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Criminal Law
University of Iowa School of Law
Tomkovicz, James Joseph "Jim"

Justification for punishment
1. Retributive punishment
a. Moral justification for punishing people. They have done something wrong and need to pay a debt to society. Punishment should fit the crime.
2. Utilitarian punishment
a. Rehabilitation: fix whatever the problem was that was making them commit the crime in the first place. This is seen as good for everyone.
b. Deterrence:
i. Specific: that person won’t commit that crime again.
ii. General deterrence: if I see someone else get punished for a crime I won’t commit that crime. Deters others.
c. Incapacitation
i. They cannot commit the crime again if they’re in prison or dead.

Actus Reus
1. Overview
a. With only a few exceptions, the criminal law punishes voluntary action; it does not punish inaction or merely thinking
i. Utilitarian justification: involuntary behavior shouldn’t be criminalized because it can’t be deterred
ii. Retributivist justification: an individual who did not choose to do a wrongful act does not deserve punishment
b. Reasons for not punishing thoughts without action:
i. It’s difficult to tell what one is thinking, let alone whether or not they’ll act on their thoughts to commit a crime
ii. Someone might have the intent to commit a crime and then change their mind
iii. Everyone fantasizes about committing a crime
c. Omission may be a crime if D had a legal duty to act; but D must also be capable of this act b/c the law can’t stimulate action that cannot physically be performed
d. Some mental state or attitude is usually (though not always) necessary for the commission of a crime
i. Exception: strict liability crimes don’t require a mental state
2. The Common Law
a. Voluntary Act
i. Definition: movement of the human body that is, in some minimal sense, willed or directed by the actor
ii. Involuntary act: those over which the individual has no conscious control
iii. Usually voluntary acts are essential for criminal responsibility – even for strict liability crimes that don’t require any mental state
iv. As long as there is one voluntary act in D’s course of conduct, he may be criminally responsible
1. Ex: D, knowing he’s subject to epileptic seizures, voluntarily drove a car and killed four people when he lost control during a seizure; even though the actual act that killed the people was involuntary, the earlier act of voluntarily getting into the car and driving satisfies the voluntary element
2. this comes down to proximate cause and knowledge – if you know that something (seizures) is going to happen, you’re on notice. With proximate cause, you look at if the outcome was a risk that could have come from getting drunk. Ie: you can foresee (proximate cause) that if you get drunk you’ll
v. If someone does a harmful act because they are threatened with death or serious injury, the criminal law generally considers them voluntary; punishment depends on whether or not D can raise a defense based on justification or excuse
b. Omission and Legal Duty
i. No liability for omissions unless the law imposes a duty
ii. Legal duties can be based on:
1. Relationship; ex: parent must provide food/shelter for kids
2. Statute; ex: many states have laws requiring teachers to report suspected child abuse
3. Contract to provide care; ex: nursing homes contract to provide medical services to residents
4. Voluntary assumption of care that isolates the individual; ex: taking a sick person into one’s home
5. Creation of peril; pushing someone who can’t swim into a lake creates a duty to rescue
6. Duty to control the conduct of another; ex: employers have duty to prevent employees from speeding on the job
7. Duty of a landowner; ex: theater owner has to provide emergency exits
iii. Generally, D must know facts from which the duty to act has arisen; but ignorance is not a defense
c. Moral Duty
i. Criminal law generally imposes no moral duty to act unless it is embodied in a civil law duty
ii. However, some states have enacted Good Samaritan statues criminalizing the refusal to help those known to be in serious peril when aid could be provided without danger
d. Possession
i. Knowingly taking or keeping a forbidden item is a voluntary act even though it sometimes doesn’t require the D to “do” anything
3. The Model Penal Code
a. Voluntary Act
i. Definition of action: bodily movement whether voluntary or involuntary
ii. One isn’t guilty under the MPC unless his liability is based on conduct that includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable
iii. A bodily movement that otherwise is not the product of the conscious or habitual effort or determination of the actor – this is what Martin falls under
1. Habitual: the important distinction is that it’s something that you always do, like answer your phone, it’s still seen as voluntary even though you didn’t consciously do it.
iv. Commentaries say that voluntary act is behavior within the control of the actor
b. Omission and Legal Duty
i. Permits omission to satisfy the conduct element of a crime when:
1. Statute defining the offense expressly says that failure to act is a crime
2. D has a duty to act imposed by civil law
ii. MPC effectively requires a voluntary act – or an omission and legal duty – for criminal responsibility
c. A More Precise Definition for Actus Reus
i. Material elements of Actus Reus as defined by MPC
1. Conduct: physical behavior of D; ex: driving car or shooting gun
2. Circumstance: objective fact or condition existing in the real world when D engages in conduct; ex: entering home at night is burglary
3. Result: consequence or outcome caused by D’s conduct
d. Possession
i. It’s actus reus if Δ knowingly got it, and were aware of the fact they had it for a long enough period to get rid of it.
ii. If D knows they are accepting custody of something (ex: illegal drugs), then his “possession” is clearly a voluntary act under the MPC
iii. Subsequent realization that a person is in possession of illegal drugs is sufficient for criminal responsibility if, after becoming aware of the illegal drugs, the person does not terminate possession within a sufficient period

s to the result
iv. Negligence as a Predicate for Criminal Liability
1. Distinction b/w recklessness and negligence: a negligent person has not subjectively foreseen even the remotest possibility that harm may occur.
2. “Negligence, to be criminal, must be reckless and wanton” State v. Weiner; makes negligence hard to distinguish from recklessness
3. The concept of degrees of negligence
a. Subjective recognition of the harm, and/or
b. A risk of only some, very serious, harm and/or
c. A statistically greater risk of harm
4. The cases seem to suggest that only if D’s failure to recognize the risk was “really outrageous” or “really stupid” should they be punished – it’s like a really stupid reasonable person test
5. Subjectivity vs. Objectivity
a. Criminal negligence is often subjectivized more than tort negligence; probably because of an aversion of punishing people based on negligence
v. Difference b/w negligence and recklessness: you act without the knowledge that something harmful could happen; you don’t perceive a risk
d. Proving Mens Rea
i. Intent, knowledge, and recklessness require the state prove D’s actual mental state with regard to facts and result.
ii. Determining whether a D has the requisite mens rea for conviction requires a good deal of inference; inferences are based on the outward conduct of a person.
iii. This often involves looking at motive
e. Motive and Mens Rea
i. Motive is generally not admissible to show that the D isn’t guilty; but it is used by prosecutors to bolster their cases
ii. Prosecutors use motive to help juries infer mens rea
iii. Even if motive isn’t relevant in determining guilt, it can be relevant at the time of sentencing
3. Contemporaneity, Prior Fault, and Time Frames
a. D is only liable if actus reus and mens rea coincide; this is often misunderstood, though
b. The question is whether the D, at some relevant time, with the requisite mens rea, acted in a way that ultimately caused the harm.
4. Statutory Interpretation and Mens Rea
a. Principles of Statutory Construction
i. Under common law, courts require the prosecution to prove mens rea, even if the legislature has not specifically required a mental state; this is part of the maxim that penal statutes are construed narrowly against the state
ii. Another maxim: statues in derogation of the common law are to be construed narrowly
iii. In pari material – statutes dealing with similar subjects should be construed similarly