I. Statutory authorization: Long-Arm Statute (grants of jx, triggered after I-Shoe)
1st question – is there a statutory or rule authorization for the basis of personal jx?
– CA section 410.10 – In CA, state courts can exercise jurisdiction on any ground supported by the Constitution. So CA can skip question 1 b/c CA state courts have full scope of personal jx as long as it’s permissible under due process (so 2 questions smushed into 1)
– Long-Arm Statutes of most other states – I-Shoe set precedent so courts could take cases arising out of certain contacts (like committing tortious act w/I the state, doing biz in that state, or owning property in that state) that were sufficient for exercising personal jurisdiction over nonresidents. à Many based on Illinois from Gray v. American Radiator.
o Gray v. American Radiator – Illinois – expansive example of long-arm statute that authorizes jx for out of state acts for committing tortious acts w/I the state. Valve made outside state but it exploded in Ill. Δ did nothing in Ill, but place of wrong is where the last event took place, so tortious act happened in Ill.
o Hess v. Pawloski – implied consent to process of service when Δ exercising privilege to drive in MA, he’s subject to obligations of MA law. Δ’s instate activities are sufficient to justify service for suits related to the activities. But court says can’t just imply consent to suit for all non-residents. This case is exception b/c car driving is dangerous, so court is going to allow regulation of cars.
o Marcus says know how to do statutory analysis of your case in accordance to the words of the statute. As a fallback, many states have actually interpreted their long-arm statutes to be as broad as CA law, even if the words follow more of Ill/Ok.
– Rule 4k(1) – authorizes exercise of personal jurisdiction by federal court to the extent a state court, using state’s long-arm statute could exercise jurisdiction à So basically, these statutes authorized jx in which the Δ acts outside the state but causes an effect within the state.
o Exceptions to Rule 4k
§ Rule 4k(1)(b) – in some instances, Congress authorized nationwide service of process in specific statutes.
§ Rule 4k(1)(b) “bulge jurisdiction” – authorizes service w/I 100 miles of federal courthouse even if in a different state.
§ Rule 4k(2) – if contacts are sufficient to permit jx constitutionally, but Δ not subject to jx of any state court, then federal court can have jx.
– Full faith and credit – if it’s a valid in personam judgment in one state then it’s enforceable in other states and other states are required to give it as much credit.
II. Due Process – specific jurisdiction analysis (to satisfy minimum contacts, must prove both purposeful availment and reasonableness for jx to be constitutional).
2nd question – if there is basis for jx, then is it constitutional to do so under due process?
o Int’l Shoe – minimum contacts required for jx so that “notions of fair play and substantial justice” are upheld.
o WWV – policy justification – one of the things we want to protect is the ability of Δs to say they don’t want to serve or seek to serve in CA b/c they don’t want to be subject to potential suit there.
– PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT – focuses solely on the Δ’s actions—was there some voluntary action by the Δ establishing an affiliation w/ a forum, in which the Δ seeks benefit from the forum state? (Any activities that warrant conclusion that case be brought in this forum). This is a policy judgment, the Δ should be able to limit the places in which he is subject to suit by choosing not to direct their activities toward those places. Foreseeability – Δ’s conduct and connection w/ the forum are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there is NOT SUFFICIENT BY ITSELF.
o Relation to claims – specific jurisdiction allows some claims to be brought here, but not all (that would be general jurisdiction). There should be some kind of connection between the claim being asserted and the contacts/actions of the Δ that satisfies purposeful availment. Π’s claims should “arise out of or relate to” Δ’s efforts to serve in a particular forum (Δ’s efforts can include seeks to serve, stream of commerce, targeted conduct, etc).
o Seeks to Serve (more direct than SOC) – O’Connor’s decision in Asahi. WW
l (or negligent) torts, jx is allowed for nonresident Δ in a forum where Δ has expressly aimed/targeted its action.
§ Calder v. Jones – slandering story about Jones. Court required more than mere distribution of papers here. Generally, should not be able to sue employees b/c the employer distributes the products, but what Δs did in writing the story should have alerted him to possible suit in CA. Brunt of the harm in CA and Jones’ injury felt in CA, and writer intentionally wrote the story, knowing Jones lived in CA and that it would impact her in CA. Purposeful availment prong satisfied and lots of reasonableness reasons too.
§ Bates – letter sent to Bates would fall short of targeted conduct b/c letter was sent to PA then. No reason to foreseen the effect in NY and the brunt of the harm was in the forum state so you should have seen that you actions would have haled you into the forum. If anything they would have foreseen that they would have been haled into court in PA b/c that’s where they sent the letter, not NY.
· What if targeted conduct (arrows) don’t all point in the same direction? It gets harder to establish targeted conduct then, but the more arrows point to the forum, easier it is to uphold jx based on targeted conduct. Stick to whether Δ should have reasonable foreseen being haled into court in the forum. Courts have varying interpretations when arrows don’t all point to the same direction.
§ Keeton v. Hustler – Δ purposely availed himself to in state activities by distributing magazines w/I the state on a regular basis and in substantial quantities. Π had no prior contacts w/ NH, but she sued there b/c SOL ran out in all other states. Jx upheld b/c Δ seeks to serve in NH and distribution there was not random nor fortuitous.