Functions of Tort Law: corrective justice, optimal deterrence, loss distribution, compensation, redress of social grievances
–corrective justice: law, as a matter of fairness between the parties to a dispute, undoes imbalance created by a violation of a preexisting right
–economic efficiency: let costs lie where they fall in accidents unless some clear social benefit is achieved by shifting them; cost should be put on party best located to make cost-benefit analysis
–efficiency consequences: how much in total a certain policy, rule will cost society
–distributional consequences: who pays costs
I. Intentional Torts
A. Physical Harms 1. Battery
–the intentional infliction of harmful bodily conduct upon another
–Restatement Third, § 1 Intent
–a person intentionally causes harm if he brings about that harm purposely or knowingly
–Purpose: A person purposely causes harm if he acts with desire to bring about that harm
–Knowledge: if engage in action knowing harm is substantially certain to occur
Vosburg v. Putney
–def kicked ¶ in shin in classroom; prior injury to leg; touch activated microbes, caused destruction of the bone
–Ct.: to recover for battery, ¶ must show “either that the intention was unlawful, or that the defendant is in fault. If the intended act is unlawful, the intention to commit it must necessarily be unlawful. . . .no implied license to do the act existed . . .a violation of order and decorum of school, and necessarily unlawful.”
–“The rule of damages for torts” is “that the wrong-doer is liable for all injuries resulting directly from the wrongful act, whether or not they could have been foreseen by him.”
Mohr v. Williams
–¶ consented to operation on right ear; def operated on left; ¶ claimed she did not consent and constituted assault and battery
–Ct.: “If the operation was performed without ¶’s consent, and the circumstances were not such as it justify its performance without [i.e. emergencies] it was wrongful; and, if it was wrongful, it was unlawful . . .every person has a right to complete immunity of his person from physical interference of others . . .and any unlawful or unauthorized touching of the person of another constitutes assault and battery.”
–Emergency Rule: consent implied from circumstances
Hudson v. Craft
–boxing exhibitions at carnival violated code because prize money given and def did not have license and violated with rules of State Athletic Commission (legislature regulates)
–¶ took part and was injured
–Restatement § 61: “Where it is a crime to inflict a particular invasion of an interest of personality upon a particular class of persons, irrespective of their assent, and the policy of the law is primarily to protect the interests of such a class of persons from their inability to appreciate the consequences of such an invasion, their assent is not consent.”
–Ct.: promoter liable as a principal because he is “activating force” and contestants “protected from his conduct and their ill-advised participation in an unregulated match”
–Athletic injuries–¶ consent to injury from rules of game but not when blows illegal
(Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc.; Naobzny v. Barnhill; Turcotte v Fell—not liable)
2. Self Defense
Courvoiser v. Raymond
–def thought his jewelry store was being robbed; he expelled intruders with gun; he fired shots to frighten them away; officer approached def, identified himself and told him not to shoot; def fired; jury only asked to decided if ¶ was assaulting def at time he shot
–Ct.: Jury should have been asked to decide if there was justification for shooting because it occurred during a riot and def potentially mistook ¶ for rioter
3. Defense of Property
M’Ilvoy v. Cockran
–def tore down fence on ¶’s land, and ¶ wounded him in throwing him off prop
–Ct.: Rule: “Where possession has been invaded by implied force only, injuries in defense of the possession ought to be justified by way of moliter manus; but where the possession is attacked by actual force, force may be employed by the possessor.”
–assault and battery justified, not wounding
Bird v. Holbrook
–walled garden with spring gun traps set to injure and catch thief, not for deterrence; ¶ went into garden to retrieve bird, got shot
–Ct.: “he who sets spring guns, without giving notice, is guilty of an inhuman act, and if injurious consequences ensure, he is liable to yield redress to the sufferer.”
Katko v. Briney
–shotgun trap in abandoned house; jury instruction: “one may use reasonable force in the protection of his property, but such right is subject to the qualification that one may not use such force as will take human life or inflict great bodily injury.”
4. Necessity
Ploof v. Putn
rt, no damages”
–“When any man does an act, he is bound to do it in such manner that by his act no prejudice or damage is done to others.”—negligence
–“If a man suffers damage, it is right that he be recompensed. . . and so according to the amount of the trespass, it is proper that he should make amends.”—strict liability
–“he should have said that he could not do it in any other manner or that he did all that was in his power to keep them out; otherwise he shall pay damages.”—negligence
Weaver v. Ward
–¶ wounded by gun in military skirmish; def pleads inevitable accident
“No man shall be excused of a trespass except it may be judged utterly without his fault.”
Scott v. Shepherd
–def threw lighted squib in open space; it was tossed around and eventually struck ¶
–Ct.: injury is direct and immediate act of def; act unlawful
Guille v. Swan
–def flew balloon that landed in ¶’s garden; liable for damage caused by storming crowd
Brown v. Kendall
–dog fight; def tried to break it up and accidentally hit ¶ in eye with a stick
–Ct.: “if act of hitting ¶ unintentional and done in the doing of a lawful act, then def not liable unless it was done in the want of exercise of due care.” def should be allowed to instruct jury that if he was using ordinary care, and / or ¶ / both not, he is not liable
Fletcher v. Rylands
–¶’s property flooded by water from reservoir on def’s land
–Ct.: “We think that the true rule of law is that the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.” (should be party to suffer)
Brown v. Collins
–def’s horses frightened by train and ran into ¶’s lamp post
–Ct. refuses to extend rule of Rylands v. Fletcher and holds for def
