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Commercial Paper
University of Texas Law School
Graglia, Lino A.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II: BROWN TO BAKKE OUTLINE
Prof. Lino Graglia – Fall 1998

This outline is e-mailware! While there is no cost for using the outline, you must drop me a line at dfalgoust@mail.utexas.edu to tell me what you think, if it helped you, etc.; it’d also be nice if you dropped by my web page at http://www.geocities.com/NapaValley/3578/ and signed my guest book.

Feel free to redistribute this outline unmodified to anyone who may find it useful. This outline is provided “as is” and I make no promises as to its accuracy (it worked for me, your mileage may vary). Good Luck on exams!
Damien Falgoust
University of Texas School of Law

I. Introduction
A. Explanatory notes about this outline
1. The text for this course is Lino Graglia, Disaster By Decree: The Supreme Court Decisions on Race and the Schools (1976). The publisher is Cornell Press. All references to chapters refer to this book. It is currently out of print (Texas students purchase a cheap photocopied version), but it may be available used from various online booksellers. I highly recommend reading it.
2. Abbreviations
a) LG – Lino Graglia
b) EP – Equal Protection; DP – Due Process; P&I – Privileges and Immunities
c) CRA – Civil Rights Act (presume 1964 CRA unless otherwise indicated)
d) PPP – Pupil Placement Plans
e) CRC – Civil Rights Commission; HEW – Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare; DOJ – Dept. of Justice.
B. Constitutional Interpretation and Judicial Review
1. Constitutional law is a fraud. It has nothing to do with the Constitution but rather misrepresentation built upon misrepresentation.
a) Constitutional law is simply a guise for intellectual elites to enact their policy preferences while avoiding the political process.
b) This is perfectly illustrated by the school race cases, in which the same constitution first permitted racial discrimination, then forbade racial discrimination, and finally required racial discrimination.
2. Judicial review is unique to America. However, it is not provided for in the Constitution and was not contemplated at the Constitutional Convention.
a) This is odd, since surely if the framers had intended to give such a broad grant of power to the courts they would have explicitly done so (in much the same way as they gave the President the veto power).
b) Judicial review was established by Marbury v. Madison (1803).
(1) The case is itself a sham: the Court did not have jurisdiction, but Marshall worked backwards in his opinion in order to establish judicial review.
(2) Marshall’s opinion reads as though a law can only be struck if it clearly violates a constitutional provision (ex: law requiring quartering of soldiers). He ignored his own test in later cases, though.
(a) The Constitution forbids very little on its face; almost no laws are passed that would violate it (also, see Home Building Co. v. Blaisdell, where a clearly unconstitutional state law impairing contracts is upheld anyway).
(b) Thus, if there are no clear violations, the Court should leave the matter to Congress because the essence of democracy is majority rule.
(c) This isn’t the case, however; the test has moved from clearly wrong, to “natural law,” to unreasonableness.
c) More significantly, the first significant use post-Marbury of judicial review was in the infamous Dredd Scott decision.
(1) It would seem that at least here judicial review worked badly.
(2) The Taney court disallowed the Missouri Compromise; this was a significant interference with the political process. The upshot was that the Court said the Congress couldn’t prevent slavery in the new territories.
(3) This made the Civil war inevitable, and humiliated the Court; the Court was at its least influential after Dredd Scott.
(a) The Civil War eventually led to vast federal power since states no longer had the option to secede if they disagreed with federal policy.
d) Judicial review’s next significant use was to strike down the 1883 Civil Rights Act, preventing discrimination in public accommodations (this created the State Action doctrine, saying Congress could prohibit discrimination by the states but not by individuals).
e) Judicial review from Reconstruction to the New Deal
(1) The Court acted conservatively to disallow radical social change and to kill socialistic programs.
(2) Generally, judicial review used to protect the Jeffersonian ideal – that is, to protect property and contract rights.
(a) This dates back to Marshall – in Fletcher v. Peck (Yazoo land scandal), he held unconstitutional an act to rescind a sale even though bribery was involved (“Contractual laws will bind the deity himself”)
(3) Perhaps most significantly, the Court now has the 14th amendment to play with, so it needn’t relay on vague natural law language.
(a) The idea of substantive due process arose; essentially, this means that the 14th amendment requires all laws be reasonable.
(b) This is terribly flawed reasoning: the last word in due process is “process.” That is, DP necessarily means that normal legal procedures be followed in every case. It doesn’t provide a limit on the law itself, it only provides that the law be followed in all cases.
(c) Murray v. Hoboken – DP defined essentially as a natural law limitation on laws, on the ground that all laws are necessarily deprivations of liberty under the 14th amendment.
(d) The infamous Lochner v. New York – Court strikes down state limit on baker’s hours on substantive DP grounds.
(i) Holmes’ dissent may be the most famous in all of law: general principles don’t control specific cases. LG says he’s right. Substantive DP is dumb.
f) Judicial review during the New Deal and beyond
(1) McLaughlin, West Coast seemed to be the end of substantive DP; court quits getting in Congress’ way, lets New Deal acts stand (good b/c even though it’s bad policy it isn’t unconstitutional)
(2) Merely applying the law isn’t any fun nor does it build a reputation as a “wise and noble Justice”; thus substantive DP (and activism) makes a comeback in Brown.
(3) This decision gave the court unprecedented accolades and prestige – which gave them license to go further.
(a) Today, virtually every major social change has come from the Court, not the legislature.
(b) This is directly related to the prestige of Brown – the public sees the Court as all-wise and is thus far more accepting of its decisions. “Power corrupts, and absolute power…”
(c) The Court is now the engine of change instead of the brake. It promotes egalitarianism (socialism) at the expense of meritocracy (capitalism). They enact the ACLU platform virtually verbatim.
3. What hath judicial review wrought?
a) The 14th amendment is 98% of constitutional law, since most cases deal with state laws. All of it stems from the EP and DP clauses. Four doctrines are most important:
(1) Incorporation of Bill of Rights to the states (this is selective: the 1st amendment and criminal procedure protections only; even Black was too embarrassed to extend the 7th amendment).
(2) “New” EP – “old” EP (Railway Express, infra) permitted only limited review; “new” EP gives the court a lot more to work with.
(3) Procedural DP – this is tautological (“process” is the second word in DP, so “procedural” is redundant). Basically, the government must give people notice and the right to be heard.
(4) Substantive DP – all laws must be reasonable.
C. Constitutionalism vs. Activism
1. Constitutionalism = rule of the living by the dead
2. Activism = rule by nine unelected, unaccountable judges who call things unconstitutional that aren’t.
3. Why have a constitution? Why should the dead control the living?
a) To establish rules of governance? (Why is this necessary? Parliament’s rules are set by statute…)
b) To establish rights? (Not historically; a common market was the principle thrust of the Constitution)
c) To in times of calm prevent irrationality in times of passion? (Hamilton’s theory) (Unpersuasive – when is a “time of calm”? Isn’t a post-revolutionary time one of passion?)
d) Every voluntary transaction is necessarily wealth-maximizing; why take such coercive measures?
(1) Free rider problem; also, tragedy of the commons.
(2) This is the best answer: there are some defects in democracy. Ex: The Prisoner’s Dilemma, e.g., PAC’s (i.e., policy has high value to one group but low individual cost to everyone else).
4. The problem isn’t constitutionalism, it’s activism.
a) The 5th and 14th amendment have come to stand for the notion that all laws must be reasonable.
(1) Problem: reasonableness is a subjective judgment (opinions are like assholes…)
(2) Implicit assumptions are either that judges are more reasonable than everyone else or natural law is objective, and democracy is dangerous.
(3) This is silly. If anyone’s opinion should count, shouldn’t it be the majority? Their decision will, by definition, make the most number of people the least unhappy.
(4) Reasonableness is always a matter of weighing costs against benefits. Those costs and benefits are frequently unquantifiable, however; they vary from person to person.
(a) Ex: leafleting (free speech) vs. clean streets. We can compromise with time/place restrictions and by placing trash cans, but this does not perfectly resolve the conflict – the streets will still be dirtier than they would be with a leafleting ban.
(b) Thus it’s all a value judgment: how important are clean streets to you relative to free speech?
D. Constitutional Interpretation
1. LG: The only proper way to interpret a document is by original intent
2. Why? Because that’s what it means to

like for purposes of the laws, e.g., if a trait matches the harm that is being remedied, then the discrimination is permissible.
(a) Thus in the driving example above, the trait (blindness) matches the harm (unsafe roads) that is being remedied.
(3) Problems to be overcome
(a) Underinclusiveness
(i) This means that others who cause the harm don’t possess the trait being legislated against.
(ii) Ex.: Banning trumpets in building to make it quieter. Trumpeter complains that trombones are just as loud.
(iii) Note the chief complaint is based on envy: you’re hurting me, but not hurting the other guy. (“Shaaden freuden” – taking joy from the misery of others)
(iv) Justification: a legislature can proceed one step at a time; it need not attack all similar harms simultaneously.
(b) Overinclusiveness
(i) This means that some who possess the trait don’t cause the harm.
(ii) Ex: Can’t drive until you’re 16, even though some 15 year olds may be excellent drivers.
(iii) Note those subject to and overinclusive law are far more sympathetic than those subject to an underinclusive one.
(iv) Justification: administrative ease. (It’s a lot easier to bar 15 year olds than to weed through them all trying to find the few that are good drivers)
(v) Justification: limits bureaucratic discretion, and with it arbitrariness.
(4) For further discussion, see Joseph Tussman and Jacobus TenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Cal. L. Rev. 342 (1949).
5. As a practical matter, there is no rule on EP – it’s really just a requirement of reasonableness.
a) Thus, all EP questions are ultimately policy choices requiring pure policy judgments. Thus, the only question that matters is who will decide? Will the court intervene or abdicate?
b) The reasonableness test goes under the guise of “rationality” (e.g., the rational basis test – but that can’t be because something is irrational only if there is no connection between inferences (e.g., we want quiet, so everyone must wear bells).
c) Reasonableness, on the other hand, only means the chances of an inference being true is slim (“A may lead to B, but probably not”).
d) Thus, rationality is a minimum for reasonableness, but a rational act can still be unreasonable. (i.e., an irrational act cannot be reasonable).
e) Argument: court is to weed out laws passed by special interests that detriment the public interest. But isn’t democracy, and thus the public interest, simply the clash of competing interests? It is an arguable point.
6. EP and Economic Regulation – Railway Express v. New York (1949).
a) Facts: NYC enacts regulation saying you can’t advertise on the sides of trucks unless you are advertising your own products; the law is challenged on both substantive DP and EP grounds.
b) DP claim is that this law is an unreasonable deprivation of property.
(1) Court (Douglas) wanted to reject this completely, but used rational basis review instead.
(2) The Court will not pass on the wisdom of the legislature; it will only review if the decision has been obviously false and irrational.
(3) This never happens. No law has failed rational basis review since 1937.
c) EP claim is that there is no rational relationship between the classification (who can advertise) and the purported harm (unsafeness).
(1) Why not forbid ads in Times Square? They’re much more distracting to drivers.
(a) Answer: legislature doesn’t have to cure everything at once. (“one step at a time”)
(2) And why can companies advertise their own products? Isn’t that equally distracting?
(a) Douglas: legislature could have concluded one is safer than the other. (Yes, but they could just as easily concluded that the sun rises in the west).
(b) Real reason the law is upheld: All laws fulfill their real purpose by definition – laws aren’t passed by accident.
d) Jackson’s concurrence