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Torts II
University of Georgia School of Law
Peltz, Richard J.

Table of Contents
I.RES IPSA LOQUITUR.. 3
B.      Application:3
C.      D’s Argument against RIL. 3
D.      P should plead two counts of Negligence:3
E.      Effect of RIP:3
F.      Policy considerations:3
II. JOINT LIABILITY.. 4
A.      Rule:4
B.      Example to show different Systems:4
C.      Common law.. 4
D.      Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act (UCJTA).4
E.      Uniform Apportionment of Tort Responsibility Act (UATRA)4
F.      Analysis with % of Fault resting with P. 5
G.      Policy Concerns:5
III.        EMOTIONAL DISTRESS / NON-PHYSICAL DISTRESS CLAIMS 6
A.      G.R:6
B.      3 Major theories of recovery -6
C.      Rationales for limiting emotional-distress recovery:6
D.      Non-physical distress claims that are permitted:6
E.      Proof of Emotional distress:6
IV.        INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS (IIED)7
A.      Definition:7
B.      Intent (reg. transferred intent does not apply)7
C.      Recklessness. 7
D.      Extreme and Outrageous :7
E.      Severe emotional distress. 7
F.      3rd Party Liability for IIED.. 7
G.      Defense. 7
V. RESCUER DOCTRINE AND FIREFIGHTER RULE   7
A.      Rescuer Doctrine:7
B.      Firefighter rule. 7
VI.NEGLIGENCE.. 8
A.      Definition. 8
VII.       CAUSATION.. 8
A.      Generally. 8
B.      Causation as a matter of law (same as duty analysis)8
C.      Causation as a matter of fact (proximate causation)8
D.      Cts Interpretations:8
VIII.     DUTY.. 9
A.      G.R:9
B.      Duty Limits:9
C.      Affirmative Duty:9
D.      Breach of Duty. 10
IX.        NON-PARASITIC ECONOMIC LOSS IN NEGLIGENCE   11
A.      Generally:11
B.      Strict Liability:11
X. LAND OWNER NEGLIGENCE.. 12
A.      Comments. 12
B.      LANDOWNER NEGLIGENCE AS TO INVITEES:12
C.      LANDOWNER NEGLIGENCE AS TO PL.-LICENSEES:12
D.      LANDOWNER NEGLIGENCE AS TO PL.-TRESPASSERS, RULE (A):12
E.      LANDOWNER NEGLIGENCE AS TO PL.-TRESPASSERS, RULE (B):12
F.      LANDOWNER NEGLIGENCE AS TO PL.-TRESPASSERS, RULE (C):12
G.      Note Difference Between B and C is element 3(a)Special rule of LANDLORD NEGLIGENCE:12
H.      Defense to Landowner Negligence.13
XI.        TRESPASS & CONVERSION.. 13
A.      Definition:13
B.      TRESPASS TO LAND requires. 13
C.      TRESPASS TO CHATTELS (TO PERSONAL PROPERTY) requires:13
D.      CONVERSION (Theft)13
XII.      NECESSITY.. 13
A.      Usually invoked when:13
B.      Definition:13
C.      Public Vs. Private Necessity. 13
XIII.     NUISANCE.. 14
A.      Public Nuisance. 14
B.      Private Nuisance:14
XIV.     INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 15
A.      Requires. 15
XV.       DEFAMATION:16
A.      Generally:16
B.      DEFAMATION requires:1/2/3/4/5/6. 16
C.      Defenses to Defamation / Invasions of privacy:17
D.      Types of Defamatory Communications:17
XVI.     INVASION OF PRIVACY.. 17
A.      Generally:17
B.      DISCLOSURE. 17
C.      FALSE LIGHT. 18
D.      INTRUSION.. 18
E.      RIGHT OF PUBLICITY.. 18
F.      Damages. 18
G.      Possibly Policy:18
XVII.   WORKERS COMPENSATION.. 18
XVIII. CONSTITUTIONAL TORT.. 19
XIX.     INTENTIONAL TORTS. 19
A.      INTENT. 19
B.      ASSAULT. 20
C.      BATTERY.. 20
D.      BATTERED-WOMENS SYNDROME. 20
E.      FALSE IMPRISONMENT. 21
F.      FALSE ARREST:21
G.      PRIMA FACIE TORT. 21
H.      FRAUD.. 21
I.       DAMAGES – INTENTIONAL TORTS. 21
XX.      DEFENSES TO INTENTIONAL TORTS 22
A.      SELF-DEFENSE:22
B.      SELF-DEFENSE WITH DEADLY FORCE:22
C.      DEFENSE OF OTHERS:22
D.      DEFENSE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY:22
E.      RECOVERY OF PERSONAL PROPERTY (+5):22
F.      DEFENSE OF REAL PROPERTY:23
G.      DEFENSE OF REAL PROPERTY BY DEADLY FORCE:23
H.      DEFENSE OF PERSON OR PROPERTY BY MECHANIZED MEANS:23
I.       MERCHANT’S PRIVILEGE:23
J.       CONSENT:23
K.      ARREST PRIVILEDGE. 23
XXI.     ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE.. 24
XXII.   INFORMED CONSENT (Negl. – COA)24
XXIII.DEFENSES TO NEGLIGENCE.. 25
A.      Contributory Negligence. 25
B.      Assumption of Risk. 25
C.      Comparative Fault (there are 2 types-see chart)26
D.      Contri Negl Vs. Comp. Fault26
E.      Pure Vs. Mod CF. 26
F.      Last Clear Chance Doc (this is for xtra credit)26
G.      Recreational land use statutes (RUSs)26
XXIV. STRICT LIABILITY.. 27
A.      Abnormally Dangerous Activity. 27
B.      Animals:27
XXV.   RECKLESSNESS (COA):27
XXVI. STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY.. 28
A.      Definition:28
B.      Defective Condition (P must establish 1 of 3)28
C.      Causation. 29
D.      Prescription Drug and Medical Device Liability. 29
E.      Defenses – Applies to all types:29
F.      Policy. 29
XXVII.      DAMAGES. 29
A.      Generally:29
B.      Compensatory Damages. 29
C.      Consequential Damages. 30
D.      Punitive Damages. 30
E.      Defenses. 30
XXVIII.         WRONGFUL DEATH.. 30
XXIX.SURVIVAL OF TORT ACTIONS. 31
XXX.   INSURANCE TERMS. 31
XXXI.POLICY CHECKLIST (2nd sem)32
XXXII.     POLICY CHECKLIST (1ST SEM)33
 
 
I.                    RES IPSA LOQUITUR
1.Generally:
a) Used to establish proof of Negligence.(breach of duty).
b)”Hey, I’m not sure what happened but it’s reasonable to infer D did something careless or the accident wouldn’t have happened!”
c) If P can establish RIP, no need not to prove the specific conduct of which D was negligent.
2.Rule:
a) P may establish proof of negligence if 1) The event does not ordinarily occur absent negligence; 2) Other possible causes, including the conduct of plaintiff and third persons, are eliminated by the evidence; and 3)the negligence is within the scope of defendant’s duty to plaintiff. Here, the P will argue the first element is met…
b)P must also prove Causation and Damages
B.Application:
1.The event does not ordinarily occur absent negligence;
a) Note that this elements makes the case on whether RIP should apply.
(1) Woman falling into painting.
(2) D should always Counter Sue!
2.Other possible causes, including the conduct of plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence;
a) P does not need to show that D’s negligence is the only possible explanation for the injury-causing occurrence, but only that the inference that D’s negligence outweighs the sum or likelihood of the other possible causes.
AND
3.the indicated negligence is within the scope of defendant’s duty to plaintiff.
a) Min: D required to have exclusive control over the instrument of injury, but ct works around  limitation if w/ multiple defendants  using “common duty” owned to P
b)Maj: Exclusive control not required during time of injury. (Typically applied if there is only one D)
C.D’s Argument against RIL
1.D has not automatically lost on  the breach of duty if jury finds the res ipsa loquitur elements have been proven.
2.D’s evidence of reasonable conduct may be persuasive enough jury to conclude D was probably not at fault OR other elements (i.e., damages/causation still need to be proven.)
D.P should plead two counts of Negligence:
1.One predicated on RIL and another on traditional Negligence even if both  are related to same injury.
2.The D may move to dismiss the RIL claim, and if defendant prevails, the plaintiff can still struggle to prove negligence on the other count in the traditional fashion.
E.Effect of RIP:
1.Majority: Permissible Inference Instruction
a) RIL entitles the plaintiff to a jury instruction that the jury may draw inferences as to the defendant’s responsibility for the negligent condition without any other proof.
2.Burden Shifting:
a) Also, some ct s will allow RIL to establish a rebuttable presumption of defendant’s negligence, thereby shifting the burden of proof to the defendant to show nonliability.
3.Differences:
a) Note that the inference instruction it not all that different in practical effect from the rebuttable presumption.)
F. Policy considerations:
1.RIL Fair
a) forces D who has most understanding of how the harm-causing event came about to come forward with that information.
b)criticisim that liberal use of RIP takes away any incentive for P to make every effort to try to discern how the harm-causing event came about.
c) RIL resembles strict liability because establishes liability w/o full proof. (i.e., P does not have to go all the way to the finish line. )
 
II.                  JOINT LIABILITY
A.Rule:
1.An actor is responsible

n Law
a) There is a policy shift that is represented in this development of law. Common law here is very friendly to the successful plaintiff, or hostile to the liable defendant as compared with contributory negligence in which it is unfriendly to plaintiffs.
b)But the common law is consistently hostile to culpable parties, whoever they are. In joint liability situations, plaintiff has already prevailed, so is not culpable at all
c) The common law priority is to make plaintiff whole, and the system does not wish to expend resources sorting out fault among liable defendants.
2.UCJTA /:
a) These new systems are more sympathetic to the defendants. After plaintiff is made whole, why not let the defendants sort it out among themselves? No harm to plaintiff at that point.If there is an insolvent defendant, that burden still will rest on the defense side
b)Moreover, comparative fault is now being introduced (20th century) as between plaintiff and defendants, alleviating the harsh effects of the common law and striving for greater accuracy in the American tort system. So we accommodate this change in attitude by making fault allocation among defendants discretionary
3.Comparative Fault / UATRA
a) Finally, as comparative fault and precise fault allocation come to express dominant values in the tort system, we move to compulsory allocation of fault.  Making plaintiffs whole is at last subordinated in our system to a sense of “fairness,” each party its share, so plaintiff’s recovery becomes several only. 
b) The tort system is much friendlier now to defendants, or, to defendants and plaintiffs on an equal footing.
4. Market Share Liability Theory:  
a) This is a theory of liability (responsibility) not damages.
b)Market share liability theory arises in very plaintiff-friendly jurisdictions and predates the defendant-friendly move toward several-only liability (damages)
c) Parallel b/w MSL and Damages allocation
(1) Both depend on the relative fault of the defendants, and both ultimately present the “empty chair” problem
(2) At least in the more conservative Mosk formulation of market-share liability, we have to know that we have some substantial share (90%?) of the market providers before the court. 
(3) Because liability is strict, market share equals fault allocation!
(4) At the same time, remember that market-share liability (responsibility) and several-only liability (damages) are discrete, and you can have one without the other.
(5) Plaintiffs like market-share liability because it eases the plaintiff’s burden on causation.
(6)  Defendants like several-only liability because they don’t have to pay judgments in excess of their relative fault.
[1] ex. if D1 paid 100%/100k of judgment, D1 recovers 2/9 from D2 and D3
[2] ex. if D1 paid all of judgment (100k) D1 recovers 33% from D2 and D3. – assuming 3 defendants
[3] 90% of Pl’s loss or 90k from any of the defendants
[4] If D1 paid 100% or 90k of judgment, then D1 recovers 2/9 or 20k from each D2 and D3.)
[5] ex. if D1 paid all of judgment (100k) D1 recovers 33% from D2 and D3. – assuming 3 defendants
[6] P may recover no more than 50% or 50k from D1 and 20%/20K from D2 & D3
[7] (Pl may recovery no more than 5/9 or 55% or 55,555 from D1 and 2/9, or 22% from each of D2 and D3
[8] P may recover no more than 50% or 50k from D1 and 20%/20K from D2 & D3