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Constitutional Law I
University of Iowa School of Law
Pettys, Todd Edward

 
Constitutional Law – Spring 2014 – Prof. Todd Pettys
1)      Overall Concepts
a)      Types of Constitutional Interpretations
i)        Compact Federalism (minority view): The sovereign power of the federal government came from the states granting this power to the federal government. As a result, the states have some power to define the Constitution or control the federal government
(1)    This rationale was rejected by Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland
ii)       Structuralism: The power of deciding the means to carry out the powers outlined in the Constitution are implied in the Constitution (1) the Constitution creates a “structure” of the government, (2) that structure was intended to work, (3) so the actors are impliedly given the power to pick the means for carrying out that governmental structure (outlined in the Constitution)
iii)     Framer’s Intent: Legislative/intellectual history
iv)     Dictionary Definitions: Using dictionary definitions of a word (from the time the word was used)
v)      Representation-Reinforcement: We should favor interpretations of the Constitution which reinforce a representative form of government
(1)    This should encourage political accountability (voters’ abilities to know who to hold accountable, and how to hold them accountable)
vi)     Practical Reasoning: Common sense
vii)   Intratextualism: Look elsewhere in the Constitution to see how the phrase/term was use
2)      Changes in the court’s philosophical
a)      Changes in models of structure of federalism (conservatives and liberals change based on whether people are
i)        Two conceptions of federal government
(1)    People => states => Federal gov
(2)    People => state & people => Federal Gov.
ii)       Regarding term limits (people controlling government)
(1)    Conservatives – used conception 1 (that people must act through states)
(2)    Liberals – used conception 2 (that the people have “2 concurrent governments”)
iii)     Regarding Congress controlling state actors (Government controlling people)
(1)    Conservatives – used conception 2 (that the federal government must enforce things directly, not through the states, we have 2 concurrent governments)
(2)    Liberals – used conception 1 (that federal government can act through states)
iv)     Why this difference exists
(1)    Conservatives are interested in maximizing state powers
(2)    Liberals are interested in maximizing federal power
a)      Different phases of the court (similarities between Commerce Clause cases and Inherent restrictions on Government cases)
i)        Three main phases for the Commerce Clause
(1)    Prior to the New Deal (very formalistic, promoting states’ rights, categorical Hammer v. Dagenhardt, Carter Coal, “economic v. non-economic”)
(2)    New Deal and after (functionalist (looking at outcome of regulations), less formalistic, promoting federal power, saying political process is the measure of whether Congress has gone too far, Wickard and Darby)
(3)    New Formalism (return to some formalism, promoting states’ rights, Lopez and Morrison)
ii)       Similar phases for the 10th Amendment cases
(1)    Prior to the New Deal (very formalistic and has categories, National League of Cities, “traditional area of government function)
(2)    New Deal and after (less formalistic,  Garcia, “leave it up to political process”)
(3)    New Formalism (return to formalism – NY v. US and Printz, (”Coercion v. encouragement)
iii)     Summary, there is a continuous loop of formalism-less formalism-formalism. The problem is once you define a rule, you have to keep defining small parts of it, which can lead to more formalism)
iv)     Summary
(3)    Different interpretations of federalism between Conservatives and Liberals on the federal court
3)      Judiciary
a)      Sources of Judiciary’s Power
i)        SCOTUS’s Art. III power to hear cases between states and citizens of the states
(1)    Article III grants Congress “original jurisdiction” over cases where (among other things) a state shall be a party
(2)    Chisolm v. Georgia – A private citizen claimed the state owed him money
(a)    SCOTUS found against a state, causing uproar among anti-federalists
(b)   This led to the 11th Amendment (courts can’t hear cases between states and citizens of that state)
ii)       Marbury v. Madison
(1)    Facts
(a)    Before leaving office, Adams (a Federalist) passed two pieces of legislation through Congress, and created a number of courts, and (attempted to) appoint a number of judges.
(b)   The Secretary of State was unable to deliver the commissions to all the judges before Adams left office. The next Secretary of State refused to grant the commission
(2)    Procedural History
(a)    Marbury sues for his Commission in SCOTUS
(3)    Holding
(a)    Court’s Power to issue writs of mandamus
(i)      Does Marbury have a right to the commission?
1.       Yes
(ii)    Do the laws afford Marbury a remedy?
1.       The judiciary can provide relief when there is a specific duty to a specific person (ministerial acts), but not in political matters (political acts)
(iii)   Can the SCOTUS provide this remedy? Is writ of mandamus an appropriate remedy?
1.       The Court claims the power to issue review “ministerial” actions of President, and issue writs of mandamus (compelling him to act)
(b)   Court’s jurisdiction
(i)      §13 of the Judiciary Act authorizes Congress to grant writs of mandamus in cases it has original jurisdiction over (although the more likely reading is that it only grants SCOTUS that power for appellate jurisdiction cases)
1.       This violates Art. III which do

ry low-key, with almost no interest
(ii)    After the Robert Bork hearings, they have become much more confrontational
(2)    Impeachment (Art III, §1 and Art II, §3)
(a)    Early on, the Jefferson congress tried to impeach a judge who made his political views very well known, but failed
(b)   Since then, there has been a truce (congress doesn’t try to impeach judges very often, and judges haven’t been overtly political)
(c)    Can only impeach judges for “high crimes and misdemeanors”
(3)    Structural Interference
(a)    Congress is able to regulate the size and budget of the court
(i)      The size has both increased and decreased over time, but remained at 9 since the late 1800s
(b)   This can also deal with the circuit courts
(i)      Each circuit is assigned one justice who answers emergency questions (the 8th Circuit’s justice is Justice Alito) – These justices deal a lot with death penalty cases, where they can be quickly contacted for last minute stays and appeals
(c)    However, ever since FDR tried to “pack the court” this tactic has been generally rejected/ignored
(4)    Jurisdiction Stripping
(a)    Congress could strip the courts of their power to hear appeals
(i)      Art. III §2 – Congress can make exceptions to the SCOTUS’s appellate jurisdiction
1.       Some think they can strip SCOTUS’s power to hear cases on certain issues
(b)   Ex Parte v. McCardle
(i)      During reconstruction, someone presented the SCOTUS with a case that could have allowed SCOTUS to claim reconstruction is unconstitutional
(ii)    However, congress passed a law saying that SCOTUS couldn’t rule on issues regarding reconstruction
(5)    Constitutional Amendments
(a)    Article V outlines this (two ways)
(i)      2/3 of congress passes it, and then 3/4 of the states have to affirm it
(ii)    2/3 of the state legislatures call for each state to hold a constitutional convention, and then 3/4 of the states have to affirm it (this has never been used)
(b)   These are not very common – so it’s easier to get the SCOTUS to reinterpret the constitution
c)       Justiciability Doctrines
i)        Introduction
(1)    5 doctrines
(a)    Advisory Opinions
(b)   Standing
(c)    Mootness
(d)   Ripeness
(e)   Political Questions