Select Page

Administrative Law
University of Pennsylvania School of Law
Coglianese, Cary

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: guiding principles and theoretical bases. 4
I.        Deficiencies of the Common law.. 4
a.       Tort law (liability regime) v. regulations. 4
b.       Example: Relaxation of trucking rules.5
II.      Regulation—purpose and scope. 5
a.       Market Failures. 5
b.       Other (questionable) Economic Purposes. 6
c.        Redistribution. 6
d.       Collective Values. 7
e.        Solve systematic disadvantages and informal castes. 7
f.        Planning. 7
g.       Paternalism.. 7
III.     Administrative Law—purpose and scope. 7
a.       Purpose. 7
b.       Scope. 8
IV.     Influences on Administrative Agencies. 8
a.       Structural influences. 8
b.       Political influences. 8
c.        Corporate influences. 9
d.       Legal influences (Administrative law)9
e.        Social influences. 9
f.        Historical influences. 9
V.       The Traditional Model of Administrative law.. 11
a.       Purpose. 11
b.       Characteristics. 11
c.        The “transmission belt”. 11
VI.     Models of Political Science/Political Economy.. 11
a.       James Q. Wilson and the Collective Action Model11
b.       Public Interest Model11
c.        Public Choice Model11
d.       Principal/Agent Theory. 12
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: the FDA as case study.. 12
I.        The FDA—Purpose and Power. 12
a.       Purpose. 12
b.       Power. 12
II.      Political influences on the FDA.. 13
a.       Public Interest Model13
b.       Public Choice Model13
c.        Principal/Agent Theory. 13
III.     Rule-Making Process. 13
IV.     Legal Constraints. 13
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: FDA v. Brown & Williamson.. 14
I.        Theories of statutory interpretation.. 14
a.       Textualism.. 14
b.       Intentionalism.. 15
c.        Purposivism.. 16
II.      Canons of interpretation.. 16
a.       The “Whole Act” rule. 16
b.       The “cannon of avoidance”. 16
III.     Hierarchy of sources in statutory interpretation.. 16
IV.     Statutory Interpretation: FDA v. Brown & Williamson. 16
a.       General16
b.       Justice O’Connor’s Majority Opinion:17
c.        Justice Breyer’s Dissent18
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND THE BALANCE OF POWERS. 18
I.        The Principle of Separation of Powers and/or “Checks and Balances”. 18
a.       Framer’s intent18
b.       Benefits of Separation of powers. 18
c.        Costs of Separation of powers. 19
d.       General Principles: Mistretta v. United States. 19
II.      The non-delegation (non) doctrine. 19
a.       Analytic and Textual foundations. 19
b.       Reasons for delegation. 20
c.        Function/purpose of the non-delegation doctrine. 20
d.       Early History (Pre-1935 decisions)20
e.        Flowering of the Doctrine: Panama Refining and Schecter. 21
f.        The “Intelligible Principle” rule. 21
g.       The Modern non-delegation doctrine. 22
h.       Delegations to non-executive agencies/entities. 24
i.        Non-Delegation as a canon of construction. 24
j.        Theoretical Critiques and Policy Concerns. 25
III.     Legislative controls over executive agencies. 26
a.       The Legislative Veto. 26
b.       Legislative removal power. 27
c.        Direct Congressional Representation. 27
d.       Summary of solutions to principal/agent problem.. 27
IV.     The Executive Branch and the Agencies. 28
a.       The Appointment/Removal power. 28
b.       Presidential Review—Executive Order 12,866, OMB and OIRA.. 29
c.        Criticism of Executive Review Process. 31
d.       Theoretical Critiques and Policy Concerns. 31
V.       “Independent” Agencies. 32
a.       Characteristics. 32
b.       Constitutionality. 32
c.        Presidential Control over Independent Agencies. 32
d.       Legal and political critiques. 33
Rulemaking and Adjudication.. 33
I.        Administrative procedure, generally.. 33
a.       Value of procedure. 33
b.       Legal sources of administrative procedure. 34
II.      Rulemaking v. Adjudication: Constitutional Distinction.. 34
a.       Historical development34
b.       Legal Rules/Principles. 35
III.     The APA—General framework for adjudications and rulemaking.. 35
a.       General35
b.       Definitions. 35
c.        Formal Adjudication (APA §§554, 556, 557)36
d.       Informal Adjudication. 36
e.        Formal Rulemaking (§§553, 556, 557)37
f.        Informal (notice and comment) rulemaking (APA §553)37
IV.     Rulemaking v. Adjudication: Policy Concerns. 37
a.       Factors to consider. 37
V.       Constitutional Due Process in the context of agency adjudications. 38
a.       Framework for analysis. 38
b.       What rights/interests are protected?. 38
c.        What process is due?. 40
d.       Impact of Due Process requirements. 41
e.        Goals of Due Process. 42
f.        Alternatives to Due Process hearings. 42
VI.     Informal (Notice and Comment) Rulemaking.. 43
a.       Rulemaking, generally. 43
b.       Policy concerns and considerations of increased rulemaking. 43
c.        Rulemaking and Adjudication: clash and impact43
d.       Requirements for Informal Rulemaking (APA §553)44
e.        “Hybrid Rulemaking”: additions to §553. 45
VII.   Exceptions to APA §553. 47
a.       APA §553(a) exceptions. 47
b.       APA §553(b) exceptions, generally. 47

hanging and hidden fees with severe penalties for default
§ Key concern is that investors backed the money loaned and so could have effects on the entire economy.
§ Fed initially had little response, did little to regulate subprime market even when signs of problems. When it did regulate, only set forth standards not actual regulations, thus lender were left to self-police [Fed wanted to avoid involvement b/c don’t have resources to regulate/high administrative costs in enforcement, wanted to keep real estate boom going, trusted self-regulation of industry for self-preservation’s sake, allowed first time home ownership which was a good thing.
I.                   Deficiencies of the Common law
a.       General
                                                              i.      Awards under common law liability remedies are reactive meaning that Plaintiff has already been harmed but with regulation, could be reactive, but is also proactive in seeking to prevent harm before it occurs.
1.      Also, standard of care is duty to act reasonable to not harm others but not entirely clear what standard actually entails, court proceedings can be slow, and regulators usually have greater expertise in a field than the court.
2.      Courts do same kind of work but regulators can achieve similar results at a more optimal and efficient level as well as a more proactive approach.
b.      Tort law (liability regime) v. regulations
                                                              i.      Functions of Tort Law
1.      Redistributes the cost of accidents
2.      Deters negligent behavior
3.      Punishes wrongdoers and compensates victims for their suffering
4.      Internalizes externalities
                                                            ii.      Deficiencies of a liability regime
1.      Uncertainty (high information costs)
a.       a corporation will be uncertain as to the stability of a judge made rule.
2.      Crude utilitarian calculations
a.       A corporation may simply decide that the costs of lawsuits is less than the cost of ignoring negligence (B