He views the text in between the cases as important as the cases themselves so focus on the entire assignment.
Main Issue: What happens when the private law and owners (or universities or athletic associations) is challenged by players, broadcasters, and local communities (an occasionally even by disgruntled owners) who try to win a better outcome in court?
1) Moral Integrity of the Sport: Best Interest of the Sport: The Role of the Commissioner and the Law
a) Overview:
i) Baseball gave birth to the role of commissioner under the Major League Agreement.
ii) Longstanding Assumption: it is the responsibility of the commissioner to decide whether (supreme voice) and how to protect the “best interests of the sport” from such behavior.
iii) Exception: Boxing-does not have a commission, only a large number of “governing” organizations manipulated by promoters.
iv) Modern View: The commissioner’s powers has been somewhat diminished. There is more powers with the owners.
b) Pete Rose v. Bart Giamatti(1989) pg 7–“Integrity of the game—best interests of the game”-dispute b/w baseball commissioner and Giamatti and baseball superstar Rose about Rose betting on baseball games. The form contract b/w the two gave the commissioner power and discretion.
i) Issue: To what extent should public law, speaking through judges, venture to overturn decisions made by private leagues, speaking through their commissioners?
ii) Rule (1): The punishing ability resides in baseball with the commissioner to decide the “best interests of the game.”
(1) “Best Interest of the Game”– It means that you can put aside even due process concerns as long as you are not acting in an arbitrary manner when using the “best interest of the game” power.
iii) Rule (2): Major League Baseball cannot be compared or equated with a typical unincorporated association engaged in any other business.
(1) Baseball’s management through a commissioner is equally an exception, anomaly and aberration.
(2) In no other sport or business is there quite the same system, created for quite the same reasons and with quite the same underlying policies.
(3) Standards such as the best interests of baseball, the interests of the morale of the players and the honor of the game, or ‘sportsmanship which accepts the umpire’s decision without complaint,’ are not necessarily familiar to courts and obviously require some expertise in their application.
c) The Legal Scope of the Commissioner’s Authority
i) Milwaukee Am. Ass’n v. Landis (1931) pg 15—“the powers of the commission’s office”— Commissioner disapproved an option contract between it and another team assigning a then-existing agreement for the player.
(1) Issue: Whether and what is the scope of commissioners authority?
(2) Rule (1): The commissioner is given almost unlimited discretion in the determination of whether or not a certain state of fact creates a situation detrimental to the national game of baseball.
(3) Rule (2): The decision of any arbiter, umpire, engineer, or similar person (commissioner) endowed with the power to decide may not be exercised in an illegal manner that is fraudulently, arbitrarily, without legal basis for the same or without any evidence to justify action.
(4) Rule (3): An agreement to arbitrate a controverted question in executory form is normally held void, BUT an actual submission to an arbiter or umpire in good faith is proper, and decision under same is binding UNLESS it is unsupported by evidence or UNLESS the decision is upon some basis without legal foundation or beyond legal recognition.
(a) Ex. “not arbitrary or fraudulent”—if made in pursuance of jxn granted to the commissioner with the expressed desire to achieve certain ends—to keep the game of baseball clean, to promote clean competition, to prevent collusive or fraudulent contracts, to protect players’ rights, to furnish them full opportunity to advance in accord with their abilities and to prevent their deprival of such opportunities by subterfuge, covering or other unfair conduct.
ii) *Finley v. Kuhn (1978) pg 18—“labor situation in baseball”—Baseball commissioner (∆) disapproved the assignments of three player contracts by baseball club owner (∏) as inconsistent with the “best interests of the game.” Introduced free agency.
(1) Rule (1): The Commissioner of baseball has the authority to determine whether any act, transaction, or practice is in the best interests of baseball, and upon such determination, to take whatever preventive or remedial actions he deems appropriate, whether or not the act, transaction, or practice complies with the Major League Rules or involves moral turpitude.
(2) Rule (2): It is not the judiciary’s job to review commissioner’s a
that period, he was not to play for any other club. ∆ violated the agreement by arranging to play for a rival organization during that time. The court issued the injunction against the player because the baseball club could not, in the labor market, purchase the same service in the labor market.
(1) Rule (1): The legal principle that contracts must be mutual, does not mean that in every case each party must have the same remedy for breach by the other.
(2) Rule (2): Freedom of contract covers a wide range of obligation and duty as between parties, and it may not be impaired, so long as the bounds of reasonableness and fairness are not transgressed.
(3) Rule (3): Where a negative remedy of injunction will do substantial justice between the parties, by obliging the defendant either to carry out his contract or lose all benefit of the breach, and the remedy at law is inadequate, and there is no reason of policy against it, the court will interfere to restrain conduct which is contrary to the contract, although it may be unable to enforce a specific performance of it.
(a) Thus, the court cannot compel the ∆ to play for the ∏, but it can restrain him from playing for another club in violation of his agreement.
ii) Central NY Basketball, Inc (Syracuse Nat’l) v. Barnett (1961) pg 109—Barnett (∆) is an NBA player and signs a contract with another corporation (ABL) instead of renewing existing contract. NBA sought injunction claiming ∆ agreed to give him the right to renew his contract for a year if he did not sign a new one. A permanent injunction was granted to enjoin ∆’s performance of service for the other corporation and enjoined the other corporation from interfering with ∆’s contract with the NBA.
Rule (1): Where one personagrees to render personal service to another which require and presuppose a special knowledge, skill and ability in the employee, so that in the case of default, the
