Constitutional Law I Outline

       I.            Constitutional change
1.      Constitutional change by informal amendment
a.       Through judicial rulings
2.      Constitutional moment
a.       Historical moments in which social/political pressures build to a breaking point, resulting in informal amendment.
3.      How to perceive constitutional change from the constitutional theory point of view?
a.       Constitution has a static meaning, some judges got it wrong and some right
b.      Constitution has no right answer, but only what justices say it is.
c.       Constitutional moments: [controversial but influential]                                                         i.            There are sustained initiatives from political branches to alter the received meaning of constitutional doctrine.
                                                      ii.            Not just some justices change their mind, but it is the result of challenge, debate, and lasts for a substantial period during when the large majoritarian electoral outcomes seem to endorse the position.
d.      Pro and con of such perception of change
                                                        i.            Pro: great explanation
                                                      ii.            Con: constitution is meant to provide a way that appropriates super-majoritarian challenge.
 
    II.            Methodology
1.      General:
a.       Doctrine should never be examined without examining the underlying methodology
b.      But: we can never know what kind of methodology that really drove the court come up with the specific doctrine.
2.      Textualism
a.       E.g. Frederick Douglas address
3.      Originalism
a.       Categories
(1)   Framer’s intent
(2)    Ratifier’s intent
(3)   Public ordinary meaning
b.      Pro: stability
c.       Con: dead hand control
d.      Cardozo: general purpose instead of specific intent
e.       Judah Benjamin: spirit of 1776 
4.      Structuralism
5.      Practical precedent
6.      Intra-textualism
7.      Consequentialism
a.       Pro:
(1)   In abstract, bad result should be avoided
b.      Con:  
(1)   Wide disagreement among people regarding what is good/bad, which provides room for personal preference
(2)   We can be wrong about what consequence would come
(3)   Long-term consequence and short-term consequence may well conflict
(4)   Legislature is more democratically accountable
 
 III.            Institutional legitimacy & competency
1.      Judicial fact finding v. congressional fact finding
a.       Judicial: parties will produce expert evidence, etc
                                            i.            Completely incentivized by adversary system; parties put forward the evidence in their best light.
b.      Congressional:
                                            i.            Committee level: whether evidentiary hearing or committee staff; select people who will speak in front it; a little bit sense of partisan angle: majority of the committee v. minority of the committee,
                                          ii.            But maybe no such thing at all.
                                        iii.            Can revisit the issue again and again
c.       Who is better?
                                            i.            Vary from issue to issue
                                          ii.            If we have to select one, we have to make a judgment call about who is on the whole better.
2.      Counter-majoritarian difficulty
a.       Maybe we do not actually value majoritarian that much: E.g. president veto power; super majoritarian
b.       Judicial review is consistent with the majoritarian after all.
(1)   Judges are trying to uphold constitution, which is the product of majoritarian. [super-majority]                                                         i.            Of course, if you are questioning whether, by asserting what constitutional law is, judges are just saying what they believe. Then this argument fails.
(2)   The policy views dominant on the Court are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the law making majorities.
                                                        i.            In most cases, judicial review either reflected the dominant view, or the cases were quickly overruled.
                                                      ii.            Constitutional moments
c.       Perhaps judicial review advances competing constitutional values such that we should be willing to live with its counter-majoritarian aspect.
(1)   e.g. if the act limits the right of black American to vote, then probably it is consistent with the democracy. But not other acts.
(2)   Carolene Product fn4
3.      Spectrum of deference
a.       Rational basis review
b.      Medium: good-looking process
(1)    incentive to go through actual fact finding process (sounds like Justice Harlan in Lochner)
(2)   attack:
                                                        i.            so easy to have a fake process;
                                                      ii.            judicial intrusion to the internal operation of congress;
                                                    iii.            counter-argument: better than nothing;
                                                    iv.            congress cannot be made to, but court should not be made to defer too
(3)   Process is also a spectrum too: mere existence of process or good quality process
c.       Entirely de novo
 
 IV.            Interstate commerce clause
1.      Marshall court
a.       Gibbons v. Ogden 1824
(1)   Rule: the construction of inter-state commerce is:
                                                          i.            Commerce:
·         term,
·         objects,
·         channels
                                                        ii.            Among state:
·         physical crossing of the state line,
·         indirect impact
(2)   Johnson’s view: congress has dormant commerce power to override state legislation that impedes inter-state commerce power.
(3)   Background:
                                                        i.            Federalism concern
                                                      ii.            Steam power enhances transportation, improves the mobility of populations, which in turn lessened loyalty to the local government and increases the authority of the central government.
b.       Wilson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co. 1829
(1)   Rule: in the absence of preemptive federal regulation, court is unwilling to declare u