1) Copyright in Context
a) S
2) Authors, Writings, and Progress
a) Fixation
i) MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computers, Inc.
(1) Issue: does the loading of copyrighted computer software onto a computer’s RAM create a copy that is sufficiently “fixed” under the Copyright Act?
(2) Yes.
(a) Because the copy of the software loaded into the computer’s RAM could be “perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,” a copy was created in violation of P’s copyright.
(3) It is generally accepted that loading software into a computer creates a copy under the Copyright Act.
b) Originality
i) Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony
(1) Issue: are photographs copyrightable?
(2) Yes.
(a) Photographs that reflect originality and creativity in features such as selection of costume, pose, lighting, expression, and so on can be copyrighted as the “writing or production” of an “author.”
(b) An “author” is “he to whom anything owes its origin,” and a “writing” any literary production of such an originator.
(3) Artistic input is no longer a consideration in granting protection to photographs under English law. In this country, it is still considered a basis for copyrightability of photographs, but courts have been willing to find such input in the slightest things, such as one’s choice of the type of camera or film to use.
ii) Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.
(1) Issue: are chromolithographs, designed for advertising purposes, barred from copyright protection?
(2) No.
(a) The fact that a chromolithograph was produced as an advertisement vehicle does not alter the fact that such “pictorial illustrations” are copyrightable. To hold otherwise would be to set up the judiciary as an arbiter of artistic quality.
(b) In this case, the very fact that there was a desire to reproduce the chromolithographs outside the advertisement framework shows that they had their worth.
(3) Under previous decisions, the chromolithographs would have been copyrightable had they been designed for no purpose beyond artistic expression. Whatever artistic value was inherent then is hardly changed by the subsequent use.
iii) Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.
(1) Issue: if one who “copies” a work in the public domain contributes something of his own to the “copy,” something more than a “mere trivial” variation, can the “copy” be copyrighted?
(2) Yes.
(a) Copyrightability requires that an author contribute to the work something originating with him, but there is no requirement that it be novel. That is why one who independently creates what turns out to be an exact duplicate of the painting or work of another could nonetheless receive a copyright on his own work.
(b) Here, the fact that P’s personal input
be to grant patent-type protection without requiring a show of novelty. Copyright is based on originality, not novelty, and protects the explanation and not the use of the system explained.
(3) Many have interpreted this case as allowing copying for use as opposed to copying for explanatory purposes. However, in applying this rule, some courts have gone a bit far and have allowed something to pass as copying for use when there were other arrangements of words available that could just as easily have been used to convey the noncopyrightable system or art. This has engendered much criticism of this interpretation of the rule of this case.
ii) A.A. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc.
(1) Issue: are interpretations of historical events copyrightable?
(2) No.
(a) Neither factual information nor interpretations of it can be subject to copyright.
(3) The court granted wide latitude to works based on historical subjects, including the selection and order of facts and the use of interpretations and stock narrative devices, suggesting that only works explicitly duplicating prior works will infringe.
