Juvenile Justice
Fall 2012
Professor Untiedt
Juvenile Justice Outline
Origins/History
– originally no separate system, just infancy (conclusive at 7, rebuttable presumption through 13)
– IL’s Act comes from a Progressive belief in rehabilitation and less culpable, parens patriae, environmental theories of juvenile deviance
o IL Act utilizes unpaid probation officers to investigate, appointing someone on child’s behalf, no jail for under 12
o Revised for wards of state up to 21, age differential for jurisdiction of males v. females
– Mack: A move away from reformatory not good enough (a school for crime), need real school and family life, not prison disguised as school à a probation focused system
o Not seen as punishment, child has a right to be controlled (but also implies no liberty rights)
– Ainsworth – advocates abolishing juvenile courts, says that adolescence (like childhood, but more so) is social construct
o This bad because no distinction between criminal and noncriminal behavior that was seen as deviant for the age (aka smoking, sexual activity); all justify states use of parens patriae power à “an unprecedented expansion of state social control over adolescents”
– Zimring: revisionist view: real purpose of juvenile court was not to reform (interventionist theory), but to divert (diversion theory) children from destructive punishments of criminal justice system
o or rather these were two purposes, but diversion was more important
o if intervention really the theory, then Winship would really have to say that “It is better that ten kids who need help do not get help than one kid who does not need help is erroneously assisted.”
– Commonwealth v. Fisher (PA 1905) upholds juvenile court’s authority to commit juvenile without criminal procedural safeguards
o yes no due process, but this not a new court, just a new designation for the fact that these things have always been done without these procedural safeguards for criminal trials à simply not punished (instead saved!), so not entitled to these rights
– theory of parens patriae – child “has a right ‘not to liberty but to custody’”
– In re Gault (US 1967) – Juvenile court records not really being kept secret, and this can still be done within confines of due process
o Recent studies found that fairness, impartiality and orderliness will impress youths therapeutically than the benevolent judge in an informal setting
o The reality is liberty is taken away when sent to institution for years, requires due process
o requires “fundamentally fair” procedural safeguards during adjudicatory hearing determining delinquency
– Jacob’s thinks that legalization of Juvenile Court through Gault attacks interventionist rationale more than the diversion rationale
– Kent v. US (US 1966) requires due process in judicial waiver hearings in juvenile court
– In re Winship (US) à proof of delinquency must be established beyond a reasonable doubt
– McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (US) à jury trial not required, not all criminal procedural rules required, accurate factfinding required but this does not require a jury
– Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 Congress requires deinstitutionalization of status offenders and non-offenders (must be charged a delinquent), does this through limiting formula funding for those who do not comply
– Early 1990s – response to a “violent juvenile crime epidemic”
o States lower maximum age to send more kids to adult court (instead of affording a waiver process)
o Mandatory minimums
o A lesser concern for keeping records confidential
Juvenile Crime and Victimization
– Delinquency: Since legislative grace, ages vary but top out at 17 years old, though a juvenile sentence can extend longer (in some states up to age 25)
– Status Offenses – also jurisdiction here: truancy, incorrigibility, run-away, comsumption of alcohol, tobacco, curfew, etc.
– Dependency, Neglect, and Abuse – self-explanatory, dependency means no fault of caretaker
– Synder 1999: Vast majority of states oldest age for delinquency is through 17, in CT, NY, and NC it is age 15
o Juvenile arrest rate was constant through 70’s and 80’s, increased from 1989-1994, drops back down but still higher in 1997 then in 1988 (aka superpredators was a myth)
§ Ditto percentage of violent crimes committed by juveniles
§ Females, once 12%, now make up 20% of juvenile crime rate in 1997
– 2002 juvenile violent crime index down again, 47% drop from 1994, as low as 1980
o from peak, juvenile arrest rate has decreased 72%
o female aggravated assault rates, however, have not dropped
§ overall aggravated assault has dropped, but not to 1980s levels
– unlike other crime, child neglect and abuse is still on rise
– Census: risk factors: poverty, welfare dependence, absent parents, one-parent families, unwed mothers, and parents who did not graduate from high school à 50% of kids have at least one of these factors
o And these factors have racial disparity factors
– 2.3 million arrests, 17% of all arrests (defined as under 18)
o violent crime index arrests has been reduced 3X (29%) more than adult (10%)
o Property crimes were lowest in three decades
– 18% handled by police, 73% were referred to juvenile court, and 7% referred directly to criminal court
o handled by police means that warned and handed over to guardians
Age
– What justifies treating adolescents less severely than adults?
o Most youths know right from wrong by age 14, so why extend juvenile justice through 16-18? How does blameworthiness connect with the juvenile justice system [my answer, a different mix of the purposes of criminal law]
o Whether blameworthiness is required to process through system depends on what the system is (is it truly rehabilitative?)
– since juvenile courts are statutory entities, states can define the age and criminal conduct that qualifies
– Infancy Defense? In re Tyvonne J. (Conn. 1989) (8 year old shoots friend with pistol, didn’t think it was real) – court rejects infancy defense, using the parens patriae/rehabilitation (not punishment) argument
o “Purpose of the comprehensive statutory treatment of ‘juvenile delinquents’ is clinical and rehabilitative, rather than retributive or punitive.” = a syste
ned court by granting a statutory right to insanity defense, but other states have endorsed this rationale
Competency
– About half of states have statutes or case law holding that juveniles have a fundamental right not be tried while incompetent (FL, KS, GA, WA, AZ) but not OK since proceedings are rehabilitative
– Golden v. State (Ark. 2000) finds no insanity defense, but required that juvenile be competent at time of adjudication
o Argues that Gault right to counsel presumes a ∆ can communicate with his lawyer
o On insanity defense, Medima says no constitutional right, held earlier in K.M.that no statutory right
o Smith dissent: dissents on competency, juvenile always subject to some form of custody
– Cowden and McKee à study of 144 children found only 20% under 13 and 50% of 13 year olds competent to stand trial (compared to 80-90% of adults evaluated)
– Grisso using similar study that Dursky is a functional test, should not matter whether incompetency is due to mental illness or immaturity
– In the Matter of WAF (DC app. 1990) à before the rehabilitation can begin, there must be a factual determination on the act committed, juvenile must be competent to participate in any factual dispute à thus competency to stand trial goes to basic accuracy of the fact finding determination (I like this)
– Tate v. State (Fla. App. 2003) (FL wrestling case, 3-4 year development delay) – Competency hearings not per se required because charged as an adult, but should have been held here: (1) because mandatory life imprisonment, (2) under 14, (3) with know disabilities
Punishment v. Treatment
– Gault recognized that certainly a mix of the two
– In Re Eric J. (CA 1979) (equal protection claim because 4 years, would have been much lower if adult because no showing of aggravated circumstances) §726 of Welfare & Institutions Code provides that wardship pursuant to §602 cannot be in excess of the maximum term of imprisonment that could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense
o Despite disparity, appellant has not been denied equal protection of the laws
o Because not “similarly situated” à (1) just a different kind of custody from that of parent’s (though still affects liberty) (2) state’s purpose is not punitive
– Smith v. State (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1969) (potential 6 year training school for switchblade) – agrees, no equal protection claim because a reasonable means and valid governmental objective (which here is different purpose à Education and rehabilitation disposition to benefit the ∆ instead of retribution)
