I. Intentional Torts
a. Intent: The subjective element of an intentional tort is satisfied if the actor intentionally commits the conduct elements that comprise the tort. Intent is defined as desire or substantial certainty, as contrasted with conduct that is accidental or negligent.
i. Desire: Intent is satisfied if the defendant desires the consequences of his conduct (e.g. intent for battery is satisfied if the actor throws a rock at the victim with the conscious purpose of causing the victim harm).
ii. Substantial Certainty: Intent is satisfied, even if the defendant doesn’t desire harmful consequences, if he subjectively knows that harmful consequences are substantially certain to result from his conduct (e.g. intent for battery is satisfied if the actor blows up a bank for the purpose of stealing the money inside, and knowing that there are people inside who will be injured). Recklessness dos not equal substantial certainty (knowledge of substantial risk is not enough).
1. Garratt v. Dailey: Court remanded to trial court issue of whether a 5-year-old boy was substantially certain the victim would fall when he pulled away her chair as she attempted to sit.
iii. Transferred Intent: Under traditional common-law, transferred intent applied to battery, assault, false imprisonment, trespass to chattel, and trespass to land. If defendant has intent to commit any of these 5 torts, but his actions result in any of the other 5 torts, the defendant is liable, even though he did not intend the other tort. The Restatement adopts the doctrine of transferred intent only between assault and battery, so that intent for either assault or battery satisfies the required intent for both torts.
1. Alteiri v. Colasso: Defendant found liable for battery for throwing a rock which struck plaintiff, although he did not intend to strike, but only to scare his victim.
iv. Mistake Doctrine: Mistake, even if reasonable, is no defense to liability. E.G. If A shoots B’s dog, believing it is a wolf, A is still liable.
v. Insanity and Infancy: Unlike in criminal law, neither insanity nor infancy is a defense to liability for intentional torts. Intent is subjective however, and if an actor, because he is severely mentally impaired or very young, lacks the capacity to form the requisite intent, no tort is committed. This doctrine is justified by the reasoning that between an innocent injured party and a tortious defendant, it is more just to impose liability for the injury on the tortious party, even if he cannot appreciate
nscious or asleep.Apprehension must be reasonable. Apprehension does not require fear.
d. False Imprisonment: False Imprisonment occurs when a 1) defendant intentionally 2) and unlawfully 3) confines or 4) restrains the victim 5) within a bounded area.
i. Awareness requirement: Victim generally must be subjectively aware of the confinement. Thus, an unconscious or sleeping victim cannot be falsely imprisoned. RS allows liability without awareness if the victim is harmed. (Kajtazi v. Kajtazi: Court ruled that where the victim due to infancy or incompetency is unable to exercise intelligent and willful volition as to his custody, a false imprisonment claim can be predicated upon his restraint or removal against the will of the party having his legal custody).
Bounded area requirement: The victim must be confined in a bounded area. If he victim is free to proceed in any direction, or has access to and subjective awareness of reasonable means of escape (not requiring excessive embarrassment or discomfort), it
