of evidence obtained by methods that “shock the conscience”
ii. Officers, lacking probable cause, entered Rochin’s house through an open door. They found Rochin sitting on a bed and asked him about 2 capsules on the nightstand, he grabbed them and swallowed them despite officer’s efforts to prevent this. He was taken to hospital where a doctor pumped his stomach. The capsules were later used in evidence in his prosecution for possession of morphine. This evidence was barred from use.
2. Mapp v. Ohio (1961) pg. 16
a. Facts
i. Investigation of bombing of Don’s King’s house à police received tip that policy (gambling) paraphernalia being hidden at Mapp’s residence
ii. Police went to Mapp’s home, but Mapp refused to admit them w/o a warrant
iii. Police returned and forced entry; showed piece of paper they claimed to be “warrant” and officer physically struggled w/Mapp over paper
b. RULE: 4th and 14th A req exclusion in state crim proceedings if evidence tained by unreas search or seizure
i. Wolf overruled
c. Mapp Exclusionary Rule Analysis
i. Legal Basis for Imposing Exclusionary Rule on States
1. By not identifying a remedy for violation of the 4th A, framers gave implied delegation to federal courts to develop by case law
2. 14th A used as vehicle for imposing 4th A on the states
ii. Policy Justifications for Exclusionary Rule
1. Deterrence: prevent violations by disincentivizing illegal searches
a. Court’s Position = deterrence function is primary (and perhaps only meaningful) justification
b. Prevention in form of “socialization” process (Stone v. Powell)
· By reinforcing exclusionary rule, officers will internalize it
2. Preserving Judicial Integrity (fairness)
a. Need to avoid depreciating public image of courts to assure they remain effective
b. Wrong for courts to be involved with fruits of unconstitutional law enforcement à ethical argument
c. Janis: judicial integrity violated only if admission of evidence encourages future violations
3. Providing Appropriate Remedy
a. Exclusionary rule does as much as possible to return wronged individuals to status quo
b. Court’s position: no legitimate remedial function; any remedial effect that 4th A serves is an incidental side effect of it
iii. Costs of Exclusionary Rule
1. Loss of Relevant Evidence
a. Prosecution deprived of ability to use evidence that reliably shows person’s guilt of criminal offense à violation of 4th A doesn’t make evidence any less reliable
2. Administration Costs
a. Interruption/extension of litigation process to address and resolve complex side issues
b. Perhaps mitigated by procedural methods (i.e. states can req issues be raised before trial)
3. Loss of Judicial Integrity
a. Cost to judicial integrity when courts acquit guilty ∆s b/c of technicalities à may cause loss of public respect and support for courts
3. Other Uses of Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence
a. Balancing analysis used to determine if exclusionary rule should be expanded beyond context of trial:
i. Would the increase in deterrence that can be expected from the potential expansion (“incremental deterrence”) justify the “cost,” with special emphasis on the increased loss of reliable evidence that would also result? (Scott)
b. Parole violation hearing à ADMISSIBLE
i. PA Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott à evidence admissible in parole violation hearing to prove ∆ violated conditions of parole
1. Costs of excluding reliable evidence particularly high in parole context b/c states give up rt t
lusionary rule only invoked based on violation of ∆’s own 4th A rights
iv. Attenuation of the Taint
1. Judicial event (Wong Sung’s appearance before magistrate) and release to community can both significant intervening events that tend to show attenuation
2. Standing
a. General Rule: a criminal ∆ is entitled to attack the “reasonableness” of a search or seizure only if the ∆ shows that the search or seizure intruded upon the ∆’s own 4th A right
i. Whether this was so depends not upon separate set of “standing” rules or cases but upon application of the case law defining scope of 4th A protection (Rakas)
3. Fruit of the Poisonous Tree
a. General Rule: all evidence obtained or discovered as a “factual result” of a violation of a ∆’s 4th A rights is “fruit” of the “poisonous tree” and inadmissible (Wong Sung)
i. Evidence obtained by officers before ∆’s 4th A rights violated cannot have been discovered as a result of that later violation and is therefore not excludable (Wong Sung)
ii. Factual causation is established if the ∆ shows only that officers were motivated by the results of an unreasonable search or seizure to take action, even if that action is supportable on other grounds (Murray)
1. If but-for the search/seizure, evidence wouldn’t have been obtained
iii. Limits on “fruits” rule:
1. If officers improperly enter home w/o warrant to arrest suspect, suspect’s later confession (at stationhouse) cannot be inadmissible fruit of unreasonable entry if confession made after suspect removed from home
a. New York v. Harris (1990) pg. 36: illegality of officers’ entry and ∆’s arrest in his home didn’t render unlawful ∆’s continued custody once removed from the house
b. Jurisdiction Over the Person Never “Fruit”
i. Mapp rule is only an evidentiary rule à trial court’s jx over a ∆ arrested in violation of 4th A not a challengeable “fruit” of unlawfully arrest
ii. However, in some situations, manner in which jurisdiction obtained may be so offensive as to raise DP prohibition against conviction (Rochin)
