Torts I Outline
Prof. Kautsch
Posser 11th Ed.
CHAPTER 1 INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH PERSON OR PROPERTY
I. Intent – Liability for intentional torts is premised on the intent to bring about the consequences – not the consequences themselves – Damage is not necessary
Meaning of intent: There is no general meaning of “intent” when discussing intentional torts. For each individual intentional tort, you have to memorize a different definition of “intent.” All that the intentional torts have in common is that D must have intended to bring about some sort of physical or mental effect upon another person
a. Battery & Intent: In order that an act may be done with the intention of bringing about a harmful or offensive contact or an apprehension thereof to a particular person, either the other or a third person, the act must be done for the purpose of causing the contact or apprehension or with knowledge on the part of the actor that such contact or apprehension is substantially certain to be produced.
i. It is not necessary to INTEND HARM
b. Substantial certainty: If D knows with substantial certainty that a particular effect will occur as a result of her action, she is deemed to have intended that result. [7] (Example: D pulls a chair out fro under P as she is sitting down. If D knew with “substantial certainty” that P would hit the ground, D meets the intent requirement for battery, even if he did not desire that she do so. [Garratt v. Dailey])
c. Character of an actor’s intent: In order that an act may be done with the intention of bringing about a harmful or offensive contact or an apprehension thereof to a particular person, either the other or a third person, the act must be done for the purpose of causing the contact or apprehension or with knowledge on the part of the actor that such contact or apprehension is substantially certain to be produced.
i. If one acts with a degree of certainty less than that of substantial certainty – highly likely or foreseeable – then intent has not been established [Spivey v. Battaglia]
d. Mistake: does not negate intent. [Ranson v Kitner]
e. The Insane are capable of forming intent
i. Insofar as a particular intent would be necessary in order to render a normal person liable, the insane person, in order to be liable, must have been capable of entertaining that same intent and must have entertained it in fact.[McGuire v Almy]
2. Transferred intent: Under the doctrine of “transferred intent,” if D held the necessary intent with respect to person A, he will be held to have committed an intentional tort against any other person who happens to be injured. [8] (Example: D shoots at A, and accidentally hits B. D is liable to B for the intentional tort of battery.) [McGuire v. Almy] (does not apply to NIED or Conversion)
3. General intent – substantial certainty – judged by an objective standard.
a. Five torts that fall within the Writ of Trespass:
· battery
· Assault
· False Imprisonment
· Trespass to Land
· trespass to Chattels
· When the defendant intends any one of the five, the doctrine applies that D is liable even P was not the intended target.
II. Battery
1. Definition – is the intentional infliction of harmful or offensive bodily contact.
2. Intent – It is not necessary that D desires to physically harm P. D has the necessary intent for battery if it is the case either that: (1) D intended to cause a harmful or offensive bodily contact.
b. Offensive is judged by the standard of the reasonable person
c. Protected interest: bodily integrity
d. Example 1: D shoots at P, intending to hit him with the bullet. D has the necessary intent for battery.
e. Example 2: D shoots at P, intending to miss P, but also intending to make P think that P would be hit. D has the intent needed for battery (i.e., the “intent to commit an assault” suffices as the intent for battery).
f. Wallace v. Rosen:
· Not battery because the intent was not to cause harm or apprehension thereof, but to get students to safety.
3. Liability for battery:
An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if:
i. He acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of another of a third person or an imminent apprehension of such contact, and
but P does. P is frightened, but the shot misses. This is assault.
4. No hostility: It is not necessary that D bear malice towards P, or intend to harm her.
1. (Example: D as a practical joke points a toy pistol at P, hoping that P will falsely think that P is about to be shot. D has one of the two alternative intents required for assault – the intent to put P in imminent apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact – so the fact that D does not desire to “harm” P is irrelevant.)
5. .Imminence:
1. It must appear to P that the harm being threatened is imminent, and that D has the present ability to carry out the threat.
6. Words only:
1. Ordinarily, words alone are not sufficient, by themselves, to give rise to an assault. Normally there must be some overt act – a physical act or gesture by D – before P can claim to have been assaulted.
2. Threatening words and/or preparation are not enough there must be an overt act that gives rise to the apprehension of an imminent battery.
7. P unaware of danger
1. P must be able to apprehend the threat
8. Threat to third persons:
1. P must have an apprehension that she herself will be subjected to a bodily contact. She may not recover for her apprehension that someone else will be so touched.
9. Conditional threat:
1. Where D threatens the harm only if P does not obey D’s demands, the existence of an assault depends on whether D had the legal right to compel P to perform the act in question.
IV. False Imprisonment
1. Definition: False imprisonment is the direct restraint involving the use of force or the threat of the use of force as to bring about the restraint of the physical liberty of another without adequate legal justification.
2. Intent: It must be shown that D intended, or knew with substantial certainty, that his actions would confine P against her will
