Consitutional Law I
Fred Morrison
Fall 2013
FEDERAL JUDICIAL POWER
A. AUTHORITY FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
a. Marbury v. Madison
i. TWO THINGS
1. Constitution is the supreme law of the land-Article III is ceiling
2. Judicial review established
ii. Article III: created the fed. judiciary and defines its powers. Some of the topics covered:
1. “The judicial Power of the U.S. shall be vested.”
2. “… in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time establish.”
3. “cases” and “controversies”
4. Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the S.Ct. has appellate jurisdiction, subject to “such Exception and under such regulations as Congress shall make.”
iii. Judicial Review: The judiciary has the authority to review the constitutionality of executive and legislative acts, as long as they are not “political”
1. Distinguish b/n “political acts” and “duties”
a. Political discretionary-not reviewable by court
2. Check on legislative branch.
3. If the S.Ct. identifies a conflict btw a cons-al provision and a congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconst-al and to refuse to enforce it.
iv. Marbury’s 5 themes in a nutshell:
1. Separation of Powers: their powers sometimes overlap to act as a checks and balances to prevent from exceeding
2. Fed. Law Supremacy: Not implicated classically; when conflict b/n the Constitution and the act of Congress—constitution wins
a. Constitution is the supreme law of the land
3. Enumerated Powers; fed. court can only exercise powers given by the Constitution (Art.III is a ceiling)
4. Federalism: none
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b. Judicial review of state and local actions
i. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee (dispute over land; whether a VA statute conflicted w/a fed. treaty)
1. The Court can review the constitutionality of a decision by a state’s highest court
a. A state is not a sovereign entity.
b. Need for uniformity in decisions throughout nation interpreting the Constitution
c. M v. M applies to state decision!
2. The S.Ct. may determine whether a state court has reached a decision that is not in conformity w/ the Constitution; but it may NOT review state court decisions that merely adjudicate of state law (exclusive and adequate), ONLY FED. QUESTIONS (Appellate Jurisdiction).
ii. Cohen’s v. Virginia-criminal Ds can seek S.Ct. review when they claim their conviction violates the Constitution.
B. LIMITS ON FED. JUDICIAL POWER-ARTICLE III
a. Congressional limits
i. Congress’ ability to limit jurisdiction of fed. courts:
1. Article III ceiling (m v.M)
2. McCardle and Klein
ii. Article III-sets out types of cases S.Ct. can hear: “box” of powers, Can Congress give anything outside of the box-NO (M. v. M.); can they remove powers w/in the box?
iii. Article III: the Exceptions and Regulations Clause: “the S.Ct. shall have appellate jurisdiction both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such regulations as the congress shall make.”
1. One side: provides Congress with broad powers to remove matters from S.Ct. purview-a check on judiciary’s power
2. Other side: Congress is limited in ability to control S.Ct. jurisdiction-clause modifies the word “fact” (concern about ability to over-turn the fact finder)
3. Both views-power cannot be used in manner that violates Constitution
iv. Ex parte McCardle (Congress takes away S.Ct.’s appellate jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus pleas)
1. Congress has the ability to modify jurisdiction of the Supreme Court-can decide when S.Ct. can hear cases.
2. Although the Court’s authority stems from the Constitution, it “is conferred w/such exceptions and under such regulations as congress shall make.”
a. S.Ct. right to hear an HC case is only withdrawn where Court gets case by appeal from lower courts: an original petition for HC could be commenced in S.Ct. (Felker v. Turpin)
v. US v. Klein (S. Ct. decides what constitutes loyalty after Civil War)
1. Separation of powers is a limit on Congress’ authority to limit S.Ct. jurisdiction.
2. While acknowledging Congress’ power to create exceptions and regulations to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, Congress cannot direct the results in particular cases, there by invading the judicial function.
3. Any jurisdictional limitation must be neutral
vi. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon
1. Congress has power to pass legislation that will affect only suits pending or going forward
2. Courts must apply new law to cases pending-not old cases or fact finding.
vii. Important consideration: Article III shouldn’t be looked at in isolation
1. “Everyone should have their day in court.”
a.
b. Justiciability limits
i. Five limits:
1. Prohibition on advisory opinions
2. Standing
3. Ripeness
4. Mootness
5. Political Question
ii. Advisory opinion
1. To avoid an advisory opinion, there must:
a. Be an actual dispute between adverse litigants, and
b. A substantial likelihood that a fed. court decision will bring about some change or effect
2. Court doesn’t give advice on how to do smth-only CASE or CONTROVERSY!
3. Congress cannot vest review of the decisions of Art III Courts in officials of the Executive Branch (Hayburn’s case)
4. A statute cannot retroactively command the fed. courts to reopen final judgments, thus violating separation of powers and principle that a judgment conclusively resolves the case (Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm)
5. Compared w/ declaratory judgments
a. Parties seeking declaratory judgment have been actually injured by statute and not just concerned with hypothetical activity.
iii. Standing
1. Const-al standing requirements:
a. P. must allege that he has suffered or imminently will suffer an injury
b. P. must allege that the injury is caused by A conduct
c. P. must allege that a favorable fed. court decision is likely to redress the injury
2. Prudential standing requirements:
a. Limitation on 3rd party standing
b. Prohibition against generalized grievances
3. Injury
a. General principles:
i. The injury cannot be merely speculative, hypothetical, amorphous or conjectural. (Wright)
ii. Injuries must be concrete, finite, or imminent
iii. If a Const-al right is violated, the injury requirement is satisfied
iv. Common law violation are injuries as well, and they satisfy the injury requirement
Massachusets v. Environment:-global warming, upheld, showed everything
b. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
i. Injury must be actual and imminent
1. Desire to use or observe an animal species, even for a purely aesthetic purpose is an interest for purposes of standing
2. The desire to return some day to the areas affected is insufficient for standing “w/o any description of concrete plans or any specification of when the some day will be “-otherwise too speculative
i. Association has standing where its own interests are at stake, or
ii. Association can sue on behalf of its members if:
1. Members would otherwise have staning to sue themselves
2. Interests sought to be protected are crucial to organizations’s purpose, AND
3. Neither claim nor relief requires participation of members in lawsuit
e. First Amendment provides grounds to assert rights of parties not before the court if a statute abridges 1st amendment (overbreadth doctrine)
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6. Prohibition against generalized grievances
a. General Rule: If the plaintiff alleges a violation of no specific const-al right, but instead claims an interest only as a taxpayer or a citizen in having the gov. follow the law, standing is not allowed.
i. Standing would exist if taxpayer were challenging the constitutionality on a tax they were subject to or a miscalculation by IRS.. individual relief for their own tax status
a.
b. Rule before 19680Frothingham v. Mellon
i. Fed. court review must be based on a P’s alleging indefinite way in common w/ people generally.”
ii. Taxpayer had no standing to assert that taxpayers’ funds in general were being improperly collected or spent
c. EXCEPTION made after 1968 –Flast v. Cohen (tax payers challenged funding of religious schools-Court allowed suit b/c this was a violation of Establishment Clause)
i. Taxpayer may challenge constitutionality of a fed. taxing and spending program if there is a logical nexus b/n status of a taxpayer and the claim
ii. Two part nexus test:
1. Statute must rely on Congress’ taxing and spending power (Art. I, §8); i.e. Congress must be spending or taxing!
2. The law/expenditure must violate a specific const-al limitation: here the expenditure was in violation of 1st amendments (religion)
iii. NOTE: No case after Flast has been able to come w/in the exception!! This is a narrow exception!!
d. Cases that failed the Flast test:
i. US V. Richardson –taxpayer wasn’t technically challenging how congress was spending money, he was challenging a CIA regulation-only those const-al provisions which act as “specific limitations” on the taxing and spending power of congress may be relied upon
i. Valley Forge College-No standing b/c the govt. action was authorized not by the T&C clause, but by the Property Clause. First part of the test was satisfied.
e. Citizenship suits: no standing on the part of citizens as to object to unlawful or unconst-al conduct b/c they have no individualized injury in fact. (Schelesinger v. Reservists)
f. After these cases, the only situation in which a taxpayer standing appears permissible is if the P challenges a got. Expenditure as violating the establishment clause.
g. Challenging an administrative agency regulation that doesn’t directly control person’s activities-P must be part of the group intended to benefit from the law
