C I V I L P R O C E D U R E I I O U T L I N E
Professor Gensler, Spring 2010
JOINDER
Rule 18
· “Pile on Rule” – claim joinder is unlimited
o π may join as many claims in one suit as desired
o The claims need not be related in any way except that they have the same ∆
o While choosing what to pile on beware of claim preclusion, because if π chooses not to bring something, they may lose it forever
o The fact that a claim may be joined does not answer the question of whether the court has jurisdiction over the matter (Rule 82)
· Supplemental jurisdiction doctrine – if a π has a federal question claim, but wants to add a state law claim to it, the π can extend jurisdiction to cover the claim, but the claims in this instance must arise out of the same transaction or occurrence
Rule 13
· 13(a)—Compulsory Counterclaim
o If a counterclaim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim, and does not require adding new parties, it is compulsory and must be brought or lost
· 13(b)—Permissive Counterclaim
o Any other counterclaim that a party has may be brought
§ It need not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence
· 13(g)—Cross Claim
o A party may crossclaim against a coparty if the claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence
§ This can happen with πs . . .
· πs join together to sue a common ∆, then also sue each other
§ But is more common with ∆s
· ∆s are joined in a suit, then sue each other
Rule 20
· 20(a)(1)—πs may join suits when:
o 1) It arises out of the same transaction or occurrence (s/t/o)
§ Determined by logical relationship and overlap of evidence
o 2) There is a “common question of law or fact” for all πs (CQLF)
§ There only need be 1
· 20(a)(2)—∆s may join suit when any right to relief is asserted against them if:
o 1) It arises out of the S/T/O
o 2) There is CQLF
· Rule 20 is very broad but is tempered by Rule 42(b) and Rule 21
o Rule 42(b)—For convenience, to avoid prejudice, or efficiency reasons, the court may sever claims or issues within claims
§ The case still continues as a single action, but the court tries claims or issues separately
o Rule 21–Misjoinder
Rule 21
· Misjoinder of parties is not grounds for dismissing an action
o It is only grounds for severing claims or parties (different civil actions are created)
o When a court invokes Rule 21 it is creating a different civil action
· Rule 21’s most commons usage is to correct joinder errors under Rule 20
Rule 14
· 14(a)(1)—∆ may (can assert in separate claim) implead a 3rd party into the lawsuit (∆ becomes 3rd party π)
o Comes into play when ∆ may be liable, but if so, then another is liable as well
o You may implead only if there exists a recognized theory of derivative liability (2 classic theories)
§ Indemnity: those holding insurance seek to have their expenses paid by an insurance company
§ Contribution: ∆s acted in concert to cause the harm (usually in tort claims)
o No “him, not me” claims: 3rd party ∆ may not be impleaded merely because he may be liable to the π
o S/T/O does not matter, only theories of derivative liability matter
o The ∆ does not need the court’s permission to implead a 3rd party ∆ if done in the 14 day window after the ∆ answers the original complaint
§ If the ∆ waits until after this window passes, the ∆ must obtain leave from the court
· The court will usually allow unless there is good reason not to
· 14(a)(2)(A)—3rd party ∆ must assert any defense it has against the claim
· 14(a)(2)(B)—once impleaded, the 3rd party ∆ may counterclaim against the 3rd party π, but must if the counterclaim is compulsory
· 14(a)(2)(C)—3rd party ∆ may assert any defense that a 3rd party π has against the original π
o With impleader there are 2 ways a 3rd party ∆ can win:
§ If original ∆ wins, then 3rd party ∆ off the hook
§ If the 3rd party ∆ wins against the 3rd party π
· 14(a)(2)(D)—3rd party ∆ may file suit against original π
o Claim must stem from S/T/O
· 14(a)(3)—original π may assert a corner-claim against 3rd party ∆ once they are impleaded (claim must arise out of S/T/O)
JURISDICTION IN GENERAL
§ Judicial power has three prongs:
o 1) Personal jurisdiction
o 2) Subject-matter jurisdiction
o 3) Venue
§ If Gensler asks, “Does the court have power?” address all three
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
First Things First
§ The court always has jurisdiction over the π by consent (do not leave points on the table!!!)
§ Personal jurisdiction is generally the same for federal courts as it is in the state the federal court resides in—Rule 4(k)
Personal Jurisdiction Menu:
§ Service in State
o If you’re in the state, they’ve got you
§ Attachment of Property
o Died in 1977
§ Domicile
§ Consent
o π always consents
§ Status
o For
ys “I Agree”
§ Consent jurisdiction is specific
o If ∆ consents, it is only applied to the case at hand
§ It does not affect your ability to not consent in other cases
Status
§ Not relevant in this class—dealt with in family law
§ Goes to the extent custody of children in a divorce, does not extend to the individuals in the divorce
Contacts (added in 1945)
§ General rule: PJ exists based upon a ∆’s previous contacts with that jurisdiction
§ International Shoe Co. v. Washington (unpaid payroll taxes)
o SC ruled PJ existed based upon ISC’s contact with the state of Washington
o Long-arm statutes: statute that creates mechanisms for a π to serve process outside the borders of the state but still be under the state’s PJ
§ Initially it was a 2-part analysis:
· 1) Does the long-arm jurisdictional mechanism reach the ∆?
· 2) If so, does the service of process fall within the Due Process limits?
§ This method sometimes meant certain ∆s were unreachable
o 2nd generation of long-arm statutes
§ Allow service of process to the limits of the 14th Amendment and the Constitution
§ McGee v. International Life (one insurance policy in CA)
o Minimum contacts is not judged on a qualitative basis
§ Rather, in some cases only one contact is sufficient to establish PJ
§ Hanson v. Denckla (rich kids arguing over inheritance)
o It is not enough that there are lines of communication between the ∆ and the forum state
o Must instead have vectors from the ∆ to the forum state
§ In this case the trust did not purposefully avail itself of the privileges of conducting activities within the forum state
§ World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson (car explosion in OK)
o The question in this case is the sufficiency of the vector from NY (WWVW) to OK
§ WWVW sells cars in NY knowing they will travel all over the nation—is this enough of a vector to get PJ
o SC makes a definitive ruling on contacts
§ Transitive reaching out does not constitute a contact