Intentional Torts
CONCEPT OF INTENT
Intent occurs when the ∆:
purposely desires the result, OR
knows to a substantial certainty that it will occur
must have knowledge of substantial certainty
Garratt v. Dailey(pg. 1): boy liable for battery if proved that he knew w/substantial certainty that pulling chair would result in π’s injury
must desire the result (act) or substantially know it will occur, but not necessarily know of the consequences of the act
Insanity and infancy not defenses to intentional torts if there is the ability to form intent
Williams v. Kearby (pg. 6): Δ, who at the time was considered mentally insane (age 14), shot and wounded πs who are suing for battery
Intent is subjective – up to fact-finder to determine
TRANSFERRED INTENT
TI doctrine applies to five intentional torts:
1) Battery
2) Assault
3) False Imprisonment
4) Trespass to Land
5) Trespass to Chattel
· Elements
o D intends to commit a tort against one person (any of the intentional torts), but instead or in addition:
§ commits a different (transferable) tort against the same person (D intends T1 on P1 but T2 results against P1), OR
§ commits the same tort against a different person (D intends T1 on P1 but T1 results against P2), OR
§ commits a different (transferable) tort against a different person (D intends T1 on P1 but T2 results against P2) (see Altieri)
o THE INTENT GETS TRANSFERRED TO THE TORT WHICH RESULTS
· SPLIT: RS does not generally adopt TI doctrine but accepts transfer between battery and assault; in c/l TI applies to all 5 types of torts
Altieri v. Colasso: Boy threw a rock meant to scare (assault) one boy but hit another (battery) and injured him; held liable for battery for 2nd boy, even if he didn’t mean to hit him.
MISTAKE DOCTRINE
No defense that ∆ mistakes the identity of property or person or believes there’s a privilege if there’s an intent to commit an tortious act
Ranson v. Kitner (pg. 24, note 5): A shoots B’s dog believing that it is a wolf with intent to kill it. A is liable.
Policy: Imposes strict liability on ∆ who interferes w/another’s property or person. However, person may morally not be at fault. Can have a deterrent effect and discourages risks by potential ∆, and prevents unjust enrichment.
BATTERY
· π causes
o intentional infliction of a harmful or offensive bodily contact
o with the π’s person
§ does not necessarily have to be battery to a specific body part: can also be something intimately associated w/body (ex. Purse, clothes, car (if in it at time), objects on body, etc.)
· In tort law it must be intentional (accidental battery is under negligence or strict liability)
· ∆ responsible for harm caused by battery, even if actual battery wasn’t intended
· Battery is a dignitary tort (protects dignity, not just skin and bones); Does not necessarily have to physically hurt
o Leichtman v. WLW Jacor Communications, Inc. (pg. 10): smoke blown in face supports battery theory because most would say that smoke blow directly at you is offensive, and ∆ had intent to cause offensive contact
o Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel (pg. 14, note 3): snatching a plate from a customer can constitute battery because it’s an extension of the person (results in psychological harm b/c physical autonomy has been harmed)
o Bohrmann v. Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. (pg. 11): Students taking a tour of a power plant were exposed to an excessive amount of radioactivity. ∆’s intentionally exposing πs to radiation was harmful or offensive enough for a battery. However, the πs here have a fear of future harm, the court determined that you need actual harm not fear for the future.
· Victim does not have to be conscious to have suffered from battery (ex. A kissing B while she is asleep – motive is irrelevant; as long as society defines the contact as harmful or offensive, A is liable for battery)
· If D has special knowledge that P considers normal touching very offensive and D touches P in a normal way, D will be liable for battery, even though the contact would not be harmful or offensive to the OP.
ASSAULT
occurs where ∆’s acts intentionally cause the π’s reasonable apprehension of an immediate harmful or offensive contact
I de S et Ux v. W de S (pg. 16): Husband recovered from ∆ who wielded an axe at wife
Even though wife not physically harmed, there was a fear of imminent physical injury
SPLIT – Most courts require that apprehension be reasonable, RS §21does not require apprehension to be REASONABLE
ex: ∆ knows π believes, unreasonably, that a pen is a gun and ∆ clicks the pen as if to shoot π, causing apprehension of imminent harm
under RS, ∆ is liable for assault (like special knowledge rule in battery)
under maj – c/l, ∆ is not liable because apprehension is unreasonable
Imminence requirement: There must be an imminent threat of harmful contact – not a threat of future battery.
Castro v. Local 1199(pg. 17): π alleges that Frankel, her supervisor, verbally argued with her, and slammed the table and “came at her” by wheeling his chair closer and closer to her. When she asked if he was threatening her life, he replied, “take it as you want.”
The events that π asserts DO NOT constitute an assault — Frankel interpreted his remarks as a threat, he slammed the table and moved closer to her. Ct said his threats were forward-looking, soshe was not reasonably led to believe that she was in danger of imminent bodily harm.
If victim is attacked from behind or while asleep, it isn’t assault because there was no apprehension prior to contact
Contemporaneous pereception requirement: battery does not require the victim to be conscious at the time the contact occurred, but assault does
Must be awake and aware to be able to have an apprehension of immediate harm/offensive contact
SPLIT
c/l – Mere words not enough – unless together with OTHER ACTS OR CIRCUMSTANCES (an overt act), they put P in reasonable apprehension of an imminent harmful or offensive contact w/P’s person
RS – verbal statements can sometimes imply sufficient immanency without an overt act and therefore be an assault.
ex.: π’s announcement that ∆ is instantly to be shot, w/ no additional action, can create sufficient imminent apprehension for an assault. Mere words are not enough; a verbal threat with an overt act is enough.
Fear: apprehension need not produce fear, victim’s awareness that imminent harmful contact will occur is enough
Threat to 3rd party is not actionable because it’s not immediate: P cannot recover for apprehension that someone else will be hurt
FALSE IMPRISONMENT
· Definition:
o π intentionally
§ confines or restrains
§ in a bounded area
§ victim is conscious of the confinement or is harmed by it
· Consciousness of confinement SPLIT:
o traditional requirement of FI requires the victim to be conscious o
either know content/assertion (publication/statement) is false, OR
§ Acted with intended reckless disregard to the content /assertion’s truth or knowledge it was falsity
§ Common law malice is defined as ill will, hatred, or reckless disregard toward the rights of the victim
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell(pg. 55): Fallwell, a famous religious figure, was parodied in Larry Flynt’s well-known magazine. Ct found no IIED.
Ct found that there was no malice according to NY Times standard b/c he wasn’t asserting that the ad was true, nor did he have the ill will or hatred that was required.
Policy: Because of constitutional protection of speech, public figures have a much higher standard to show intentional infliction of emotional damage
exception: Common Carriers / Innkeepers / Public Utilities
extreme/outrageous behavior requirement waived: liable for gross insults which cause patrons to suffer mental distress
π must be a patron of ∆, and ∆ must be in his line of work at the moment of IIED
ex. a bus driver telling a pedestrian that he is a smelly slob would not be liable (unless he meets the regular requirements of IIED – that he knows of π’s hypersensitivity that would make ∆’s conduct extreme/outrageous, and severe emotional distress was actually suffered)
but if bus driver tells C, a passenger boarding the bus, that he’s a smelly slob, he would be liable under this exception w/o need to prove extreme/outrageous conduct or SED suffered
policy: common carriers have traditionally owed passengers an exceptionally high duty of care
SPLIT: Third-party recovery
o Modern (Majority) – Cts. have awarded 3rd-party victim recovery, when 3rd parties prove (in addition to elements) that
§ they are immediate family (close relatives) of the primary IIED victim
§ they are present at the scene of the outrageous conduct to the IIED victim, AND
§ D knows the close relative is present (*some states add that D must know 3rd party is a relative)
§ Policy: prevents too many people from being able to recover
o
Less restrictive
R2 §46: Where such conduct is directed at a 3rd person, actor liable if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress:
§ (intentional or reckless)
§ to a member of such person’s immediate family who is present at the time, whether or not the distress results in bodily harm OR
§ any person who is present at the time if the distress results in bodily harm
Slocum v. Food Fair Stores (pg. 41): π insulted by supermarket employee and suffered heart attack
Common carrier rule: generally would be liable for gross insults, but court refused to extend it to supermarket clerks
