UN and Other International Organizations Outline

UN & IO’s Outline Daugirdas Fall 2012
I.                   Introduction to IOs and the UN
          Introduction- September 5th
·         UN Charter
Ø  Article (23/1)à Who sits on the Security Council: 5 permanent members/ 10 elected non-permanent members.
Ø  Article (27/1)à How many votes do we need: 9 votes.
Ø  Article (24/1)à “… the security acts on its behalf.”
Ø  Article (2/1)à Sovereign Equality/ But what about the 5 permanent members? The fact they have a “Veto” and a permanent position & membership in the SC.
Ø  Article (25)à Legal Obligations to carry out the SC decisions in accordance with the charter. / Does there have to be a violation to International law so that the SC has to make any movement? No, we do not have to need a violation to international law, only international threat for peace is enough to get the SC use its authority and make movements & adopt resolutions when there’s such threat.  (So the council can go under chapter 7).
Ø  Article (103)à The charter prevail on the other obligations. E.g. Luxury Goods, so if there was an agreement between Korea and France on exporting alcohols before the nuclear test that Korea had, what happens? The answer is in the Article 103; that France should follow the obligations according to the charter that prevails on any other obligations.
Ø  When the SC is not clear about a specific matter, such the definition of luxury goods, maybe another resolution that is more specific should be adopted.
·         SC Resolution 1718 (2006): It was clear from the language that the SC was acting under chapter 7. / What did the SC do? à Paragraph 8 was about package on sanctions. Paragraph (8/b) was in context with Article (41) of the charter, as ceasing the export is not considered an armed force. Paragraph (12) Establishing a committee after adopting a resolution assure the continuousness of its existence and that there will be no need for designation after that. However this resolution does not give the authority for other member states to use military forces to prevent Korea from making another nuclear test and thus breaching the resolution.
                        -This resolution Calls upon member states to cooperate, but this isn’t a                                “decision” so is not mandatory.
            – Realists: cost benefit analysis.  If sanctions costly, states resist
              Functionalists: If no longer beneficial, necessary, dissolve IO
              Constructivists: meet with DPRK
·         SC Resolution regarding Syria (2012): In order to adopt a resolution by the SC there must be an international threat, but how is this related to Syria? Article (2/7) puts limitations on the UN not to interfere in the internal jurisdiction of the member states but without making any prejudice to the application of enforcement measures under Chapter 7; and this was clear in the paragraph (14) of the resolution. What Syria was doing was a terrorism that is clearly violated Human rights and international human rights laws, this would have affected the world in many different aspects (economics, politics,..)
 
            Theoretical Frameworks for Understanding IOs- September 6th
·         Alvarez:
v  IOs are typically collections of sovereign states that have banded together as states to create, under a constitutive international agreement governed by international law usually known as a charter or a constitution, an apparatus charged with the pursuit of certain defined common ends
v  Reasons for creating IOs: Externalities, depoliticization, administrative; IOs are useful for states, as they approximate the prime factors of state-centric international law. These IOs have their own legal personality that is dependent from the states created it.
v  Functionalist Theories
§  The most common perspective on IOs remains functionalism
§  Credits changing state needs for both the rise in, and the subsequent development of IOs
§  Historical analysis: Sates discouraged conflict and generated cooperation and later a permanent diplomatic ambassador.
§  19th century states’ interdependence led to the rise of multilateral international conferences on an ad ho and periodical basis.
§  Later there had been a necessary for common approaches to problems of commerce, communication and transportation, which can be better filled through the creation of permanent secretariats and unanimous agreement for taking action.
§  As a reaction to the WWI, the League of Nations was the progenitor of the modern universal international organization. Its idea was to force the adhesion of pre-1914 international relations into a system or an organized international society. Its main goals were not mere acceptance of obligations but also promoting international cooperation. Three pronged approach: peaceful settlements, collective security,  and disarmament.
§  Failure of the League of Nations contributes to: 1. Constitutional weaknesses (e.g. unanimity requirement) 2. Non-universality 3. Lack of political will (e.g half sanctions). Although it failed but it established important precedents in international institutional law.
§  After WWII, IOs increased at an extraordinary level in respond to the increasing needs for inter-state cooperation in the wake of increasing interdependence.
§  However the functionalists see the decline of the IOs number was due to the fact that IOs dissolved when the ceased to meet the needs of their creators.
§  Functionalist accounts of IOs assume that states are the dominant actors in international relations and engage in the anarchic pursuit of power without institutions and that, over time, they respond rationally to developments and learn from experiences (such as the failure of the ad hoc conferences because they were dependent on the initiation of a state and limited to the specific agenda and restricted only to the states invited by the host….)
§  IOs create the conditions for orderly multilateral relations by reducing the costs of making transactions, legitimating different forms if inter-state action and increasing the quality of information received by states and this has of course a positive result in the determination of international outcomes as well as the distribution of capabilities among states.
§  Agencies called into being, sustained and controlled by states./ Product of states’ needs that state acts through them.
§  Article (2/4) is a reflection for the states’ need for a more effective collective security system to fulfill their need for stability.
§  They are created because states rationally respond to the challenges they face.
§  Operate in a competing world of states predetermined interests.
v  Realism
§  Share an assumption with the functionalists that: 1. States are the only important actors. 2. States pursue power within an anarchic system. 3. The competing state interests define the significant issue of foreign affairs. 4. Accept the fact that states can learn.
§  The rise and fall of IOs is subject to three caveats:
A.    IOs have not altered the conditions in which states find themselves. (Functionalists see cooperation while realists see a huge chaotic system). They see the IOs’ instruments ineffective ways of agreements between states. And that those IOs have not improved the world or the states sovereignty.
B.     They are result of the more powerful states whose interests matter more. (UN security council and the NATO are creatures of the most powerful states emerging WWII)/ Relative hegemonic within the respective organizations (USA). Page 31 for IRAQ
C.    IOs who are concerned with high politics and involving national security issue are the ones that matter, because none of them except EU, aspires to governance over states. The UN for the them is only an effective collective security system for “relatively minor significance” or it reflects the prevail of most powerful states.
D.    There is no tendency towards international governance.
§  Suspect th