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Antitrust Law
University of Florida School of Law
Harrison, Jeffrey L.

Antitrust Law Outline
8/24/09
·         Antitrust is common law
·         The mkt works best when businesses and firms are competitive
·         Sec. 1 and sec. 2 of the Sherman Act
·         Clayton Act
·         Robinson – Patman Act
·         Price discrimination – can’t sell same product to diff buyers at diff prices
·         3 ways antitrust laws enforced – justice dept., FTC (cease and desist), and private action
8/25/09
·         Demand –schedule of prices, amount willing and able to buy at a certain price
·         Inverse rel’ship b/w P and Q
·         D curve shifts inwards when a substitute exists
o   Buy less at each price
·         When price of complementary good increases, the complemented good’s demand decreases
·         Steep slope – necessities (kidney), no good substitutes
o   Inelastic – price doesn’t matter
·         Main cause S curve shifts – cost of implements
·         Competitive mkt – tendency for price to gravitate towards $3 for 30 units sold
·         Consumer surplus – diff b/w what you paid and how much you would be willing to pay
o   Should that triangle be as big as possible b/c indicia of social welfare
·         Debate: should we max entire triangle or just the consumer surplus triangle?
·         Allocative efficiency
·         Competitive Market
o   1. Large # of buyers and sellers
o   2. Perfect info
o   3. Items that are fungible
8/27/09
·         Monopoly – higher price at lower output
o   1. P increases
o   2. Q decreases
o   3. CS decreases
o   4. CS à PS
o   5. Allocative efficiency decreases – social welfare decreases
o   6. Cost of rent-seeking and avoidance à never be bigger than x rectangle
·         CS shifted over to PS
·         Theft – just redistribution but real cost of it is measures taken to prevent it
·         Real cost of monopoly is methods of doing it and methods of avoiding it
o   No wealth destroyed – just a redistributio

its
o   Overcharge measure
·         Offensive: P absorbed the hgiehr price
·         Ct: can’t say no to defense and yes to offense b/c will pay dmgs to 1st one and still liable to 20th, etc. so either all of it contained at manuf/wholesale level or apportion it down entire level of distribution
·         Ct chooses 1st option – have to be direct purchaser to recover from price-fixing firms
·         If allow everyone to sue, everyone will recover $.20 if price was increased by $1
·         Exceptions:
o   Where direct purchaser owned or controlled by its customer – also removes a lot of the uncertainty b/c like a single entity
·         Monopsony
o   1 buyer
o   Buyers can get together and collude to pay one price
o   Can have indirect seller to the monopsony