Strauss_Elements_Fall_2013
I. Introduction
The State (D) v. Post (P), 20 N.J.L. 368 (1845) (Nevius, J.)
Facts: Plan adopted in 1804 for gradual abolition of slavery in NJ (children of slaves born after certain date would be free). NJ’s constitution then amended in 1844 to read that “all men are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.”
· Post brought case against slave owner; argued it was unconstitutional because amendment abolished slavery. State said that conclusion couldn’t be drawn because separate section stated “that all writs, actions, claims and rights of individuals and bodies corporate shall continue as if no change had taken place” (he owned slave at time prior to amendment, so slave couldn’t be taken away).
· State won; Post appealed.
Issues:
· (1) Can slavery exist in NJ under its present constitution and laws?
· (2) Was amendment in 1844 enacted for purpose of abolishing slavery?
Rules:
· (1) If (a) institution of slavery never existed by law in NJ or (b) constitution has abolished slavery, then slavery cannot exist in NJ under its present constitution and laws.
· (2) Interpretation of law must be made in accordance with society’s nature, condition, and laws.
Holding:
· (1) Yes. Slavery can exist in NJ under its present constitution and laws because (a) legislative records show institution of slavery existed by law at adoption of constitution in 1844 and (b) constitution has not destroyed the relationship between master and slave or otherwise abolished slavery.
· (2) No. Amendment cannot be determined to have been made with purpose of abolishing slavery.
o Provision is too vague to reach conclusion it abolishes slavery. If legislators meant it to, they would have been more explicit.
o Concepts of freedom and independence are limited; strong always encroach upon the weak.
Disposition: Affirmed.
Analysis:
· Statutory interpretation: Three reasons why anti-slavery judges might have ruled this way:
o (1) See argument for anti-slavery, but on balance, this was the better opinion.
o (2) It’s not for courts to decide; leave it to legislature.
o (3) Follow where law leads, not what personal values dictate.
§ Contentious tone; like they’re doing such a good thing by being objective.
§ Relates to Conclusion materials: Should they feel proud if it’s morally wrong?
· Precedent:
o U.S. Constitution: Nation formed as means of securing liberty, but expressly recognizes slavery.
o VA Constitution: Similar language as NJ, and no court there held that it abolished slavery.
o Commonwealth v. Ives (MA): Similar language in state constitution used to abolish slavery.
§ But this court disagrees with that decision. Judge there had political motives.
· Possible arguments for Post:
o (1) If there isn’t already a law about slavery (because it’s not explicitly mentioned in constitution), then nothing even needs to be abolished.
§ Rebuttal: But institutions like families (and your obligations to family members) also aren’t explicitly mentioned.
ú Rebuttal: Two institutions are different. Slavery is controversial; family not questioned.
ú Rebuttal: Public policy grounds (immorality of slavery should make it illegal).
· Not a great argument; appeals to emotions only.
ú Rebuttal: See if it’s being enforced by officials / society.
· But this could create circular issue; can’t question what society wants just by looking at what it does.
o (2) Even if slavery did exist as institution, it was abolished by new constitution.
§ Rebuttal (court’s argument): If that was intention, drafters would have used more explicit language.
ú Rebuttal: Institution was already diminishing at time of drafting; drafters may have thought it would go away by itself. NJ is different than states where slavery is the social / economic backbone.
· Can bring in MA / VA precedent here; argue that we should follow MA instead because it’s geographically closer to NJ, and like NJ, slavery isn’t social / economic backbone.
ú Rebuttal: Drafters needed to compromise; maybe anti-slavery drafts settled on language that could at least be interpreted as such in court.
· Hypothetical: Word “slavery” is argued about to point of absurdity (like “slave to fashion”).
§ Rebuttal (court’s argument, though just dicta): Abolition will absolve masters of responsibility to care for slaves; makes it difficult to care for older slaves.
ú Hypothetical: Lawsuit could arise on same legal claim (that all writs continue); slavery existed at time of amendment, and as result of its abolishment, ex-slave can no longer support himself. Wants to collect from master.
II. Precedent, Formalism, and Legal Realism
A Case Study of Development of Legal Rule Through Precedent
The Privity Rule
· The rule: If injury is caused to third party by defective product manufactured by another party, injured party can only claim damages if can show privity of contract between itself and defendant.
o All cases involve negligent manufacturer, injured plaintiff, and plausible connection between the two parties. Question is if manufacturer should be liable.
· Development of rules:
o Privity rule’s development:
§ (1) No privity, no liability.
§ (2) Introduction of “inherently dangerous” exception.
§ (3) Introduction of foreseeability exception.
o Reflects typical pattern of common law rule developed through precedent (not based on statute, but instead developed by judges who lay out a rule and then decide case’s outcome):
§ (1) Have reasonably clear rule.
§ (2) Rule starts getting applied in ways that seem increasingly arbitrary.
ú If rule has weakness, cases will find the weakness.
§ (3) Weakness discovered, but rule doesn’t change right away.
§ (4) Arbitrariness increases as rule applied to more and more cases, until one court decides we’ve been acting like the rule has been (x), but it’s really been (y), and (y) makes more sense than (x).
ú This was the foreseeability exception that Cardozo introduced in MacPherson. Was revolutionary at time, but today not so controversial.
Winterbottom (P) v. Wright (D), 10 Meeson & Welsby 109 (1842) (Abinger, C.B., Alderson, B., and Rolff, B.)
Facts: Wright contracted with Postmaster General to provide mail-coach for carrying mailbags. Wright, under terms of contract, agreed to keep coach in safe condition. Atkinson entered into contract with Postmaster General to transport coach and supply horses and coachmen. Winterbottom, the coachman, was injured when he was thrown from coach due to its unfit condition. Sued on theory that Wright contracted with third person (Postmaster General), and therefore became liable to everyone who might use the carriage. Further argued that because contract was made on behalf of public by Postmaster General, no action could be taken against him. Therefore, must be remedied by Wright.
· Wright ßà Postmaster General ßà Atkinson ßà Winterbottom.
Issue: Is defendant liable for injuries caused to plaintiff if plaintiff was not privy to contract injuries resulted from?
Rule: Plaintiff cannot sue for negligence if event in question resulted from contract plaintiff was not privy to.
Holding: No. Wright not liable.
· Levy v. Langridge: Defendant sold defective gun to plaintiff’s father for use by father and sons. Gun blew up in plaintiff’s hand. Defendant was liable.
· Abinger: Winterbottom was not party in contract between Wright and Postmaster General. Just as he can’t sue on breach of contract, can’t sue in tort.
o In Levy, gun bought by father because son couldn’t make bargain himself, but son was still substantially the party contracting. Proxy in this case wasn’t acting in Winterbottom’s interests, but his own, whereas proxy in Levy was acting in plaintiff’s interests.
· Rebuttal: Here, Wright vowed to keep carriage in good condition for benefit of Winterbottom. Winterbottom was beneficiary of that promise, even if there were intermediaries. Winterbottom was only one who should care about carriage’s condition.
ú Rebuttal: Winterbottom isn’t only one who cares; Postmaster General does because no mail is delivered if it gets damaged. If it didn’t matter to Postmaster General, wouldn’t have been part of contract in first place.
· Alderson: If claims could be filed by people not party to the contract in question, there would be no end to number of suits that could be filed.
o But if Winterbottom had been party to contract, then case would fall under principle of Levy, and Wright would be liable.
o Difference in Levy was that defendant had knowledge of article’s defect; made false representations / there was fraud.
§ Rebuttal: There’s a misrepresentation here too. Handed over carriage saying it was ok, but it wasn’t. when you sell something to someone, you do it under notion it’s in good shape.
ú Rebuttal: In Levy, defendant knew it was defective; intentional misrepresentation, whereas one in Winterbottom wasn’t.
· Rolff: Wright took on duty to maintain carriages, but took on no duty towards Winterbottom.
o “Damnum absque injuria”: There are some injuries for which the law provides no remedy (i.e., damage without injury).
o “Hard cases make bad law”: Judge’s only options are to make very limited ruling with no precedential value or to create bad precedent.
Disposition: Judgment for Wright.
Analysis:
· An option for Winterbottom could have been to negotiate indemnification clause into employment contract; bargain for injury coverage. But in this era, most were illiterate; not a likely option.
· Slippery slope argument: If you allow for something in this case, slippery slope to oblivion.
· Action of the first impression: Suit without precedent.
o May be result of new technology; suit results from products that didn’t exist in past.
o In Post, judges looked to language in constitution; had distinct text to work with.
§ Don’t have that here. Need to defer to common law by looking at (1) precedent and (2) potential effects of decision.
Longmeid (P) v. Holliday (D), 155 Eng. Rep. 752, 6 Ex. 761 (1851) (Parke, B.)
Facts: Holliday sold defective lamp to Longmeid. Holliday didn’t manufacture it (done by third parties) and no proof shown that Holliday knew it was defective. Lamp exploded when used with naphtha, and injured Longmeid’s wife. Jury found Holliday not guilty of fraudulent or deceitful representation. Longmeid had previously recovered damages in another action for Holliday’s breach of implied warranty of sale (was implicit in sale that lamp was not defective, so seller had breached this). Jury found all facts for Longmeid, except allegation of fraud. Holliday objected that because fraud was not proven, action couldn’t lie.
· Note that action for breach of implied warranty
ract?
Rule: Remote vendor with no privity or connection between him and plaintiffs should be held liable for negligence only if article in question is inherently dangerous.
Holding: No. Litchfield not liable. Almost all objects become dangerous under some circumstances, yet aren’t inherently dangerous. This was not an inherently dangerous instrument; fact that it worked for five years is testament to this.
· If Loop had no knowledge of defects and was in rightful and lawful use of machine, still couldn’t rule in Loop’s favor due to above argument. But not worth considering since judgment is still for Litchfield.
Disposition: Affirmed.
Analysis:
· Rules / standards:
o Differentiate from Thomas:
§ (1) Loop used product without authorization.
§ (2) Manufacturer pointed out defects to intermediary who bought product directly from him.
§ (3) Loop was careless in his use of the item.
o But court ignores these differences; doesn’t matter since under privity rule, judgment for Litchfield anyway.
§ Can come at case by (1) considering everything or (2) deciding on an issue and then proceeding from there (if first issue decides case, stop there).
§ Here, no one is hurt by omission of facts. Same outcome either way.
ú Rebuttal: Could hurt plaintiffs in similar cases in future, because making such a broad ruling wouldn’t allow for specific differences between cases (like three above). For example, door should have been left open for same case where plaintiff wasn’t negligent.
· Rebuttal: Doesn’t hurt future plaintiffs because it’s just how precedent works.
o Rebuttal: Tips too far to legislature’s job; exceeded boundaries.
o Rebuttal: Judge got it wrong; said differences didn’t impact decision, but they did factor in. Removing culpability of Loop makes stronger argument for object being dangerous. Psychological desire to favor Litchfield.
· Categories: Idea that world can be divided into (1) ordinary things and (2) dangerous things.
o Maybe there are borderline cases, but what about just using intuition?
Losee (P) v. Clute (D), 51 N. Y. 494 (1873) (Lott, J.)
Facts: Clute, trustees and agents of Saratoga Paper Company, manufactured boiler out of brittle iron in negligent and defective manner. Boiler was thrown on to Losee’s premises, exploded due to defects, and led to injury and damage. Losee filed complaint against Clute; complaint dismissed by trial court. Losee appealed.
· Clute ßà Saratoga ßà Losee.
Issue: Can original manufacturer be held liable for boiler explosion, given that plaintiff was not party to original contract?
Rule: Remote vendor with no privity or connection between him and plaintiffs should be held liable for negligence only if article in question is inherently dangerous.
Holding: No. Clute not liable. True that Clute knew boiler was constructed improperly and was intended to be used in immediate vicinity of residential houses and stores, so an explosion would be likely to threaten human life and property, but boiler tested by Clute and then used by Saratoga for three months prior to explosion. After that test and acceptance, Clute had nothing to do with boiler; contract was between Clute and Saratoga, which now had exclusive ownership and management over it. Clute didn’t know where it would be used (in this case, in a highly populated area), and Saratoga may have used it improperly.
· The Mayor, etc. of Albany v. Cunliff: At most, architect or builder of work answerable only to his employees; not liable for accidents that may occur after execution of work.
· Losee cited Thomas, but that doesn’t apply. Boiler is more analogous to flywheel in Loop.
Disposition: Affirmed.
Analysis: Court not affected by fact that it was just a bystander; this could be because court thinks Losee could still sue Saratoga. Letting manufacturer off the hook for that reason.
Statler (P) v. George A. Ray Mfg. Co. (D), 195 N.Y. 478 (1909) (Hiscock, J.)
Facts: George manufactured large coffee urn and sold it to jobber, who sold it to Statler’s company. Urn malfunctioned when first used and caused accident. Statler sued in trial court and won. No contractual relationship between parties, but Statler succeeded on grounds that (1) George knew purposes for which the urn was to be used, (2) George knew urn was inherently dangerous if not constructed properly, (3) urn was negligently constructed, and (4) poor construction led to accident. George appealed.
