Criminal Law
Professor Neha Jain
Spring Semester, 2013
The Determination of Criminal Guilt
I. Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
A. In Re Winship
a. Court held that the due process clause protects the accused against conviction EXCEPT upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime.
B. Reasons for the holding?
a. Reduces the risk of convictions resting on factual error
b. Commands the respect and confidence of the community in applications of criminal law
c. Individuals do not fear improper prosecution
d. It is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free – distinguishes criminal standard from civil standard (Winship)
II. Expansion of Winship
A. Mullaney v. Wilbur (S.C. 1975) – D was charged with murder. Trial court instructed jury that if state proved that D killed the victim unlawfully and intentionally, then it was murder. If D persuaded jury that the killing was in the heat of passion on sudden provocation, then it was manslaughter. Supreme Court held that instructions violated Winship.
a. Court held that the due process clause required state not only to prove that D was guilty of criminal homicide, but also to persuade the jury regarding the facts relating to D’s degree of criminal culpability.
b. Once a D satisfies his burden of production regarding an affirmative defense, the prosecution is constitutionally required to disprove the defense.
III. Patterson v. New York (S.C. 1977) – D was charged with murder. He believed he was guilty of manslaughter because of extreme emotional disturbance for shooting his wife’s lover.
A. N.Y. homicide statute required proof of 3 facts:
a. (1) human death;
b. (2) that the accused caused it; and
c. (3) that the accused intended the result.
B. The statute explicitly made extreme emotional disturbance an affirmative defense. D argued that Mullaney invalidated the statute because the law permitted the prosecutor to shift to him the burden of proving his lesser level of culpability due to extreme emotional disturbance.
a. Supreme Court upheld the statute.
C. Court rejected reading of Mullaney that the due process clause requires the prosecution to prove any fact affecting the D’s degree of criminal culpability
D. Court reasoned that if it endorsed that broad reading, legislatures would be inclined to repeal defenses, or at least not broaden them.
E. Under the due process clause, the prosecution is required to prove every element in the definition of an offense, but the legislature may allocate to the D the burden of persuasion regarding non-elements, i.e., defenses.
IV. Analysis of Winship, Mullaney & Patterson
A. In view of underlying values of the due process clause enunciated in Winship – since prosecution is required to prove the elements of an offense, even if the crime is a trivial one that will not result in substantial incarceration or stigma, it should also be required to prove the degree of a person’s guilt.
B. Mullaney and Patterson worried about restricting legislative choices, so the court allows the legislature to shift the element of provocation to the D as an affirmative defense
C. Practical effect of Patterson is to permit legislatures, at least under the aegis of the due process clause, to avoid most of the restrictions in Winship by redrafting their statutes to treat the absence of an element of an offense as an affirmative defense.
V. Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?
A. “It is that state of the case, which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge … .” (C.J. Shaw in Commonwealth v. Webster)
VI. The Model Penal Code (§§1.12-13)
A. Prosecutor is not required to disprove an affirmative defense “unless there is evidence supporting such defense.”
a. It does not specify the strength of the evidence required to satisfy the defendant’s burden of production.
B. General rule for burden of persuasion is that the prosecution must prove every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
C. The term “element” as used in the MPC includes conduct that “negatives an excuse or justification” for the action.
a. MPC allocates to the prosecution the duty to disprove defenses, assuming that the D has satisfied his burden of production. This does not apply to defenses that the MPC expressly requires the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence.
The Determination of Criminal Punishment
I. The Goals of Punishment
A. Utilitarianism/Deterrence (formulated by Bentham) – pain inflicted by punishment is justifiable if, but only if, it is expected to result in a reduction in the pain of crime throughout society
a. Humans are rational actors – balance the expected benefits of the proposed conduct against its risks, considering such factors as the likelihood of successful commission of the crime, the risk of detection and conviction, and the severity of the likely punishment.
b. The rational actor will avoid criminal activity is the perceived potential pain (punishment) outweighs the expected potential pleasure (criminal rewards).
c. No matter how egregious the wrongdoing, utilitarians do not advocate punishment unless they believ it will provide an overall social benefit.
B. General deterrence – a person is punished in order to convince the general community to forego criminal conduct.
a. the person is used as a means to a net reduction in crime
b. person’s punishment teaches us what conduct is impermissible
c. person’s punishment instills fear of punishment in would-be violators of the law
C. Specific deterrence – a person is punished to deter future misconduct by that person.
a. Incapacitation – imprisonment prevents him from committing crimes
b. Intimidation – punishment reminds him that if he returns to crime, he will experience more pain
II. Retribution – punishment is justified when it is deserved.
A. Looks backwards to justify punishment solely on the basis of the voluntary commission of a crime.
B. Based on the view that humans possess free will, and therefore, may justly be blamed when they choose to violate society’s mores.
C. Assaultive retribution – it is morally right to hate criminals. Because the criminal has harmed society, it is morally right to hurt him back.
D. Protective retribution – punishment is a means of securing a moral balance in the society.
a. Society is made of rules, and as long as everyone follows the rules, an equilibrium exists – everyone is similarly benefited and burdened
b. If a person fails to exercise self-restraint, he destroys the balance and becomes a free-rider – he benefits from the system of rule without accepting the same burdens
c. By punishing the wrongdoer, society demonstrates its respect for him – society treats him as a responsible moral agent
d. Punishment permits the offender to pay his debt to society and to return to it free of moral guilt and stigma
E. Victim vindication – by committing an offense, a criminal implicitly sends a message to the victim and society that his rights and desires are more valuable than those of the victim. Punishment corrects this false claim – it reaffirms the victim’s worth as a human being in the face of the criminal’s challenge.
III. Rehabilitation (paternalistic) – prefers to use the correctional system to refor
sary to establish a duty of care. Slight expansion in this area of criminal law because there are many more unconventional relationships nowadays.
B. People v. Carroll (1999)
a. Held – a stepmother owes a duty of care to her husband’s children
C. State v. Miranda (2005) – Miranda, a live-in bf failed to protect a four-month-old child from a fatal beating inflicted by his girlfriend, the child's mother
a. Held – his family-like relationship assuming responsibility for her children DOES NOT establish a duty of care
b. Our trend toward non-traditional family arrangements IS WHY establishing duties will bring too “amorphous, and too fact based and based on hindsight, to fit comfortably within our Penal Code.”
IV. Exceptions to the No-Liability Rule
A. Statutory Duty – a duty to act may be statutorily imposed
B. Status Relationship – even in the absence of a statute, a person may have a common law duty to act because she stands in a special status relationship to another.
a. Typically founded on the dependence of one party on the other, or on their interdependence – parents to their minor children; married couples to one another.
C. Contractual Obligation – a duty to act may be created by implied or express contract.
a. Commonwealth v. Pestinikas – D permitted a 92 year-old person to die of starvation after agreeing to feed him, and knowing there was no other way for him to obtain food. D was convicted of third degree murder.
b. Jones v. United States (D.C. Ct. App. 1962) – D found guilty of involuntary manslaughter for the death of a 10 month old boy. Baby was placed with D. Conflicting evidence whether mother was also staying with D and whether D was being paid to care for the baby. D appealed on the issue that D was under a legal duty to supply food and necessities to the baby.
1. Held – that a finding of legal duty is the critical element of the crime charged and failure to instruct the jury concerning it was plain error.
c. Mens Rea – there is potential for a murder charge if the D refusedaid with the intention of causing death, OR full knowledge of a great risk that the decedent would die
B. Bystander Indifference
a. Pope v. State (Md. Ct. App. 1979) – D found guilty of child abuse and misprison of felony (disclose knowledge of criminal acts) under common law. D took in mother and child for the weekend when they had nowhere else to go. Mother severely beat the child and the child died as a result of the injuries. D did not seek immediate medical attention nor did she intervene to prevent the mother from beating the child.
1. Held – reversed conviction because the mother was always present, thus D was not responsible for the supervision of the child.
2. Contemporary misprision of felony requires active concealment of a known felony
b. Balancing Test – general duty to assist should be justified if it may mitigate injury or loss of life, but that duty must not interfere unduly with the liberty interests of the individual. Considerations: (1) closeness/proximity; (2) whether intervention is safe/easy
