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First Amendment
University of Michigan School of Law
Herzog, Donald

Table of Contents
I.                   Opening Problems
a.       “The Greater Power Includes the Lesser.” Commonwealth v. Davis.
b.      Rights, Privileges, and Unconstitutional Conditions. Speiser v. Randall.
c.       Overbreadth.
                                                              i.      Broaderick v. Oklahoma.
                                                            ii.      Lewis v. New Orleans.
                                                          iii.      Virginia v. Hicks.
 
II.                Prior Restraint
a.       Leach v. Carlile.
b.      Near v. Minnesota.
c.       Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe
 
III.             Speech, Advocacy, and Action
a.       Masses v. Patten.
b.      Abrams v. United States.
c.       Gitlow v. New York.
d.      Whitney v. California.
e.       Thomas v. Collins.
f.       United States v. Dennis.
g.      Brown v. Louisiana.
h.      Watts v. United States.
i.        Brandenburg v. Ohio.
j.        United States v. Rahman.
 
IV.             Picketing and Intimidation
a.       Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union.
b.      Youngdahl v. Rainfair.
c.       NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware.
 
V.                Symbolic Speech & Two Models of a Legal Right
a.       United States v. O’Brien.
b.      Tinker v. Des Moines School District.
c.       Cohen v. California.
d.      Fricke v. Lynch.
e.       Arcara v. Cloud Books.
f.       Texas v. Johnson.
 
VI.             Fighting Words and Hate Speech
a.       Cantwell v. Connecticut
b.      State v. Klapprott.
c.       Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.
d.      Kunz v. New York.
e.       Feiner v. New York.
f.       Beauharnais v. Illinois.
g.      Doe v. University of Michigan.
 
VII.          Commercial Speech and Outdoor Signs
a.       Valentine v. Chrestensen.
b.      Jamison v. Texas.
c.       Virginia Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens.
d.      Linmark Associates v. Willingboro.
e.       Central Hudson v. New York.
 
VIII.       Obscenity
a.       Roth v. United States.
b.      Manual Enterprises v. Day.
c.       Miller v. California.
d.      Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton.
 
IX.             Forced Speech, Staying Silent, Anonymity, and Association
a.       Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis
b.      West Virginia Bd. Of Education v. Barnette
c.       NAACP v. Alabama
d.      Talley v. California
e.       Wooley v. Maynard
f.       Hurley v. Irish-American GLIB
g.      Boy Scouts of America v. Dale
h.      Rumsfeld v. FAIR
 
X.                Marginal Speakers or Social Settings?
a.       Soldiers: Parker v. Levy
b.      Prisoners: Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Union
c.       Students: Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser
d.      Government Employees:
                                                              i.      McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford
                                                            ii.      Pickering v. Board of Education
                                                          iii.      Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School Dist.
                                                          iv.      Connick v. Myers
                                                            v.      McMullen v. Carson
                                                          vi.      Melzer v. Board of Ed.
                                                        vii.      Garcetti v. Ceballos
 
XI.             Defamation Law and the Press
a.       New York Times v. Sullivan
b.      St. Amant v. Thompson
c.       Monitor Patriot v. Roy
d.      Ocala Star-Banner v. Damron
e.       Shiver v. Apalachee Publishing
f.       Pring v. Penthouse
g.      Hustler v. Falwell
 
XII.          A Conceptual Thicket: Time, Place, and Manner Regulation; Public Forum Analysis; Content- and Viewpoint-Neutrality
a.       Hague v. CIO
b.      Saia v. New York
c.       Kovacs v. Cooper
d.      Police Department v. Mosley
e.       American Booksellers v. Hudnutt
f.       Renton v. Playtime Theatres
g.      Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier
h.      United States v. Kokinda
i.        Rust v. Sullivan
j.        Burson v. Freeman
k.      R.A.V. v. St. Paul
l.        Arkansas Educational TV v. Forbes
m.    NEA v. Finley
n.      Cuffley v. Mickes
o.      Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez
p.      Virginia v. Black
q.      Morse v. Frederick
 
XIII.       Testing the Doctrine: Anti-Abortion Protests
a.       Frisby v. Schultz
b.      Madsen v. Women’s Health Center
c.       Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network
d.      Hill v. Colorado
 
XIV.       Religion
a.       People v. Ruggles
b.      Davis v. Beason
c.       Cochran v. Louisiana Board of Ed.
d.      Torcaso v. Watkins
e.       United States v. Seeger
f.       Stone v. Graham
g.      Estate of Thornton v. Caldor
h.      Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing
i.        Illinois Ex. Rel. McCollum v. Board of Ed.
j.        Zorach v. Clauson
k.      Engel v. Vitale
l.        School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp
m.    Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York
n.      Prince v. Massachusetts
o.      McGowan v. Maryland
p.      Braunfeld v. Brown
q.      Sherbert v. Verner
r.        Lemon v. Kurtzman
s.       Lynch v. Donnelly
t.        Wallace v. Jaffree
u.      American Jewish Congress v. Chicago
v.      Allegheny County v. ACLU
w.    McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky
x.      Employment Division v. Smith
y.      Widmar v. Vincent
z.       ISKCON v. Lee
aa.   Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist.
bb. Capitol Square Review Board v. Pinette
cc.   Rosenberger v. University of Virginia
dd.Zelman v. Zimmons-Harris
ee.   Locke v. Davey
ff.    Pleasant Grove City v. Summum
gg. Ward v. EMU
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opening Problems
I.                   “The Greater Power Includes the Lesser.”
 
 
Commonwealth v. Davis (Mass, 1895 – Holmes):
 
I.                   Take-Away: The idea that the greater includes the lesser is bad law today. Although the government has no affirmative duty to provide streets/common areas, once it does, individuals have a 1A right to speak there.
 
II.                Background: City of Boston Ordinance: “No person shall make any public address” in Boston Common “except in accordance with a permit from the mayor.”
 
III.             Holding: The ordinance is constitutional, because the government has the right to control the use of its property. 
 
IV.             Analysis:
a.       The legislature could unconditionally forbid speaking on its property the same way that a private citizen can on his property.
                                                              i.      €: This completely misses the 1A “state action” requirement.
b.      “The Greater Includes the Lesser”: The legislature can restrict the mode by which the public can use its property.
c.       The absolute ban is not rendered invalid by the fact that it may be removed in a particular case.
 
II.                Rights, Privileges, and Unconstitutional Conditions.  
 
 
Unconstitutional Conditions: The government cannot condition a benefit on the requirement that a person forgo a constitutional right. The condition must be germanely related to a legitimate governmental interest.
 
 
Speiser v. Randall (S.C. 1958, Brennan):
                   
I.                   Take-Away: The screaming Communist wins, not because his own rights have been violated, but to protect the imagined “bashful radical” whose speech is protected but will not speak out of fear of losing a tax exemption. This would not be a problem if the government bore the burden of proof (bullshit).
 
II.                Background: California law provides that, for an individual to receive a veterans’ property tax exemption, he had to sign a declaration disavowing a belief in overthrowing the U.S. government by force or violence.
 
III.             Holding: The law is unconstitutional on its face. 
 
IV.             Analysis: Even assuming the “greater includes the lesser” (that because the government can jail you for being a radical, they can surely deny you a tax exemption), the procedures which place the burdens of proof and persuasion on the taxpayer are a violation of due process. The State must come forward with sufficient proof to justify the inhibition of the constitutional right to speech. The veterans could not be required to execute the oath as a precondition to their exemption eligibility.
a.       Greater includes the lesser: Speech can be limited through the taxing power. 
b.      The more important the right, the more significant must be its procedural safeguards.
c.       Under this law, the taxpayer bears the burden of producing evidence justifying their claim of exemption. Even after he takes the oath, the tax assessor can still disbelieve him.
d.      It is irrelevant that an exemption is a “privilege” – its denial is akin to a fine/punishment. 
e.       Criminal defendants never bear the burden of proving their innocence vs. the taxpayer normally bears the burden of introducing evidence to contradict the determination of the tax collector. Abridging the right to free speech falls in between.
f.       Chilling Effect: The danger of the current procedure is that it risks erring on the side of abridging constitutionally-protected speech. If the veteran bears the burden of proof, he will have to steer wider of the

ticularly skittish.
b.      Here, the court may simply fail to believe that there exists a “bashful leafletter” that is so scared that he will not risk permit denial.
c.       Herzog: you could read Scalia as saying: this case has nothing to do w/overbreadth, but instead it’s been read as: Court doesn’t like using overbreadth anymore.
 
 
 
 
Prior Restraint
 
Prior Restraint:
·         An administrative or legal order that prevents speech from occurring or reaching its audience.
·         Prior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights, and any system of prior restraints of expression comes to the Court with a “heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.”
 
 
 
Leach v. Carlile (S.C. 1922, Clarke):
 
I.                   Background: 
a.       Leach sold “Organo Tablets” which he advertised through the mail as recommended by physicians to cure a bunch of issues.
b.      Postmaster issued a “fraud order” prohibiting the delivery of mail to him, etc. after deciding that the substance that the appellant was perpetrating a fraud upon the public.”
c.       DC denied Leach’s request for an injunction restraining the Postmaster from giving effect to the fraud order.
 
II.                Holding: Restricting delivery of mail is not a prior restraint.
 
III.             Holmes (dissent) – what’s notable about the opinion: This is a prior restraint. 
a.       Stopwatch model: the problem with prior restraint is that it keeps the message from ever getting to the audience.
b.      “Prior restraint” includes restraining the listener from getting the message, even if the speaker is not restrained from speaking.
c.       Alternatives: Where habit and law combine to exclude every other [means of transporting letters], it seems that the 1A in terms forbids such control.
 
IV.             Law today: Leach loses. 
 
 
Court Orders as a Prior Restraint:
 
Near v. Minnesota (S.C. 1931, Hughes):
 
I.                   Take-Away: Because of the worry about the overzealous government (as opposed to the bashful radical), the appropriate way of dealing with unprotected speech is through punishment after the fact, not through a prior restraint.
 
II.                Background: 
a.       Minnesota Law provides for the abatement/injunction as a public nuisance of a “malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine, or other periodical.”
b.      Ds are enjoined from publishing (or even possessing) a newspaper, “The Saturday Press,” because they published very bigoted articles charging that law enforcement was not energetically pursuing a Jewish gangster/gambler/bootlegger/racketeer.
 
III.             Holding: The statute is an infringement of the liberty of the press, because it is a prior restraint.
 
IV.             Analysis:
a.       Slippery slope: even if this speech should perhaps be censored, who is to say where the government must stop.
b.      Blackstone: The 1A is aimed at prior restraint.
c.       Liberty of the press has been historically considered to mean immunity from previous restraint of the publication of censure of public officers and charges of official misconduct, because this is particularly important speech.
d.      The law is not justifiable b/c the paper could show that it has proper motives. (This shifts the burden onto the paper and would permit the government to censor any paper absent such a showing.)
 
V.                Butler (dissent): Decision-maker model. Blackstone didn’t fear prior restraint, but prior restraint by an administrative officer. The real issue of prior restraint isn’t when speech is restrained but who decides.