HOLLEY-WALKER – FEDERAL COURTS – FALL 2012
I. The Federal Court System: Structures and Themes
A. Federalism
i. The vertical concern that refers to the relationship between federal and state courts
a) Who should decide a case first?
b) What’s the proper trial court?
ii. Why do we care about this relationship?
a) One basic idea is that the big, evil federal government will encroach upon the rights of the population
b) Maybe the state courts are better in resolving disputes because they are closer to the population
c) Concurrent jurisdiction causes forum-shopping issues (this mixes with parity concerns)
B. Parity
i. Is one court more capable than the other? Which courts are the superior courts: state or federal?
C. Separation of Powers
i. The horizontal concern that refers to the relationship among the three branches
ii. Who has the power to do what to whom and under what circumstances?
D. Early Days of the Federal Courts
i. The Framers struggled with the idea of lifetime tenure
a) It isolates one group with a lot of power
b) Not answerable to the public
c) Not answerable to Congress
ii. Original jurisdiction
a) Other options included having no jurisdiction at all for lower federal courts…
ñ If they had not created lower federal courts with trial jurisdiction, only appellate jurisdiction, that would have strongly comported with federalist concerns
b) …and keeping the federal courts completely separated from the state courts
iii. Where to house judicial power?
a) The Articles of Confederation gave the power to Congress to create federal courts for crimes committed on the high seas and for appeals in cases of capture
iv. The alternative plan to Article III was the Virginia Plan
a) Virginia Plan allowed for multiple supreme courts
b) Also included a “council of revision”
ñ Comprised of the President and a number of federal judges
ñ The council would meet to review state and federal laws
E. Article III as an Article of Compromise
i. Both appellate and original jurisdiction
ii. Appointment of judges is made with the input of both the Executive and Legislative Branches
iii. No courts are actually created (gives Congress the power to create them)
F. Federalist Concerns
i. Judicial independence
a) Answerable to no one
ii. No mention of a right to a jury trial
a) This is extremely robust power in the hands of the courts
b) People have a right to a jury of their peers
c) With a jury, the common person in the community is able to voice their concerns
iii. Judicial review
a) Countermajoritarian concern
G. The Federal Courts Today
i. Concern for federal judges over the vast number of criminal cases before them
a) Criminal cases are not typically complex
b) The State has historically handled almost all criminal cases
ñ The rise of federal courts in handling criminal cases suggests a tip in the balance of power (parity issue)
II. Marbury v. Madison
A. William Marbury moved the court for a rule to James Madison to show cause why a mandamus (an order issued by a court to a government officer or lower court commanding the performance of a ministerial duty pertaining to the office) should not issue commanding him to cause to be delivered to them respectively their several commissions as justices
B. The court asks three questions:
C. 1. Has the applicant (Marbury) a right to the commission he demands?
i. The basis of Marbury’s right originates in an act of Congress passed in February 1801:
a) “There shall be appointed…such number of discreet persons to be justices of the peace as the president of the United States shall, from time to time, think expedient, to continue in office for five years.”
ii. It appears that a commission was made out, signed, and sealed, but never delivered to Marbury
iii. Once the commission is signed, the duty of the Secretary of State (Madison) is prescribed by law, and is not to be guided by the will of the president
iv. The transmission of the commission is directed by convenience, not by law
a) The appointment is the sole act of the president
b) The transmission is an act that may be accelerated or retarded by circumstances which can have no influence on the appointment
v. When the commission has been signed, the appointment is made
vi. Once the appointment has been made the right to the office transfers from the president to the appointee
vii.Marbury’s commission was signed by the president and sealed by Madison; therefore, he was appointed and DOES have a right to the commission
D. 2. If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws afford him a remedy?
i. Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, the individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the law for a remedy
ii. The President, by signing the commission, appointed Marbury a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia. The seal of the United States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment
iii. Having this legal right to the office, Marbury has a consequent right to the commission, a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right for which the laws of the country afford him a remedy
iv. Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy
E. 3. If they do afford him a remedy, is it a mandamus issuing from this court?
i. Is this an appropriate question for this court?
a) Supreme Court’s original/appellate jurisdiction is defined by the Constitution
b) Legislature cannot give appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court where it has original jurisdiction by constitution (and vice versa)
c) The court must have appellate jurisdiction to issue mandamus
d) Issuing a mandamus to an officer implies original jurisdiction
e) Therefore, legislation that gives power to the Supreme Court to issue a mandamus to a public officer is unconstitutional
ii. When the law conflicts with the Constitution, the Constitution governs
iii. Can Congress expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Article III of the Constitution?
a) The Constitution states that “the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cas
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”
b) Section 2:
“The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority;–to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;–to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;–to controversies to which the United States shall be a party;–to controversies between two or more states;–between a state and citizens of another state;–between citizens of different states;–between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects.”
iii. The Framers’ Debate
a) During the Constitutional Convention, there was a deadlock about the existence and role of inferior federal courts
ñ One side urged the adoption of a constitutional mandate for the creation of lower federal courts
ñ Another contingent pressed a constitutional bar to the lower courts’ creation (they found it unnecessary, since state tribunals were subject to Supreme Court review anyway)
b) The Madisonian Compromise
ñ Granted Congress the discretion to create lower federal courts
ñ Congress has never exercised the fullest extent of the jurisdictional grant articulated in Article III
iv. Interbranch Tension
a) Although an overstep may be within a branch’s authority, it may nevertheless be a step that should not be taken
b) There is an important difference between the power to take a certain action and the wisdom of doing so
c) In Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, Justice Story reasoned that because Article III states that the federal “judicial Power shall be vested” in the Supreme Court and inferior federal courts, Congress has a duty to vest the full extent of federal judicial power somewhere in the federal judiciary
v. Competing Approaches to Congressional Jurisdictional Role
a) Legal scholars have contributed a number of analytical frameworks for interpretation of Congress’ jurisdictional power under the Constitution:
ñ Some have explored and refined Justice Story’s approach and articulated various approaches, all of which restrict the ability of Congress to limit federal court jurisdiction in one respect or another
ñ One viewpoint interprets “shall be vested” to mandate that Congress allocate to the federal judiciary as a whole each and every type of case or controversy defined as part of the judicial Power under Article III’s Section 2 unless “so trivial that they would pose an unnecessary burden”
