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Torts
University of North Carolina School of Law
Daye, Charles Edward

®    Intentional: purpose and substantial certainty
®    Transferred Intent: person-to-person and tort-to-tort
®    Battery: harmful or offensive contact
®    Assault (imminence): imminent apprehension of battery
®    False imprisonment: confinement
®    Infliction of emotional distress: extreme and outrageous conduct; severe emotional distress
 
CHAPTER TWO: INTENTIONAL TORTS AGAINST THE PERSON
 
I Intent Defined
   
A. Meaning of intent:
            1. Purpose: The ∆ has to have the purpose of producing the consequence
a. The ∆ doesn’t necessarily have to have an intent/desire to harm Vosburg v. Putney (Π kicked ∆ on shin that lit up an infection)
2. Substantial certainty: If ∆ knows with substantial certainty that a particular effect will occur as a result of her actions she is deemed to have intended that result.  
a. ex: Garrat v. Dailey: Π knew w/SC that pulling chair out would cause ∆ to fall
b. reckless or highly likely is not enough
c. ∆ is liable even for any unforeseeable injury suffered by Π as a result of intentional tort (LIABLE FOR EVERYTHING THAT HAPPENS)
B. Transferred intent: If ∆ held the necessary intent with respect to person A, he will be held to have committed an intentional tort against any other person who happens to be injured. If ∆ intends one tort, but causes another, that is also transferred intent.
1.  Talmadge v. Smith: ∆ intends to throw stick to someone, but it hits the Π instead. Held: Liable to Π (person-to-person TI)
C. Mistake/Good Faith does not negate intent: Ranson v. Kitner (wolfe dog)
D. Insane People are capable of committing torts b/c they can be capable of forming intent to do a harmful act (not capable if you need malice)
            1. McGuire v. Almy: insane person ∆ hit nurse Π on head w/furniture
 
II Battery
 
A. Definition: Battery is the intentional infliction of a harmful or offensive bodily contact.  (contact that ends up being harmful or offensive)
B. Intent: It is not necessary that ∆ desires to physically harm Π. ∆ has the necessary intent for battery if it is the case that ∆ intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact.
C. Harmful or offensive contact: If the contact is ‘harmful,’ this qualifies. But battery also covers contacts which are merely ‘offensive.’ (damaging to a reasonable sense of dignity)
1. Some contacts are reasonable (brushing past) Wallace v. Rosen where teacher touches Π during fire drill
2

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D. Imminence/Present Ability: It must appear to Π that the harm being threatened is imminent, and that ∆ has the present ability to carry out the threat. (doesn’t include threats of future harm)
1. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Hill inappropriate fixing of the clock; Held: If counter was so wide that there was no present ability, there was no assault
2. If Π knows ∆ can’t carry out threat, it’s not assault
E. Π must be aware of danger
F. Apprehension ≠ Fear: It is sufficient that Π believes that harmful/offensive contact will occur if he does nothing
G. Reasonableness Standard: It’s not whether the particular Π felt apprehension, but whether an ordinary person not unduly sensitive would have been apprehensive
F. Threat to third persons: Π must have an apprehension that she herself will be subjected to a bodily contact. She may not recover for her apprehension that someone else will be so touched.