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Torts II
University of North Dakota School of Law
Johnson, Eric A.

CAUSATION
In fact – not necessarily liable, must show proof of connection, “but for test”
Proximate –cut off for liability is created – must be close relation btwn the injury and the actions, defined by courts often as something that is “reasonably foreseeable”
Must fit both the in fact and proximate cause portions of causation in order to be held liable. Need to answer more than proximate cause question – must also do the threshold Q
Sine Qua Non – “without which not” – injury wouldn’t have happened w/o D doing what he or she did, “but for test”
Perkins v. Texas & New Orleans Ry. Co. – car/speeding train collision. Need more proof than a guess for C/F. RR wasn’t liable as a result.
Gentry v. Douglas Hereford Ranch, Inc. – tripped & shot someone. Evidence must show probability not just possibility. Nothing that the jury could use in order to infer causation, so D isn’t neg.
Reynolds v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co.– fell down steps getting onto train b/c it was dark. If neg. of D greatly multiplies the probability of accident to P, and is of a character naturally leading to its occurrence, the mere possibility that it might have happened w/o neg. is not sufficient to break the causal chain.
Kramer Service, Inc. v. Wilkins– P got a cut on his forehead and developed cancer at that sight. Must have probability that is more than not, rather than just a possibility.
Wilder v. Eberhart – esophagus injuries after stomach stapling surgery. D can rebut probability by showing other possibilities. D need not prove another probability. Jury only needs enough to cause doubt of D’s probability.
Herskovits v. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound –D failed to diagnose P in a timely manner. loss of chance case. Gets P past SJ. Part fails but for test in end result, but not for remaining portion of life.
Concurring Causes
Hill v. Edmonds – Driver hit a tractor truck that was left parked in the middle of the highway w/o lights. Both tractor truck owner and driver were negligent. Their acts together did in fact cause the injury, both would be likely to incur liability. Possible when concurring causes that one may be liable for the whole injury
Anderson v. Minneapolis, St.P. & S. St. M. R.R. Co. – A forest fire and another fire (one of the RR as the starter and the other was unknown), combined to burn over P’s property. Each actor can be responsible for up to the whole injury. This is the case as long as your act was a material and “substantial factor” in causing the injury. , there should be liability when there is a known actor that’s action could have alone caused the whole injury. It is not fair as a policy consideration not to have anyone incur liability when an unknown actor is involved. Substantial factor test replaces the “but for” test when there are concurrent causes.
Summers v. Tice – Two Ds neg. fired at the same time in Ps direction. P was struck in the eye by the shot from one of the guns. If neither can prove their innocence, then they are held jointly liable. Burden shift to D’s to prove their innocence b/c they are in a better position to do so. This can only work when there is actual evidence.
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories – DES case suing 5 companies who had a 90% market share. Adopts a modified Summers approach, when there is a substantial share of the responsible parties named they split the liability for that percentage according to their market share, it then becomes like Summers b/c it is left up to Ds to figure out which of the parties is responsible by disproving their own fault. ND – has only discussed asbestos in this type of context, so nothing has been determined as such in our state
Prox. Cause
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Daniels – There needs to be a cut of f point for liability despite the action still being a cause in fact. There must be a limit in order for fairness to result. Distinguishes prox. cause from cause in fact.
Ryan v. NY Central R.R. Co.- Accidental fire set to a woodshed. P’s house and others took fire when the fire spread. If you can’t anticipate it, it is hard to know what your duty is. No prox. cause. Relationship btwn prox. cause & duty.
Bartolone v. Jeckovich – 4 car crash, P had acute psychotic break down which permanently disabled him. D arg. this not reasonably foreseeable. Take P as you find him. Eggshell skull theory. All jxns hold that if one physical injury is reasonably foreseeable, then all later physical injuries are foreseeable. Most jxns allow for psychological injuries as well.
In re Arbitration btwn Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co., Ltd. – Plank fell into cargo hold and caused a spark which made an explosion happen. As long as damage can be traced to neg. act then liability. Compensable as long as the act would or might probably cause damage – direct cause theory. ND law – measure of damages for tort – compensate for all detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could’ve been anticipated or not. (like Polemis rule) (takes the eggshell skull theory into account) (ND also uses this language to mean that if there is a chain of events, the court will look to make sure that there is some reasonable foreseeability at each phase).
Overseas Tankship(U.K.) v. Morts Dock & Eng. Co “Wagon Mound #1” – D’s oil came in contact with the slipways of P’s wharf. This oil ignited when some of P’s workers dropped molten metal into the water b/c it ignited some cotton waste. Fire seriously damaged the wharf and two ships. A man must be considered to be responsible for the probable consequences of his act – no more, but no less. This type of harm wasn’t reasonably foreseeable. Proximate means reasonably foreseeable events only.
Overseas Tankship(U.K.) v. Morts Dock & Eng. Co “Wagon Mound #2” – If it has happened before, then more foreseeable. Engineer should’ve foreseen the likelihood of a fire.
Palsgraf v. Long Island RR Co. – dropped firework package on RR tracks, scales fell over and hit woman. This case makes it necessary to look at P and if they are in the zone of danger. Was this a reasonably foreseeable P and was there a duty owed to her? No liability b/c not reasonably foreseeable P.
Yun v. Ford Motor Co. – Spare tire fell off, dad ran across highway to get it and was killed by car hitting him. No his actions were extraordinary, so not reasonably foreseeable. Intervening superseding causes of the accident which broke the chain of causation. Doesn’t meet proximate cause and debatable C/F. Common sense should be applied. Chang’s actions were viewed as an “intervening and superseding” force which cut off the liability at point where he acted.
Intervening Causes
Intervening act has to be foreseeable. If unforeseeable then it’s superseding.
Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp. – construction fiasco where the man was hit in the face with molten enamel when a man had a seizure driving a truck and ran into the construction site. Intervening cause b/c reasonably foreseeable that placing the enamel pot on the site close to the road/too close to the worksite that it would have potential to cause injury to the workers.
Watson v. KY & Indiana Bridge & RR Co. – Detrailed gas car. 3rd party struck a match to light the cigarette and P lit on fire b/c of the vapors from the gas. If there was tortious intent (or criminal) then it may go outside the realm of what is reasonably foreseeable. The act would then be superseding and sever the liability, but there are exceptions based off of context.
Fuller v. Preis – D got a head injury, then had seizures, and then killed himself. If it is a natural product of organic brain damage, then there wasn’t really control and there may be liability. If there was advanced planning, then it would’ve been a superseding force (but not in all suicide cases). Could be liable if mental health worker who didn’t prevent suicide.
McCoy v. American Suzuki Motor Corp. – Car rolled, man stopped to give assistance and was hit by a car after cop drove away. Rescue doctrine applies in product liability cases.
Still need prove prox cause. Prof. rescuers can only use the RD if the risk wasn’t reasonably foreseeable.
Four elements:
1. D was neg. to the person rescued and such neg. caused the peril to the person rescued
2. Peril or appearance of peril was imminent.
3. A reasonably prudent person would have concluded such a peril or appearance of peril existed
4. The rescuer acted w/reasonable care in effectuating the rescue
Public Policy
Kelly v. Gwinnell – social host case, gave a guy some drinks and then he got in a car accident on his way home. Social host is liable if they knew that the person became intoxicated and would attempt to drive later. Host only liable for a portion of the damages. W/minors – the social host is almost always held liable.
ND rule- against any person who knowingly disposes or gives away alcoholic beverage to a minor or an obviously intoxicated person. (social host liability) Only state to extend this to adults.
Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co. – DES case where mom & kid are attempting suit for defects. No prox. Cause. Multigenerational causes of action have generally been refused to be recognized.
DUTY OF CARE
Privity of Contract
Common types
1. P v. D – performance of K (professional neg.)
2. 3rd v. D – injury to P
Winterbottom v. Wright – manufacturer of mail coaches, one broke down. Used to not be able to sue if you were a 3rd party to K.
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. – birth of product liability law. Car suddenly collapsed b/c of defective wooden wheels. Manufacture was responsible for inspecting final product b/f allowing it to enter into the market. Liability if:
1. If by reasonable inspection the defect could’ve been discovered.
2. The nature of it if defectively made is dangerous.
3. The manufacturer knows or should known that it would be used w/o inspection.
H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co. – A building caught fire, D was contacted but they didn’t get the supply/pressure of h2o to them in time. There is no duty b/c there would be an indefinite amount of people who would be potentially able to recover. This falls outside of the zone of duty of D b/c it is outside the privity of contract.
Clagett v. Dacy – attorneys screwed up the land sale. btwn the P and D. Only privity btwn D and the client. There is a potential K that they would’ve ha

ders are held to different standard (heightened) b/c they shouldn’t be able to escape the duty to the public b/c they aren’t able to bargain effectively.
Winterstein v. Wilcom – Seriously injured while driving the race car. D was in tower to watch for hazards on track but failed to do so. The driver signed a waiver assuming the risk of his own injuries. The release was an agreement btwn the persons relating entirely to their private affairs. They are not void as a result of public policy b/c there was no leg. declaration.
Expressed A/R –
· scope
· public policy issues (look at bargaining power of the parties)
Implied A/R– can serve as a complete bar in some jxns in this country (in the 5 jxns that still use contributory neg., but for those that use comparative fault – then it isn’t a complete bar) (pro-P, subjective standard)
Rush v. Commercial Realty Co. – P were tenants of D. There was a detached bathroom that was 9 ft. to the bottom. D had a duty to maintain. P had no choice of bathrooms. D args implied assumption of risk. P knew that the floor was in bad shape (she was knowledgeable about the situation). She was forced to use it as a result of nature, so there was no assumption of the risk. Ask what that person would do, not a reasonable person standard.
Blackburn v. Dorta – The affirmative defense of implied assumption of risk is merged into the defense of contributory neg. and the principles of comparative neg. It shall apply in all cases where such a defense is asserted. Primary implied A/R was generally a distinction made that was like an expressed A/R b/c Kual aspect to it. No need for the primary distinction any more, look at them all as secondary. For secondary, reasonable conduct – but strict interpretation is too harsh (this isn’t workable anymore). Where there was unreasonable conduct it is “qualified”
ND – considers any risk that you impliedly assumed, like the situation in this case
Teeters v. Curry – St/lim malpractice action. P gave birth. D was attending physician. P had a bilateral tubal ligation, but ended up pregnant again. There were severe complications and a pre-mature kid. P had to have another of the same surgery The “discovery doctrine” applies and the time given in the st/lim doesn’t begin to run until the neg. injury is discovered, or should have been discovered. “date of injury” rule –st/lim date begins running at time of injury (here time of surgery). One yr. is short amt. of time. Limited to med. mal. where the claim is for neg. Tolled – means that there is a suspension from the ticking of the st/lim clock. Accrued means that a claim is actualized, meaning that it is another time to indicate commencement. Statutes of Repose – no pt. of injury that begins the st/lim to run, just an outer-bound limit of time to bring actions.
ND – time period of 10 yrs. after substantial completion of construction – then can’t bring K or tort suit. Add time of st/lim to the st/repose. (ex-with construction)
Immunities
· Somewhat similar to privileges, but different b/c immunities apply to all types of a case (family v. family)
· Privileges are a case by case analysis
· Immunities can apply across the board
Family
· Parental – Adult, Minor
· Interspousal
Freehe v. Freehe Neg. maintenance of a tractor. D is wife of P. P had no interest in nor was he employed by D for the farm. TC granted motion for SJ on basis of interspousal tort immunity. The spouses should be seen as separate individuals rather than a unit b/c each person is the best guardian of their own peace and tranquility, and limiting their recovery shouldn’t be limited to a criminal or divorce action. spousal immunity, countervailing reasons against outweigh those reasons for disability – after marriage formerly couldn’t sue which seems unfair b/c you could before
ND – hasn’t recognized for 90 yrs (b/c of statute)
Majority of jxns – no spousal immunity
Interspousal disability placed on married people since you could sue if tort b/f marriage but not after
Parental immunity – depends on jxn and age of child
· Motor torts – neg.
Cruel or malicious conduct by parent can still be prosecuted