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University of Pennsylvania School of Law
deLisle, Jacques

PART ONE | A First Pass
I. Intentional Torts
A. Physical Harms
1. Battery and Consent, CB 4-9, 20-29
2. Nonconsensual Defenses: Insanity, Self-Defense, Defense of Property, and Necessity
CB 33-46, 49-59
B. Emotional and Dignitary Harms
1. Assault, CB 60-63
C. What Does “Torts” Do? — A First Look at Reasons for Liability and Recovery
II. Strict Liability vs. Negligence: An Introduction to Standards of Liability for “Unintentional” Harms
A. Basic Principles, CB 100-121, 128-133
B. Justifying and Explaining the Basic Principles:
Utility vs. Corrective Justice, CB 121-128, 133-137
C. Revisiting Basic Principles, CB 137-141
PART TWO | Fundamentals of Tort Law: The Negligence Action and Strict Liability
III. Negligence — Breach of Duty
A. The Reasonable Person: Objectivity, Consensus or Judicial Intuition?, CB 145-165, 182-184
B. Calculating Risks and Defining Wrongs: Efficiency and Reasonableness, CB 166-169, 171-181, 185-186
C. Custom: Practice and Reasonableness, CB 188-219, 222-225
D. Statutes and “Rules of Law”: Legislative/Social Choices and Reasonableness, CB 228-246, 249-260
E. Res Ipsa Loquitur: Problems of Proof of Negligence, CB 261-264, 267-284
IV. Plaintiff’s Negligence, Assumption of Risk, and Apportioning Fault (and Liability)
A. Contributory Negligence and Last Clear Chance, CB 288-290, 293-297, 299-312
B. Assumption of Risk, CB 318-328, 330-333
C. Comparative Fault, CB 337-348, 351
D. Joint and Several Liability among Codefendants, CB 354, 359-366, 368-375
V. Causation
A. Cause in Fact:
1. Basic Principles: “But-For”?
2. Special Problems of Multiple Defendants
B. Proximate Causation; Finding a Duty (1)
VI. Finding a Duty (2): Affirmative Duties and Liability for Failures to Act
A. Duty to Rescue
B. Gratuitous Undertakings
C. Duties of Owners and Occupiers
D. Special Relationships
E. Other Sources of Duty (or Substitutes for it)
VII. Strict Liability: Liability without Negligence
A. Animals, CB 581-585
B. Ultrahazardous or Abnormally Dangerous Activities, CB 589-608
C. Nuisance CB 608-639, 641-649
VIII. Products Liability
A. The Decline of Privity and the Emergence of Strict Liability, CB 655-674
B. Restatement Formulations, CB 675-680
C. Manufacturing/ Construction Defects, CB 697-700
D. Design Defects, CB 703-708, 711-731
E. Proper Defendants, CB 689-695
F. The Duty to Warn, CB 731-755
G. Plaintiff’s Conduct, CB 755-764
IX. Damages
A. Compensatory Damages: Purposes and Recoverable Elements,
CB 783-791, 774-783, 793-799
B. Punitive Damages, CB 824-842
C. Collateral Benefits, CB 809-815
D. Contingent Fees, Fee-Shifting and Sale of Tort Claims, CB 800-809
PART THREE | Third Parties; Concluding Perspectives
X. Vicarious Liability and Imputed Contributory Negligence
A. Vicarious Liability: Respondent Superior and Related Issues, CB 375-392
B. Imputed Contributory Negligence, CB 313-317
C. Review of Other “Third Party” Issues
XI. Comparative and Contextual Perspectives on Tort Law and Liability for Physical Harms
A. Physical Harms:
The intentional infliction of a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the plaintiff
intent to cause some act, though the intent does not need to be directed specifically at the outcome it in fact caused
if you mean to hit A, but you hit B, you’re still on the hook for hitting B
if you mean to harm A but kill A, you’re still on the hook for killing A
(motivation is irrelevant)
requires a voluntary act
involuntary twitch is not considered infliction
harmful or offensive
Harmful is the infliction of pain, injury, disf

trespassers but accidentally hit P in the eye. D claimed he did not see the P nor intend to hurt him. 
H: P may recover where D intended, unlawfully, to strike a third party, but in missing injured P, regardless of person-specific intent.
Defenses for Intentional Torts. (From best to worst)
1) CONSENT (this all blends together)
4 types of Consent:
i. actual: fully formed, with actual facts to be considered
possible defenses here are fraud, duress, or other illegal acts
Mohr v. Williams: Actual Consent must be specific (wrong ear)
ii. implied: is what a reasonable person would infer from the non-verbal actions of another.
O’Brien v. Cunard Steamship Co: An immigrant did not want smallpox vaccination yet stood in line and held out arm. Was inoculated. H: Physician may infer consent from patients actions.
iii. constructive: is the consent an ordinary, reasonable person would give in these circumstances
classic case is in an emergency
iv. substituted: consent by proxy
you’ve designated another person to make decisions for you
Scope of the consent
The more precise you make the consent the better shielded you are as a defendant
Ear case, for example: Mohr v. Williams (π only consented for operations on one ear)
Adequacy of Consent – Consent that is not in some way flawed
If all the consequences are not explicitly noted
Duress or forced consent
Manifestation of consent
Here the consent is largely objective