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Evidence
University of Denver School of Law
Best, Arthur

I.       RELEVANCE
a.      Introduction
                                                              i.      Relevancy limits the kind of information a party can use to try to influence the factfinder’s conclusions.
                                                            ii.      Rules:
1.      Rule 401: defines relevance
2.      Rule 401: states that evidence must be relevant to be admissible
3.      Rule 403: allows a court to exclude relevant evidence, even if it is is relevant, where its legitimate value in the case would be outweighed by certain risks 
b.      Basic Concepts
                                                              i.      Whether the existence of one fact sheds light on the likely existence or non-existence of another fact?
c.       Standard Analysis of Evidence Issues
                                                              i.      Basics:
1.      What evidence is a party seeking to introduce?
2.      What purpose does that party claim the evidence will serve
                                                            ii.      Categories of Consideration:
1.      Is evidence of the type the party wants to introduce generally admissible for the purpose the party has specified?
2.      Does the evidence comply with any applicable rules about timing or form?
d.      Whether the existence of one fact sheds light on the likely existence or non-existence of another fact
                                                              i.      Walsh v. Chan – Car accident case. Any evidence affecting the assessment of probability of a past occurrence has relevance and should be considered. The court held that the trial court was correct when it held that the probative value of the testimony was substantially outweighed by the negative admissibility factors delineated in Haw. R. Evid. Rule 403 because (1) the testimony gave minimal assistance to the jury; (2) the need for the testimony was not crucial; (3) admission of the testimony would have caused substantial delay and confusion; and (4) there was a substantial danger of unfair prejudice to defendant.
                                                            ii.      Kaechele v. Kenyon Oil Company, Inc. – Gas station injuries from customer assaults with history of gas station phone calls to the police department. Jury verdict in favor of plaintiff was affirmed because the evidence was relevant, admissible, and its probative value outweighed any possible prejudice. Further, the evidence was sufficient for a jury to reasonably conclude that defendants were a cause of plaintiff’s injuries and they were more negligent than the plaintiff. Judgment affirmed because the evidence was relevant, admissible, and its probative value outweighed any possible prejudice. Further, the evidence was sufficient for a jury to reasonably conclude that defendants were a cause of plaintiff’s injuries and defendants were more negligent than the plaintiff.
e.       Conditional Relevance
                                                              i.      Cox v. State – A murder victim had testified against the defendant’s close friend, Jamie Hammer, at a bond reduction hearing held four days before he was murdered.  The conditional fact to be established in the case was that the defendant in fact learned of the victim’s testimony, giving him a motive to murder him.  The Supreme Court of Indiana found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Rule 104(b) was satisfied despite a lack of direct evidence that the defendant learned of the victim’s testimony. When the bond reduction hearing information would only be relevant if there was a basis for believing that the murder defendant really knew about the evidence, the court should admit the bound reduction evidence upon fulfillment of the conditions.
f.       Balance between probative value and risk of unfair prejudice
                                                              i.      Old Chief v. United States – Defendant was arrested for assault with deadly weapon and was charged with a federal crime, which prohibits possession of a firearm by someone with a previous felony conviction. Defendant had previous conviction of assault with a gun for which he was sentenced for 5 years. During trial, Defendant argued that the prosecution shouldn’t be allowed to introduce evidence regarding the nature of his previous felony because probative value substantially outweighed the prejudice. Showing the nature of the Defendant’s last felony had little probative value, because you needed to only show that the Defendant had prior conviction, which can be done by stipulation. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion by overriding the Defendant’s stipulation and allowing the prosecution to present the evidence.
1.      Pp. 18-19: “Finally, the most obvious reason that the general presumption that the prosecution may choose its evidence is so remote from application here is that proof of the defendant’s status goes to an element entirely outside the natural sequence of what the defendant is charged with thinking and doing to commit the current defense.” Why does Souter think this is a fair description of Old Chief? “Outside the natural sequence of what the defendant is charged with thinking and doing?”
g.      Use of flight evidence
                                                              i.      United States v. Dixon – Dixon brought an illegal alien into the US. Dixon challenges the conviction on the ground that the district court erred by improperly instructing the jury that it could consider evidence of his flight as indicative of guilt. The flight instructions are valid if the evidence supports a chain of unbroken inferences from the defendant’s behavior to the defendant’s guilt of the crime charged; four inferences must be justified: (1) From the defendant’s behavior to flight; (2) From flight to consciousness of guilt; (3) From consciousness of guilt to consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged; and (4) From consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged to actual guilt of the crime charged.
h.      Link between past injuries and a plaintiff’s injury
                                                              i.      Lovick w. Wil-Rich – Lovick was injured while using his cultivator. He brought about a strict liability and negligence action against Wil-Rich. Lovick introduced evidence at trial that a competitor instituted a safety program for a similar issue. He also introduced evidence of nine other accidents. Inclusion of prior accident evidence to show the existence of a dangerous condition requires that the prior accidents must occur under substantially the same circumstances. Evidence of other accidents is admissible for: (1) existence and nature of defect; (2) causation; (3) notice; and (4) impeachment of rebuttal. 
                                                            ii.      Spino v. John S. Tilley Ladder Co. – The Spino’s bought a ladder that ended up cracking. They sued claiming that the leg cracked because it lacked an anti-split device. Prior to trial, the Spino’s filed a Motion in Limine to preclude evidence from Tilley’s that no similar accidents or claims had occurred. Court denied the Motion, found that it was a product design case and that the testimony constituted relevant rebuttal evidence to the claim that the alleged defect was common to all household ladders manufactured by Tilley. No prior claims evidence was relevant; strict liability allows a plaintiff to recover where a product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the consumer or user causes harm to the plaintiff
i.        Use of statistical evidence
                                                              i.      People v. Collins – Prosecution called a math teacher to establish that there was an overwhelming probability that the crime was committed by the Defendants.  He testified that there was a 1 in 12 million chance that the Defendants were innocent. Introducing evidence of mathematical probability was not properly introduced and used by the prosecution in a criminal case. Introduction of evidence related to mathematical probability statistics require an adequate foundation in evidence and adequate proof of statistical independence. The record is devoid of any evidence relating to any of the six individual probability factors used.  The prosecutor himself suggested what the various probabilities should be and these became the basis of the witness’ testimony.  A foundation for the admissibility of the witness’ testimony was never even attempted to be laid out, let alone established
j.        Basic concepts of spoilation (Destruction of evidence)
                                                              i.      Kronisch v. United States – American artist was allegedly dosed with LSD by the CIA in a Paris bar. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on lack of jurisdiction and the claims being time-barred. On review, the order dismissing the claims against defendants was affirmed in part based on the statute of limitations. The order

not hearsay. The State reasons that the pictures are akin to a photograph, in that they are produced by mechanical procedures and not producing a statement or an assertion. A composite picture of a perpetrator prepared by police pursuant to the directions of a crime witness does not constitute a statement; such a picture is equivalent to a photo in that it merely reflects the perpetrator’s likeness. No assertion or statement is involved. Shows the flexibility with which courts sometimes apply hearsay doctrines, in the context of a type of non-verbal expression.
1.      Understand the definition of hearsay and apply it in a rigorous way
2.      Machine is not a person – 801a 801b
c.       Statements Relevant Regardless of their Truth
                                                              i.      Kenyon v. State– Robert Kenyon appeals his conviction for grand larceny, and the court reversed and remands it. The issue is whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied him the opportunity to introduce statements made to him by his fiancé regarding consent to use the vehicle. He and his fiancé went on a roadtrip. Their van broke down in Kansas. They placed the van in storage and hitchhike to Denver. They eventually ended up in Cheyenne. A furniture owner gave him some money and said that they could stay in a trailer near their house; he asked them to do some odd jobs in exchange. Kenyon borrowed the man’s truck, and he was pulled over for speeding. His license was expired. When Kenyon learned that his girlfriend had a family emergency, they took the truck to California. The owner reported it as stolen. Kenyon maintained that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to allow him to testify that the girlfriend had told him that they had permission to use the truck.   He argues that the testimony would have bolstered his defense that he did not harbor the criminal intent to permanently deprive the truck owner. The court erred because the statement was offered to show the effect on Kenyon’s intent and subsequent conduct; not to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The heart of his defense was that he did not have the requisite criminal intent to be convicted of grand larceny.
1.      Her saying those words is a legitimate defense?
Moen v. Thomas – The Thomas’ are appealing from a judgment which quieted title in certain property in a family trust, ordered the trust was entitled to exclusive possession of the property, and awarded damages for the use and occupation of the property. The issue was whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony of an oral year-to-year lease and in finding the parties had a year-to-year lease which could be terminated at the end of a yearly term. Under the terms of the will, the son received the surface of the ranch headquarters and some additional ranch land. The son also received an option to purchase or leases other ranch land. The son exercised his option to purchase machinery and livestock, but stated that he declined the first option to purchase the land. He orally stated his intent to exercise his right to lease the property. A few years later, the son died, and his family testified that he had informed them that he did not want to be bound to a seven-year lease. He paid rent for 1997. He later died, and appellant wife sent a rent check for 1998. Appellees told her she did not have a valid lease for 1998. At trial there was testimony that appellant wife’s husband had stated that he did not want to be bound to a seven-year-lease. Appellees won their suit against appellants. The supreme court held that the trial court did not err in admitting testimony