I. Community Caretaking: Police-initiated actions that pursue some purpose other than enforcing the criminal law (render aid, redirect traffic, locate missing persons).
a. State v. Dube: officers responded to a call by a custodian of an apartment building who needed to enter the apartment to stop sewage from leaking into apartments below. When police entered the apartment, their initial entry was lawful and the custodian had a statutory right to enter. However, after the repairs were complete, the presence of the officers at the apartment was unlawful (they needed a search warrant before the search).
b. State v. Lovegren: officer noticed driver asleep in the car on the side of a highway w/lights on, drunk driver. Under the community caretaking doctrine, the officer properly checked on Lovegren, and had a particularized suspicion to make a further investigatory stop, (field sobriety tests) which developed into probable cause for his arrest.
c. State v. Stowe: Officer had probable cause for arresting Stowe since he was using offensive language on a public highway and was visibly intoxicated. Since the officer had probable cause for arrest, he did not consent to battery by Stowe.
II. Brief Investigative Stops: 4th Amendment
a. Current exceptions to warrant requirement: exigent circumstances, direct observation of a crime, plain view, open fields, community caretaker functions, brief investigative stops, brief frisks for weapons, inventory searches, protective sweeps, automobile sweeps, border searches, school searches, prison searches, arrests in public places, searches incident to arrest, fire investigations, and administrative searches.
b. Katz: the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.
c. Terry: on the basis of reasonable suspicion, officers could conduct a pat down search for weapons.
d. Camara: Court approved the granting of warrants for municipal building code enforcement inspections on the basis of general administrative need for inspecting the area w/out individual suspicion.
e. Consensual Stops:
a. Mendenhall: Court concluded that a person has been “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. (Ex. By means of physical force or show of authority such that freedom of movement is restrained).
b. Wilson v. State: Officer asked Williams to stop while he checked to see if warrants for his arrest. A request for id is not a seizure, but seizure did not occur here when officer told Wilson to go to a specific street corner and wait and officer could see him and checked him. A reasonable person would believe that Wilson’s Fourth Amendment right to be free of reasonable intrusions was implicated. Court held that brief detention for the purpose of completing a computerized warrants check is an unreasonable seizure. When no observed violation of the law is present, the intrusion required that to run a warrants check requires reasonable suspicion on past criminal conduct.
f. Reasonable suspicion: to justify a stop the government must be able to articulate a reasonable suspicion, that the person has committed or will commit a crime. Depends on an
g. objective basis: must evaluate the totality of the circumstances w/a stop and examine whether the officer acted reasonably.
a. State v. Nelson: Whether an officer watched men drinking beer in the car parking lot, it was not objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that criminal activity occurred b/c at no time did the officer observe anything unusual. No justification for stop-no reasonable suspicion.
b. State v. Dean: Although mere presence in a high-crime area does not justify a stop, the combination of recent criminal activity and the time of day and the fact that the area was uninhabited created reasonable suspicion.
c. Illinois v. Wardlow: The fact that a stop occurred in a high crime area could be considered with other factors, such as one demonstrating nervous, evasive behavior. The determination of reasonable suspicion can be based on judgments of common human heavier.
d. California v. Hodari: A suspect’s flight, standing alone, did not create reasonable suspicion, but the Court ruled that an officer did not need individualized suspicion to chase Hodari b/c the pursuit did not amount to a “seizure” under the federal constitution.
III. Gathering Information Without Searching: under Katz, 4th amendment and most state constitutions, there is no search when the government intrudes into some place or interest where the person has no “reasonable expectation of privacy.”
a. Plain view: under the 4th amendment, no reasonable expectation of privacy in matters left within plan view. To qualify for plain view treatment, the police officer must view the item from a place where she has a right to be.
a. State v. Bobic: under the open view doctrine, when law enforcement officers are able to detect something by utilization of one or more sense while lawfully present at the vantage point where those senses are used, that detection does not constitute a search. An officer’s warrantless view into a commercial storage unit was constitutional and not a search when he looked through a small, pre-existing hole in an adjoining storage unit.
b. Bond v. United States: Law enforcement’s physical manipulation of a bus passenger’s carry-on luggage violated 4th Amendment’s proscription against unreasonable searches. Physically invasive inspection is simply more intrusive than purely visual inspection. The prodding by an officer went farther than the natural casual conduct he could have expected from other passengers. The individual’s expectation of privacy must be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
c. Seizure under plain sight: if the item is in a protected area, an officer may seize it so long as there is probable cause to believe that it is contraband or evidence of a crime or otherwise subjected to a seizure. If in a protected area, you need a search warrant.
d. Abandoned property: the same can be said as in cases of “plain view” or “open view” that the reasonable expectations of pr
izen informant, (3) the informant has made a statement that is against his or her penal interest, (4) a police officer’s independent investigation establishes the informant’s reliability or the reliability of the information the informant has given.
e. State v. Raveydts: Two elements necessary in deciding whether an anonymous tip provides a “substantial basis” for issuing the court’s finding of probable cause. First, an explicit and detailed description of an alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed firsthand. Second, the extent to which the tip is corroborated by officer’s own investigation is important. Here, informant provided considered detail about the activities they personally observed. The detective checked motor vehicle licensing records to identify druggies.
VI. Brief Investigative Stops
a. Pretextual Stops: “Whren stops” refers to traffic stops based on reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation, but intended to further the investigation of some other crime.
a. People v. Robinson: court found that the violation of a traffic statute triggers the officer’s authority to make the stop. If the stop is arbitrary and unlawful, it must be so for all purposes.
b. Whren v. United States: where a police officer has probable cause to detain a person temporarily for a traffic violation, that seizure does not violate the Fourth Amendment even though the underlying reasons might have been to investigate some other matter. Fourth Amendment allows actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent.
b. Criminal profiles and Race:
a. Quarles v. State: d got off bus in a well-known drug area and was acting suspiciously. He sought a reversal of a ruling denying the motion to suppress evidence of drugs seized from a street encounter with police. Police conduct must be based upon (1) all the circumstances, including objective observations and considerations of lawbreakers and (2) the inferences and deductions of a trained officer. The profile alone will not justify a seizure, but when considered with police observations, a seizure could be warranted even though “non-profile” characteristics would not justify it. It is the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular conduct. When Q exited the bus, he satisfied a number of well-known drug profile characteristics. Under the totality of the circumstances, the conduct of the appellant, measured by experienced police officers, provided a specific and articulable basis for a limited investigative stop.