CIV PRO
Lear
Spring 2012
Are we in the right court? Forum Selection Doctrines:
Personal Jurisdiction (PJ)
In what state(s) can the plaintiff sue the defendant? Geographical limitation on the places where P may choose to sue a D for a particular claim. It is intended, as a matter of fairness, to prevent a P from suing a non-resident D in a state unless that D has established a relationship to that state that would reasonably lead her to anticipate being sued there.
SAME answer whether ends up in fed or state court: ct must have power over something:
1) defendant herself OR 2) power over defendant's property
Three kinds of PJ:
In personam: D's herself
In Rem: power over D's property, not over D herself (land, personal property used as jdxnal basis)
Quasi In Rem
Due Process Clauses limit PJ: case must fall within breadth of DP clause to make it ok, AND state must have statute that grants PJ (political judgment deciding how much within bounds of DP states want to give their cts)
FIRST QUESTION: does a statute allow for PJ? If no, then NO jdxn, even if case falls within DP limits. If yes, analyze under statute, THEN analyze constitutionality (DP) of jdxn.
A. In Personam JDXN: Either GENERAL or SPECIFIC (Shoe Spectrum)
GENERAL: D can be sued in the forum on a claim that arose ANYWHERE in the world.
SPECIFIC: Claim ARISES IN THE FORUM; it is related to D's activities there.
Constitutional Limits:
Pennoyer v. Neff: traditional bases of in personam jdxn: 1) D is served with process in forum (presence) (gives general jdxn) 2) D's AGENT served in the forum 3) D is domiciled in the forum (also gives general jdxn) 4) consent
*tough to get in personam pj under Pennoyer; especially once society became more mobile—ct expands to fix this issue
ex., Non-Resident Motorist Act: driving car in X state means you consent to jdxn for auto wrecks AND you've appointed a state official as your agent for service of process (expands consent to include implied consent, expands agent to give you one even if you don't want one)
International Shoe: New formula! Jdxn ok if defendant has such MINIMUM CONTACTS with the forum so that jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Three things clear: 1) can serve process outside forum 2) two-part test: long arm and constitutional DP analysis 3) does not overrule Pennoyer: gives min contacts test as alternative to Pennoyer. Under Shoe:
– a corporation that chooses to conduct activities within a state accepts a reciprocal duty to answer for its in-state activities
– a state's interest in enforcing order within its borders give it PJ over D's with respect to disputes that arise from the D's activities there
– D's voluntary relations with a state gives the ct power to exercise jdxn over her. She must have invoked benefits and protections of the laws of the state.
– D may have sufficient contacts with forum even though he did not act there: if a D commits an act outside a state that she knows will cause harmful effects within that state, she will be subject to minimum contacts jdxn there for claims arising out of that act.
McGee: Upholds jdxn in CA over TX ins company—based on only ONE insurance policy sold in CA because the claim arose from it; jdxn upheld on one contact because TX co had solicited (reached out) to CA to get customer to enter k. D's voluntary acts in forum support jdxn over claims arising from those acts. State's interest: justice for CA resident supports upholding jdxn.
Hanson v. Denckla: FL has no jdxn over DE bank because DE res moved to FL. Cuts back on jdxn—under Shoe, the contact must RESULT from defendant's PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT, I.e, defendant's voluntary act—cannot be accident, must be activities directed by D at forum.
– D must have purposefully availed himself of the of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws
– D must have made deliberate choice to relate to the state in some meaningful way before he can be made to bear the burden of defending there
– Unilateral acts of the P will not suffice!
Worldwide VW: NY family moves to AZ, drives and has accident in OK. Sue in OK.
– Supreme Ct: NO jdxn in OK over NY dealer, Seaway. Car got to OK, but defendant did not send it there and therefore did not avail itself of the laws and protections of OK. 2 functions of min contacts standard: 1) protect D against burden of litigating in distant state 2) prevents states from overreaching limits placed on them by their status as co-equal sovereigns in fed system
– Unilateral acts of P not enough, even though the D could have foreseen that its buyers might take a car there.
– Refuses to allow “the chattel to become the agent for service of process”
– D did not advertise, sell cars, or cultivate a customer base in OK, so it also did not seek any direct benefit from OK activities sufficient to require it to submit to jdxn there.
– Reaffirms that PJ is price D's pay for DELIBERATE efforts to derive benefits from or conduct activities in the state, such as solicitation
– Only reasonable to assert jdxn if D serves, directly or indirectly, the market for its product in the state
– The due process clause “does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties or relations.”
– Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another state, even if the forum state has a strong interest in applying its law to the controversy, and even if the forum state is the most convenient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause may sometimes act to divest the state of its power to render a valid judgment.
Dissent: Foreseeable car sold in NY would get to OK (nature of cars!)–majority says foreseeability is relevant, but simple foreseeability that product will get to forum is NOT relevant—instead, it must be foreseeable that D could get SUED in the forum. (Circular—foreseeable product will get there, foreseeability that product will malfunction there?)
Burger King: Contract case in FL. BK corp sues 2 Michigan residents in Miami, FL (franchisees). Defendants argue ok to contact (due to franchise k), but say jdxn would not be fair.
– k = contact? NOT by itself, must have other facts speaking to purposeful availment: negotiations, future consequences, prior negotiations (how, where, why), terms of k, benefits from forum
– Reasonableness can still be argued even if purp avail through k terms unclear
– Ct says YES to jdxn in FL over Michigan defendants: continuous but limited activity in the forum (ongoing business relationship) supported jdxn because the claim arose out of it; the contact was not “casual” or “isolated”.
– Jdxn proper because of ongoing k relationship, regularly relating with FL headquarters about important aspects of business, and k clause indicating FL law would govern disputes.
– Thus, defendants should reasonably have anticipated being hailed into ct in FL
– Ct makes clear that there are TWO parts to Shoe, CONTACT and FAI
ys NO jdxn in NJ.
4 justices (led by Kennedy) adopt O'CONNOR test from Asahi: found no seeking to serve on part of English co.
3 Justices Dissent (Ginsburg): would uphold jdxn, buy Brennan Asahi theory (target USA = sued in any state where your product can cause an injury)
Burnham: NJ citizen sued in CA for claim that arose in NJ (CA must have general jdxn)–D served with process in CA—do traditional bases under Pennoyer of presence in forum still work after Shoe?
4 to 4 split again:
Theory One: (Scalia) Presence when served is good BY ITSELF (traditional basis under Pennoyer is still good law).
– “Transient (or tag) jdxn”, achieved by serving a D with process in the state where the suit is brought, even if the D is in the state briefly for reasons unrelated to the suit. Doesn't matter how unfair it is, this is how it's always been.
Theory Two: Must meet Shoe for every case! But here it did, because of symmetry: D could have sued while IN CA, and mere presence there means you're availing yourself of the protection of the laws of the state, fruits of economy, etc., plus comports with reasonableness (modern day transportation/if you go there once you can clearly go another time)
(ALL 9 justices did uphold jdxn in Burham under either test)
General vs. Specific Jdxn:
General: D can be served in forum on claim that arose anywhere in the world. D's activities in the state are such that D would expect to be subject to suit there on any claim and would suffer no inconvenience from defending there.
Ex., major American oil company would be subject to jdxn in many states, regardless of whether the claim arose in the state the suit was brought.
– Companies that have such extensive activities, personnel, and facilities in a state may be considered “at home” there and therefore subject to the burden of submitting generally to jdxn there
– General jdxn doctrine is not to be confused with citizenship for diversity purposes under §1332. Corporations almost certainly subject to PJ where incorporated or where their principal place of business is. But they may be subject to general PJ in many additional states.
Helicopteros and Perkins: general jdxn IF D had CONTINUOUS and SYSTEMATIC TIES with the forum (none found in Helicopteros because too little activity—mere purchases not enough—and CoA didn't arise from it.)
Goodyear (2011): SC unanimously rejected gen jdxn in NC, appears to go beyond continuous and systematic ties test—also must show that D is “essentially AT HOME” in the forum (ex., for person: domicile, for business: where formed/where principle place of business/where incorporated. Does it go beyond that? Historically, jdxn upheld based on doing business, what does 'essentially at home' even mean?) Goodyear: only buying and selling in a state NOT ENOUGH for general jdxn! Used to be clear that Coke, Ford etc could be sued anywhere—not so clear anymore!
