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Civil Procedure I
University of Oregon School of Law
Reynolds, Jennifer W.

Civil Procedure
Fall 2011
v  0: Traditional Bases
v  1: State Long Arm Statute
v  2: Due Process/Constitutional Analysis
0: TRADITIONAL BASES (Pennoyer v. Neff )
v  Territorial Theory: States are all powerful within borders and powerless without, under Pennoyer there are bright line rules for when a state has PJ over a ∆ (Classical Formalism approach):
Ø  1. If ∆ is a resident of the state
Ø  2. If ∆ is a non-resident of the state, but they
§  Are physically present
§  Consented to PJ
§  Own property in the state
v  Hess v. Powloski: A state can have PJ over a party through the party’s implied consent (by driving on that state’s highways).
Ø  Implied consent = legal fiction, but w/o it state wouldn’t have had jurisdiction over Hess (now states have long arm statutes for this)
§  Movement away from Pennoyer formalistic “consented to PJ” rule, to a more expansive “legal fiction” of “implied consent”
Ø  Driving is dangerous; it is not unreasonable for a state to protect their citizens from citizens of other states who are passing through.
v  International Shoe Co. v. Washington: PJ over ∆ if “the ∆ has such minimum contact in the forum so that exercise of jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Ø  Implied presence = “doing business” in a state can be enough to make them present for purposes of PJ
§  Movement away from Pennoyer formalistic “physically present” rule, to a more expansive “legal fiction” of “implied presence” 
v  Movement from Pennoyer “rule” of PJ to International Shoe “standard”
Ø  MC = FP + SJ
SPECIFIC JURISDICTION: When the c/a relates to and (? – Helicopteros) arises out of the ∆’s contacts with the forum.
v  1. State Long-Arm Statute
v  2. Due Process/Constitutional Analysis (WWVW flowchart, or Asahi?)
Ø  Minimum Contacts
§  Nature/quality of contacts
§  Purposeful availment by ∆?
·         Enough to put ∆ on notice (foreseeability alone is not enough, would ∆ know he would get sued there?)
Ø  Reasonableness
§  Interest of the forum state
§  Plaintiff’s interest
§  Collective states’ interest (ex. In promoting family harmony; Kulko)
§  Collective states’ interest in efficiency
§  Burden on ∆ (Burger King, Asahi; least important factor?)
1. LONG-ARM STATUTES: After Hess and International Shoe, states were encouraged to expand their jurisdictional reach for when they could assert PJ over nonresidents who could not be found and served in their forum.
v  Types of Long-Arm Statues
Ø  Enumerated Acts: more expansive than Constitution
Ø  Constitutional Max: equivalent to Constitutional powers
v  McGee v. International Life Insurance co.: Insurance company didn’t pay Cali resident, Cali had a long-arm statute that asserted PJ over insurance companies, issue was whether that statute was a violation of due process? Two questions
Ø  1. Did Cali have a “legitimate regulatory interest”? (language from Hess)
Ø  2. Is PJ not too inconvenient for the ∆?
§  If yes to both à PJ is ok (here it was ok)
Ø  Emphasis here is on the state’s interest
v  Hanson v. Denckla: FL/Delaware simultaneous lawsuits sisters/bank stuff. Says FL didn’t have PJ, rejects McGee 2 part analysis, FL doesn’t make sense because it was a unilateral action that bank didn’t have control over. New test:
Ø  1. Purposeful availment by the ∆?
§  Not present here à so no PJ
Ø  2. Inconvenience analysis
Ø  Emphasis here is on purposeful availment (widely adopted)
v  World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson: Car crash in OK from ∆ in NY, ∆ had no contacts with forum, takes Hanson 2 step approach;
Ø  1. Minimum Contacts analysis (to decide whether there is purposeful availment by the ∆)
§  Foreseeability alone is not enough, too speculative, must be foreseeable that ∆ would get sued there
Ø  2. Reasonableness (look at the states interest + convenience analysis)
Ø  If MC isn’t meet à DON’T go to reasonableness analysis, you are done!
v  Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz: Application of WWVW process, both satisfied; lays out the factors used for the reasonableness analysis, notes that inconvenience to ∆ is almost never unreasonable.
v  Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court: Conducts reasonableness analysis w/o

lysis of what constitutes sufficient minimum contacts; essentially it requires comparison to cases. It is harder to get than specific jurisdiction.
v  Recall, under the 0: Traditional Bases of Pennoyer, there is PJ:
Ø  1. If ∆ is a resident of the state
Ø  2. If ∆ is a non-resident of the state, but they
§  Are physically present
§  Consented to PJ
§  Own property in the state
v  Types of actions
Ø  In personam: action against a person
Ø  In rem: action against property
Ø  Quasi in rem:
§  QIR 1: Court adjudicating property status to specific people (boundary disputes, specific claimants, specific land, etc.)
§  QIR 2: Property is standing in (“avatar”) for the person (our focus)
v  Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration: In rem, π says violation of due process b/c he wasn’t notified, but jurisdiction upheld b/c don’t need to give notice for in rem, attachment is supposed to be sufficient b/c we assume π will know what is going on w/his property. Judge notes that no proceeding is really in rem, we are always dealing with people and their relationships to the property.
v  Pennington v. Forth National Bank of Cincinnati, Ohio: π attached bank account; ∆ lived out of state and disputed due process. Court ruled that attachment of property, whether intangible or not, is sufficient for jurisdiction (QIR here), if:
Ø  1. It is located within borders of the jurisdiction (i.e. in state bank account)
Ø  2. Is attached at the beginning of proceeding, and
Ø  3. The owner has a chance to be heard
v  Harris v. Balk: Debt follows the debtor and can be attached if debtor is present (this satisfied Pennington criteria, debt = intangible, and ∆ here had notice)