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Civil Procedure I
University of Illinois School of Law
Stancil, Paul J.

Stancil, Paul      Civil Procedure Fall 2012
 
 
Personal Jurisdiction
 
n  Elements: Power, Consent, Notice
·         Either power or consent can establish JDX
·         Notice
o   Invalid constructive notice
§  Newspaper notice on non-resident OR attachment at the time of adjudication (NOT at the time of execution of the judgment)
o   Supreme Court was split on the issue of statutory interpretation
§  Question of notice was buried for some decades b/c decision was based on the absence of power with power = personal service of process
·         Power: The state court’s power extends only to:
o   In Personam JDX
§  Physical presence of D (appear, found, resident, or property)
o   In Rem JDX
§  A direct proceeding against the property for that purpose or Quasi-in rem seized at the outset
·         Consent (implied from presence or consents)
o   Pre-litigation agreement: e.g. forum selection clause in Carnival
o   Waiver: D appears but fails to challenge JDX
 
n  In Personam / Quasi-in rem / In rem
·         In Personam
o   W/O service or process upon D or D’s voluntary appearance è invalid (later modified by Int’l Shoe)
·         Quasi-in Rem
o   Seizure of property unrelated to the claim is allowed
o   ONLY upon attachment at the outset of the adjudication (later killed by Shaffer)
·         In Rem
o   Claim arising from the ownership. When the subject matter of the dispute is property
 
n  Exceptions
·         Adjudicating the status of the people: D’s status with the resident of the state (e.g. divorce)
·         Contract
·         Secretary of state consent statue: agent of D
 
n  Value
·         Efficiency (çè costly fairness)
 
n  Constitutional ground
·         14th Amendment – Due Process
·         Full faith and credit clause: respect for final/prior judgment; if the motion is lost, no more re-litigation
 
n  Challenge and Waiver
·         Direct attack
o   Special appearance: D is allowed to appear before the court at the beginning of the action (before pleading to merits) for the sole purpose of challenging its power to exercise PJ over D
§  Waiver: If D raises any objection or argument that the court can construe as a defense on the merits
è waiver of her JDX objection
o   FRCP 12(b)(2) lack of PJ
§  D may raise her JDX challenge either in the answer or, if she makes pre-answer motion, at that time. More flexibility.
Ø R12(g): Joining Motions
D may also raise other objections at the same time w/o waiving the objection to PJ
Ø R12(h): Waiving and Preserving Certain Defenses
Making any pre-answer motion that omits a defense of PJ is treated as a waiver of JDX
·         Collateral attack
o   Even though a default judgment will be rendered in the original law suit, D may oppose enforcement of that judgment by asserting in D’s home state enforcement action that the original court lacked PJ over D
§  Convenient, but risky b/c if the second court rejects the JDX challenge, D can raise no other defense on the merits.
§  JDX, and only JDX, is open to collateral attack
§  If D fails è the second court is bound under the Full Faith and Credit Clause (Article IV, §1)
Ø Requires the courts of each state to honor the judgments of other states by entering judgments upon them
 
n  Pennoyer v. Neff
·         Rule
o   Location of the property needs to be in the same state as the court
o   Service must be made in state
§  Personal service, not constructive
o   Property must be owned
o   Attachment has to be entered at time of judgment
 
n  International Shoe Co. v. Washington
·         Facts
o   Int’l Shoe: Delaware corporation / Principle Place of Business (PPB): St. Louis, MO
o   Sued in Washington
·         Issue
o   Service of process on the salesman in WA and mailing to St. Louis, MO qualify for WA court’s power to subject D in personam JDX under the circumstances?
o   Court’s fairness-driven view of PJ
·         Fair play and substantial justice
o   Not offending the “traditional notion of fair play + substantial justice” under the 14th Amendment due process clause
·         Minimum Contacts
o   How substantial is the activit

s) applies to everything: in personam JDX & in rem JDX
·         Notice: Yes, by certified mails and publication
·         Triangle (State, Claim, D’s Property)
o   State çè Claim: regulatory interest (= Brennan’s dissent)
o   State çè D’s Property: Yes, only by virtue of DE statute (statutory presence only)
o   Claim çè D’s Property: No, not subject matter of the litigation nor the underlying cause of action. Quasi in rem.
n  World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson
·         Facts
o   P: NY residents moving to Arizona
o   D: Corporation serving NY markets and its vicinity
o   Sued in Oklahoma, claim for product liability for accidents occurred in OK
·         Triangle (State, Claim, Defendant)
o   State çè Claim: focus of Brennan’s dissent. Claims this is strong.
§  P’s were hospitalized in OK
§  Essential witness and evidence in OK
§  Keeping highway safety for OK
§  Efficiency
o   State çè Defendant: majority holding that it is too attenuated for grounds of PJ
§  Foreseeability
Ø “Not Sufficient” for PJ under the Due Process Clause
Ø Real inquiry should be whether D “reasonably anticipated” being haled into court in forum
§  Purposeful Availment
Ø No
Ø If yes, PJ would be valid under the Due Process through stream of commerce
è D’s expectation that product will be purchased there
Ø Majority: no solicit. No salesperson. No advertisement. Isolated occurrence.
Ø Brennan’s dissent: NOT unconnected. Vehicle-specific vision of stream of commerce
§  Fair Play and Substantial Justice
Ø 1. Burden on D
è Would the inconvenience to the D be constitutionally burdensome, meaning it would impact the D’s ability to mount a defense?