Select Page

Constitutional Law II
University of Iowa School of Law
Pettys, Todd Edward

Constitutional Law II— Todd Pettys (Spring 2013)
 
I.                   The Privileges and Immunities Clause
a.       Question of whether the P&I Cl. applies to the states individually or to the whole nation writ large; distinction between state citizenship in Art. IV and federal citizenship under 14th Amend.
b.      Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (349)
                          i.      5th Amend. does not apply against the states—yet
                        ii.      State gov’ts not those constrained by the Bill of Rights
c.       Slaughter-House Cases (351)
                          i.      The citizens of each state ARE NOT SAME as citizens of the United States: states are not bound by broad reading of P&I Cl. à the P&I Cl. does not allow federal CTs to invalidate state laws abridging citizens’ P&I
                        ii.      Ps also brought EP and DP claims:
1.      EP: only applied to blacks
2.      DP: no right (yet) to practice trade under DP Cl.
                      iii.      14th Amend. P&I Cl. only protects those rights enjoyed as a citizen of the US (not of each state)
                      iv.      14th Amend. only protects those rights existing PRIOR TO adoption of the 14th Amend.; only refers to uniquely federal rights, including:
1.      Petition Congress
2.      Vote in federal elections
3.      Interstate travel and commerce
4.      Enter federal lands
5.      Rights of citizens while in federal custody
                        v.      Art. IV, § 2 rights are those which are fundamental, belonging to citizens of all free gov’ts, which the citizens of state gov’ts have always enjoyed; cannot enumerate
1.      Possession of property
2.      Pursue and obtain happiness and safety
3.      Rights central to formation of organized federal gov’t
                      vi.      Current state/impact of Slaughter-House
1.      Art. IV § 2 and Dormant Comm. Cl. overlap
2.      Art. IV, § 2: Mostly limited to EP like treatment of state citizens in other states; prevents states from:
a.       Restricting other states’ citizens from exercising own constitutional rights
b.      Unreasonable distinctions between state citizens
3.      14th Amend.: Very limited, only refers to uniquely federal rights:
a.       Petition Congress
b.      Vote in federal elections
c.       Interstate travel/commerce
d.      The Right to Travel
                          i.      Crandall v. Nevada (360)
1.      Tax on exiting state is unconstitutional for structural/federalism purposes
2.      No explicit “right to travel” but implied
                        ii.      Edwards v. California
1.      Statute prohibiting importation of “indigents” into the state violated the Dormant Comm. Cl.
2.      Douglas in concurrence: right to travel is incident of national citizenship protected by P&I Cl. of 14th Amend.
                      iii.      Shapiro v. Thompson
1.      Time period for welfare benefits within the state is subject to strict scrutiny
2.      Duration of residence in a state is not permissible way to classify people for welfare purposesàessentially penalizes interstate travel
3.      EP analysis is invoked: welfare is a basic necessity of life and must be available to all residents despite duration of residence
                      iv.      Saenz v. Roe (357) (limited sum of welfare allotment for fiscal purposes)
1.      Right to travel contains three components:
a.       Right of citizen of state A to enter and leave state B freely (Edwards);
b.      Right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than unfriendly alien when in a state temporarily (Art. IV, § 2 P&I Cl.); and
c.       To be treated like other residents when choosing to become a permanent resident of a new state (at issue here—protected by P&I Cl. of 14th Amend.)
2.      Questions if portability of benefit (bona fide residence questions):
a.       Tuition/school=portable, may be regulated based on duration
b.      Divorce/marriage recognition=portable
c.       Welfare benefits=not potable; must be used in state
3.      Means–ends analysis, but not RBT, something stricter, but also not SS
4.      P&I doesn’t really do any constitutional lifting
II.                Due Process
a.       Procedural Due Process
                          i.      Located in 5th Amend. (federal gov’t) and 14th Amend. (applied to state gov’ts)
                        ii.      Three questions central to inquiry:
1.      When does a claim of deprivation of procedural DP attach?
2.      What “steps” is an individual entitled to?
3.      How soon does one get them/when do they get them?
                      iii.      Judicial range of inquiry reserved for the courts, not the legislatures
                      iv.      Goldberg v., Kelly (495)
1.      Termination of welfare benefits may only follow an evidentiary hearing where the party has a chance to challenge the decision to terminate benefits
2.      Welfare benefits are a form of property granted by statute, deprivation of which is subject to 14th A DP
3.      Must evaluate: is there a property interest at stake?
                        v.      Bd. of Regents v. Roth (495)
1.      Termination from gov’t job as teacher; alleged that he was entitled to hearing
2.      CT: 14th A DP provides protection for safeguard of person’s interests in already acquired specific benefits
3.      Constitution does not create property interests; those are created by statute—interest must be secured in order to invoke DP protections
                      vi.      Perry v. Sinderman (496)
1.      Contra Roth: de facto tenure in position at issue created reliance on the property right
2.      May bring DP claim for property interest/reliance interest if:
a.       Such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support claim of entitlement to the benefit (this is issue of STATE, not federal law); and
b.      That P may invoke them at a hearing
3.      Does not need to prove merits of claim to reach hearing, but must show that he has a colorable claim to the entitlement/property interest
                    vii.      Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales (497)
1.      Question of property/entitlement interest in police protection re: restraining order
2.      Recipient of a restraining order lacks entitlement interest in protection by law enforcement against the person against whom the order is issued
3.      Police protection/activity is discretionary, not an entitlement
4.      Restraining orders lack ascertainable monetary valueàit is a longstanding gov’t service, not a quantifiable property interest
                  viii.      Paul v. Davis (498) (Reputational interests/harms)
1.      Reputational interests are not bestowed by DP Cl. but by substantive law
2.      Stigma alone inadequate—“stigma plus” test: stigma + interference with some other protected property or liberty interest defined in substantive law
                       ix.      What process is actually due?
1.      Mathews v. Eldridge (499)
a.       DP is flexible and calls for different protections for different situations
b.      In administrative purposes, thee considerations:
                                                                                                  i.      What is the private interest affected by official action;
                                                                                                ii.      Risk of erroneous deprivation of such an interest through procedures used and probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
                                                                                              iii.      Gov’t’s interest, including function involved and fiscal/admin. burdens that those additional safeguards would cost?
2.      Process can be given after deprivation, as long as deprivation is not of basic life necessities
b.      Incorporation
                          i.      Bill of Rights initially intended to apply to federal gov’t alone; 14th A. expansion; though not universal acceptance of this principle
1.      Thomas in Establishment Cl. cases;
2.      Unanimous jury in criminal convictions req’d of federal criminal prosecutions, but not against states
3.      Black: universal incorporationist
                        ii.      The analysis is situated in “liberties” prong of DP Cl.
                      iii.      Selection of which liberties to incorporate:
1.      Fundamental fairness; or
2.      Fundamental need for liberty/justice (modern approach)àessential to a scheme of ordered liberty (Palko v. CT)
                      iv.      General spectrum:
1.      Black: Bill of Rights only, no additional liberty interests cognizable by Constitution; selective incorporation is not suited to judicial role
2.      Frankfurter: Selective incorporationist; federalism concerns, respect for framers’ intent
3.      Marshall/Brennan: the BoR + something more is protected by Constitution (see also Tribe and Sullivan, etc.)
                        v.      Modern shift: Warrant CT onward has adopted most of BoR while still technically incorporationist and conceives of rights outside of BoR
                      vi.      Cases:
1.      Palko v. CT (364)
a.       CT: DJ Cl. of 5th A does not apply against states (no longer good law, though)
b.      Test: liberty interest at stake must be essence of a scheme of ordered liberty; principles of justice rooted in tradit

  Change in economic and political circumstances, as well as the “switch in time that saved nine” (i.e.: Justice Roberts change of heart) influenced CT’s direction of invalidation of economic laws, in part b/c it no longer thought of economic liberty of contract as fundamental to extent previous CTs did
                        ii.      Nebbia v. NY
1.      Property and contract rights are not absolute—equally fundamental are public rights to regulate in the common interest (huge doctrinal departure from Lochner)
2.      DP right is that legislation cannot be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious
a.       This is basis of RBT
b.      Much more deferential
3.      New test: If laws have reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatoryàDP reqs are satisfied
4.      Here: Economic inequalities and problems may be addressed by legislature; plausible legislative purpose is sufficient
                      iii.      West Coast Hotel v. Parrish
1.      State min. wage law is subject to RBT and accordingly passes
2.      Laws that allegedly infringe on freedom to contract are subject to RBT, unlike Lochner-era heightened scrutiny
3.      Economic hardships may have direct effect on political markets and community health
                      iv.      Carolene Products
1.      CT presumes legislation is constitutionally permissible; RBT applies=hugely deferential
2.      Modern RBT:
a.       Law lacks any rational relationship (means) to a
b.      Legitimate gov’t end
c.       Right to contract challenges always loses today under RBT
3.      Footnote 4:
a.       Provides basis for increased standard of review for certain types of legislation:
                                                                                                  i.      Political market failure
                                                                                                ii.      Clear violations of liberties
                                                                                              iii.      EP Cl. applications
b.      Protects against negative majoritarian impulses
c.       Identifies discrete insular minorities as essential element of higher level of judicial scrutinyàless access to political markets=higher demand/justification for judicial intervention
                        v.      Williamson v. Lee Optical
1.      Regulations on fitting lenses to specific classes of licensees is upheld
2.      CT reaffirms that it focuses on conceivable legislative purposes, not ACTUAL purposes for passing legislation
3.      Imposes higher bar on Ps in RBT-Sub. DP claims
a.       RBT: burden on P to show illegitimate gov’t purpose
b.      Intermediate Scrutiny: Burden is on gov’t to show lack of illegitimate gov’t purpose
c.       Strict scrutiny: same as Intermediate Scrutiny
                      vi.      Ferguson v. Skrupa: CT will not sit as a super-legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation; CT doesn’t care what economic rationale the legislature uses
f.        Substantive DP and Non-Economic Rights
                          i.      Method of Modern Analysis:
1.      Is there a fundamental right?
a.       Yes: SS
                                                                                                  i.      Narrowly tailored to meet a (least restrictive means)
                                                                                                ii.      Compelling state interest
b.      No: RBT
                                                                                                  i.      Rationally related to a
                                                                                                ii.      Legitimate gov’t purpose