Civ Pro II – Stravitz – Summer 2009
1) Jurisdiction Over the Parties or Their Property (63-179)
a) Personal Jurisdiction – The DFT must be amenable or subject to suit in the state in which the court is located so that a judgement may be entered against him. Traditionally, this was limited to a DFT who resides in the state or is physically in the state, but these restrictions have diminished; now, we look to contact with the state and the benefits of such contact (P/J = authorized by statute / comports with due process). P/J may be waived, whereas SMJ may not be waived.
i) ‘in rem’ v. ‘in personam’ v. ‘quasi-in-rem’: quasi – will only allow recovery insomuch as the value of the property w/I the court’s jurisdiction (2 types: (a) determines rights of parties before the ct concerning particular property; and (b) determines whether property may be attached to litigate a claim in the other state???); in rem – applies to the whole world; ie, in a quiet-title action, look to FN17 on pg 148; in personam – all assets of the dft may be attached to the judgment, operates b/c of the FF&CC.
ii) Pennoyer establishes that a state’s assertion of P/J is limited by the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amend. The Full Faith and Credit Clause will allow a judgment over a dft who is located in a different state, if served properly, to be bound by that judgment by the courts of the dft’s home state. But, the dft may challenge PJ, also called a collateral attack. (1) if a sister court makes a decision without SMJ or PJ, then it violates due process, and therefore will not be subject to the FF&CC, this is the operation of the 14th, and now the main point for which Pennoyer stands; thus, Fed. & St. courts must have both SMJ and PJ. Pennoyer thus limits P/J to presence & citizenship.
iii) Blackmer provides that a court may assert jurisdiction over a citizen who is absent from the jurisdiction (jurisdiction over US citizen living in France b/c it was a US citizen, thus no infringement of sovereignty); This was extended to state-court litigation in Milliken v. Meyer where a Wyoming court had jurisdiction over a Wy citizen living in Colo.
iv) Also, in Adam v. Saenger, we see that if a PTF subjects himself to P/J in a court otherwise lacking P/J over him, then he cannot assert lack of P/J as a defense to a counter claim brought by the DFT. (Consistent w/ waivable nature of P/J).
v) Hess provides the initial expansion of Pennoyer, allowing service to be valid where by use of a state’s highways, a DFT appoints an agent w/i the state to be served.
vi) International Shoe – expands P/J to contacts theory. “[D]ue Process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” These contacts are used in two different ways: (1) to show that a DFT has sufficient contact with a forum to warrant asserting jurisdiction over it for all matters (known as general jurisdiction); and (2) to show that a DFT may have sufficient contact with the forum without having sufficient contact to warrant general jurisdiction (known as specific jurisdiction) (Note 3, 81). A court may exercise Specific J/D only because the requisite relationship exists between the DFT, the forum, and the cause of action: “As the quantity and quality of the defendant’s forum contacts increase, a weaker connection between the plaintiff’s claim and those contacts is permissible; as the quantity and quality of the defendant’s forum contacts decrease, a stronger connection between the plaintiff’s claim and those contacts is required. The concepts of general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction are simply the two opposite ends of this sliding scale.”
vii)Hess & Int’l Shoe sparked many states to pass “long-arm” statutes, which seek to provide P/J over nonresidents who cannot be found and served in the forum, basing jurisdiction on the DFT’s general activity within a state or the commission of any on of a series of enumerated acts within the jurisdiction (sometimes even the commission of an act outside of the J/D that has consequences inside of it – these statutes are supported by Int’l Shoe’s emphasis on the quantum and quality of the DFT’s activity within the forum state.
viii) (Possible Step One of Long-Arm, determine the meaning of the long-arm statute, does it apply to the situation?) In Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., DFT’s product malfunct’d in Illinois, and DFT-OHcorp asserts that it hasn’t committed a tortious act in Illinois, the suit is in Illinois; court notes “the place of a wrong is where the last event takes place which is necessary to render the actor liable” in finding that the act was committed in Illinois, thus upholding P/J under the long-arm statute. Also noted, “it is a reasonable inference that DFT’s commercial transactions … result in substantial use and consumption in this [forum] … it benefits from the laws of this state….” Court cites Int’l Shoe for due process test for one not served with process within the forum as (1) whether there exists minimum contacts, and (2) whether there was reasonable notice given. Illustrates statutory construction analysis involved w/ long-arms, also seen in Advance Ross where J/D was not found (in ARoss, only financial impact was felt in Illinois, no tortious act was committed or directed towards the Illinois forum).
ix) (After a determination of the applicability of the long-arm statute, then ask whether the statute is consistent with due process.) In McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., the Ct focused on (1) the forum’s interest (large, concerns redress for unpaid ins. claims); (2) McGee’s interest (disadvantage if forced to sue in ins. co’s home-state forum); and (3) the location of witnesses and evidence (located in forum state) — this is a different approach from that in International Shoe (although this case could’ve been decided under Int’l Shoe, specific j/d would’ve been present there b/c the conflict is out of the issue on which the DFT had availed itself of the protections and benefits of the forum state law). Also, in McGee, there was no contention of inadequate notice, and a single act DOES NOT EQUAL McGee b/c there’s a renewed Ins. K; not a stream of commerce incident, such as in Grey. In Hanson v. Denckla, a Florida court ruled that a power of appointment was invalid; however, this was not given FF&C in Delaware. The S.Ct. said the denial of FF&C was valid b/c there was no P/J over the
imum contacts with South Carolina. However, establishing minimum contacts only raises a presumption of proper jurisdiction under the d/p clause – Beyond the requirement of minimum contacts, due process requires evaluation of other factors to test whether an assertion of jurisdiction comports with “fair play and substantial justice.”
(6) Second Branch: Fair Play and Substantial Justice
(a) the burden on the nonresident DFT
(b) the adjudicative interest of the forum state
(c) the PTF’s interest in obtaining convenient an effective relief
(d) the systemic interest of the national judicial system in obtaining the most efficient resolution of the controversy; and
(e) the systemic interest of the states in furthering substantive social policies.
xiii) In Asahi Metal Industry Co., we have a stream of commerce case – hear the O’Conner plurality (purposeful availment test (something more test) more widely adopted) says of minimum contacts that the due process clause requires something more than that the DFT was aware of its product’s entry into the forum state through the stream of commerce, mere act of placing into stream isn’t an act purposefully directed toward the forum state – the Brennan plurality (Stravitz likes a little more, 8th Cir. adopted brennans stream of commerce test) says that the stream refers to regular and anticipated flows of products, and that a regular course of dealing that results in over 100,000 units annually over several years certainly constitutes purposeful availment. There is no decision on minimum contacts, and the fair play branch results in no p/j. Remember when handling stream of commerce cases, that services are not in the stream; only products.
xiv) In Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining, the S.Ct. allowed general jurisdiction over DFT mining co. in Ohio, even though the co. was primarily based in the Philippines – the court said that the ohio-court could choose whether to exercise j/d b/c the DFT had conducted continuous and systematic business operations there; general jurisdiction lays around “continuous & systematic” and “substantial or pervasive” contacts. General jurisdiction allows the PTF to bring a cause of action that does not arise out of the DFT’s activity in the forum state; all that is req’d is for a state statute to provide for jurisdiction and a finding that the statute comports with due process, under the FP&SJ test (S.Ct. has never said so, but Stravitz supports idea)? Accordingly, Specific Jurisdiction requires the cause of action to arise out of or be related to the DFT’s activity in the forum state. The Court has never found P/J on a “related to” basis.