Select Page

Torts
University of South Dakota School of Law
VanPatten, Jonathan K.

Tort Law Fall 2016 Outline (Van Patten)
CH. 2 – Intentional Torts
 
A. Intent to Contact
Battery: (1) where one acts intending to cause harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and (2) a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results.
The actor must intend to bring about a harmful or offensive contact or to put the other party in apprehension thereof.
A result is intended if the act is done for the purpose of accomplishing the result or with knowledge that to a substantial certainty such a result will ensue.
The act must cause, and must be intended to cause, an unpermitted contact.
The extent of the resulting harm need not be intended, nor even foreseen.
Waters v. Blackshear (1992)
 
Polmatier v. Russ (1988)
Defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity (schizophrenia) at his criminal trial for the murder of his father-in-law when he beat him with a beer bottle and then went to the bedroom, got his rifle, and returned to the living room where Polmatier shot him. 
Issue: two pronged test: (1) whether the defendant intended the act which produced the injury; (2) whether he intended the resulting injury.
Rule: (1) a muscular reaction is always an act unless it is a purely reflexive reaction in which the mind and will have no share.
Decision: Yes.  Although trial court found defendant insane and unable to form rational choice, a rational choice is not required since an insane person may have an intent to invade the interests of another, even though his reasons and motives for forming that intention may be entirely irrational.
Rule: (2) intent is not limited to consequences which are desired.  If the actor knows the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from the act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired the to produce the result.  It is not essential that the precise injury which was done be the one intended.
Decision: Yes.
Notes: Act requirement and Intent requirement
 
 
 
 
B. Intending Contact that is Harmful
Nelson v. Carroll (1999)
Facts: Carroll shot Nelson in stomach during dispute over a debt.  Carroll claims he accidentally shot Nelson without intent.
Issue: Whether the defense that the shot was fired accidentally is capable of exonerating Carroll of liability for the battery?
Rule: Intent requirement for battery.
(1) that the actor engaged in a volitional activity, and
(2) he intended to violate the legally protected interests of another.
Decision: No, the defense that the shot was fired accidentally does not negate the intent cause harmful contact.
Carroll’s actions evidenced an intent to commit battery because he carried a loaded gun, struck Nelson, and attempted to strike him again as the gun went off.
 
 
C. Intending a Contact that is Offensive
Leichtman v. WLW

he body.
Damages recoverable for mental trauma and distress.
Any act of such a nature as to excite an apprehension of a battery may constitute assault.  It is an assault to shake a fist under another’s nose, to aim or strike at him with a weapon, or to hold it in a threatening position, to rise or advance to strike another, to surround him with a display of force…
Apprehension must be one which would normally arouse the mind of a reasonable person
The tort is complete with the invasion of the plaintiff’s mental peace. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Browers v. Ackerley (1997)
Issue: Did the Ackerleys assault Brower when they allegedly made threatening anonymous phone calls? Was the harm imminent?
Rules:
Words alone are not enough to make an actor liable for assault unless together with other acts and circumstances they put the other in reasonable apprehension of an imminent harmful or offensive contact. 
The threat must be of imminent harm.
The apprehension created must be one of imminent contact, as distinguished from any contact in the future.
Ex.) A threatens to shoot B and leaves the room with the express purpose of getting his revolver.  A is not liable to B.