Wells, Federal Courts, Spring 2017
Judicial Review
Establishing Judicial Review
Courts have power of judicial review. Marbury.
SCOTUS struck down jurisdictional statute
Sought relief under original jurisdiction because Judiciary Act of 1789 seemed to say he had access to SCOTUS without going to any other court first.
But Art. III says there are some topics on which the court has original jurisdiction—otherwise jurisdiction is only appellate. But this situation is not one of those topics.
SCOTUS strikes down statute since it confers original jurisdiction beyond constitutional limits
Policy
Judicial review is implied in the Constitution
Constitution sets limits for branches’ use of power. If no one enforces the limits, there is no balance.
Courts must use all law to decide cases in front of it. Constitution is the supreme law, so if the statute conflicts with it, bye bye statute.
The court’s role is to check the other branches
“It is emphatically the province of the Court to decide what the law is.”
WELLSIE—this is a bolder view where judiciary exists as a restraint on other branches.
Constitutional Remedies: Basic Framework
Statutory Aspect: 42 USC § 1983
Statutory Language
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Elements
Natural Person
Deprivation of rights
Federal constitutional or statutory rights
Under color of state law
Policy
Override state law
Provide a remedy when state law is inadequate
Provide a federal remedy for situations where state courts provide a theoretical remedy
Allows post hoc review, where previously only injunctions were available for prospective relief.
§ 1983 is used routinely to sue state & local government officers AND local governments.
Can’t sue state governments under this statute
2 ways to use § 1983 to allege violation of a constitutional right:
Offensively: plaintiff sues government or government official
Can get prospective and retrospective relief
Ex Parte Young established availability of prospective relief, even against state governments. Can sue in either fed ct or state ct.
RR sued, claiming statute set rates so low and deprived them of their property without due process of law. SCOTUS allowed it, saying that RR had remedy in federal court for obtaining prospective relief for threatened violation of constitutional rights.
RR did not have to violate the statute and be penalized before having the ability to bring suit. SCOTUS allowed RR to proceed so it could enjoin the state
Court didn’t say where they got this implied cause of action from.
Retrospective remedy is a suit for damages, now brought under § 1983
Ps prefer § 1983 suits even when state actions are available
It makes a federal forum available
P can bring in state court, but D can remove to federal court since it could’ve been brought in federal court initially
Allows winning Ps to get attorneys’ fees
Defensively: defendant uses a constitutional objection as a shield against the enforcement of the law
Lochner v. NY – economic substantive DP case – NY had statute can’t have baker working for more than x hours and employer violated – used as a shield (in a criminal enforcement proceeding); no choice where to raise const. issues
Monroe v. Pape—the start of a § 1983 damages remedy
“Under Color Of”
The statute was enacted in 1871, and the language was first interpreted 90 years later in Monroe v. Pape
In the 1880s, SCOTUS decided that the statute said an officer did not act under color of state law if there is a state remedy available. There was no chance to use § 1983 unless the state law affirmatively authorized what the officer did.
Monroe—citizen brought suit against police for violation of 4th Amendment.
Means under pretense of, not authorized by state law
As long as P can show that the officer was using his badge/gun/symbol of authority, he is acting under color of state law even if he is violating the law.
But if action is motivated by personal animus, it is not under color of law. Honaker v. Smith.
No requirement that the actor’s conduct must be lawful; it can be unlawful conduct too.
A state officer enforcing federal law does not give rise to a § 1983 suit because he is not acting under color of state law.
Conduct satisfying the state-action requirement of the 14th Amendment satisfies the statutory requirement of action under color of state law. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil.
This language is now read broadly instead of narrowly to allow more access to federal courts
This is well-settled in today’s world.
Justifications for this principle:
Precedent
Classic—“under color of” was interpreted as “under pretense of” in criminal cases, so it was fair to extend that interpretation to civil cases too.
Policy against this principle:
Frankfurter dissent—bad for federal/state relations. Federal judicial power should be used sparingly
Policy for this principle:
Legislative history
This could support the other position though since the legislative history was complaining about what the South was doing and how the state remedy was inadequate. This could support a narrow view since those circumstances are not true today.
After the war, the states did not want to protect the rights of African Americans, but now in the present some state courts will do a good job and some won’t. We need to decide what is a practical reading:
, and other officials typically do not.
Actions not taken in judicial capacity only get qualified immunity.
Policy:
Absolute judicial immunity protects finality, prevents collateral attacks, protects judicial independence. Judicial mistakes are subject to appellate review anyway.
Judges ultimately do not have any protection from prospective relief
First, plaintiff must get a declaratory judgment against the judge before an injunction can be awarded.
This declaratory judgment only applies to that specific judge, not others engaged in the same conduct.
Non-judicial functions include:
Administrative duties such as hiring and firing personnel is an employment decision, not a judicial function. Forrester v. White.
A judge choosing a jury based on race was not a judicial function since other people can (and often do) pick juries. Ex parte Virginia.
Having the bailiff arrest the coffee vendor for 20 minutes for bad coffee was not a judicial function.
Judicial Functions include:
Judge ordering bailiff to retrieve late attorney and bailiff assaults the attorney—the judge’s order is a judicial function since getting attorneys into court is a judicial function. Morreles v. Waco.
Adjudication of a case is a judicial function, even when that adjudication calls for the sterilization of a mentally ill 15 year old girl. Stump v. Sparkman.
Close Call:
Triplet v. Connor—a judge assaulted someone in the courtroom & that was held to be a judicial function of keeping order in the courtroom.
WELLSIE—what if the judge hit him because the judge didn’t like him? This could create a problem with Morreles.
Don’t examine specifics so there are no problems with inconsistency in the doctrine.
If another officer is adjudicating, he can receive judicial immunity
Probation decisions, parole board members, social workers might all engage in judicial functions.
Sometimes called quasi-judicial immunity, but it’s the same thing as regular judicial immunity since the officer is being absolutely protected for engaging in a judicial function.
Cleavinger v. Saxner
Prison officers need some minimal level of independence to get quasi-judicial immunity since they are under the warden’s control and have an incentive to decide in favor of the warden.
WELLSIE doesn’t put much stock in this case since it is 30 years old and only one case takes this approach.
