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Criminal Law
University of Baltimore School of Law
Jaros, David M.

Professor David Jaros

Criminal Law Outline

Fall 2015

Intro

Sources of Law

Common Law
Statutory Law
MPC

Basic Elements of a Crime

Mens rea (mental state)
Actus reus (guilty conduct)

Attendant circumstances (facts surrounding the event)

Why punish?

Specific deterrence
Incapacitation
Rehabilitation
General deterrence
Education
Retribution
Restorative justice

Doctrines

Rule of Lenity
Transferred Intent

Mistake

People v. O’Brien

Facts: ∆ changes name on deed and convicted with altering a public record.
Holding: Ignorance of the law is no excuse. The system could not function if we allowed such a defense.

MPC §2.04
People v. Snyder

Facts: ∆ convicted of possession of a gun with a felony conviction although her lawyer told her that the previous crime was a misdemeanor.
Holding: Mistake is law is not a defense. Bigamy case (Vogel) involves mistake of fact (according to majority).

Dissent: Mistake of law regarding legal status (a collateral matter) negates intent. This is supported by Vogel.

Note: Fact that lawyer gave incorrect advice irrelevant. Distinguishes parole officer in Bray from private attorney.

THEFT CRIMES

Larceny

Elements: (1) Trespassory (2) taking (3) and carrying away (4) of the personal property (5) of another (6) with the intent to steal it.

People v. Alamo

Facts: ∆ found in hot-wired car with window forced open and burglar tools. He’s convicted of grand larceny. ∆ appeals claiming larceny requires asportation.
Holding: Common law traditionally required at least some movement. Court explains that movement is used in Harrison (pickpocket case) was used to show control. A car is an instrument of transportation and when activated comes within the total possession and control of the operator. In this situation movement or motion is not essential to control. Moreover, operation for DWI statute only requires that the car be started.

People v. Olivo

Facts: ∆ puts wrenches in pocket, passes the registers but does not exit store.
Holding: Larcenists may treat the owner’s property in a manner inconsistent with the continued rights of the owner without leaving the store. Concealment of goods and movement to exits in possession of the concealed goods constitutes behavior that violates the owner’s continued rights when balanced with all the external and surrounding relevant factors.

People v. Jennings

Facts: Armored car company had lawful possession of money for 72 hours. During that time, they earned interest without the permission of the lawful owner of cash (bank). Charged with larceny.
Holding: ∆ did not have the intent to deprive bank of “the major portion of the economic value.” Short term use of the property cannot suffice.
Dissent: A major portion of economic benefit was taken… but this is not the statute! Also argues that legislatures focus on white collar crime and increase in penalties suggests that the crime was perceived as covering more behavior than majority allows.

Embezzlement

Elements: (1) Fraudulent (2) conversion (3) of the property (4) of another (5) by one in lawful possession of it.
United States v. Titus

Facts: ∆ works in Army PX. He takes cigarettes, sells them to a store off the base at higher prices, then puts money in the PX register to pay for cigarettes. Charged with embezzlement.
Holding: ∆ completed crime when he left store and converted cigarettes to his own use. The fact that he planned to reimburse the store (or replace product with something of equal value) is not a defense.

Virgin Islands v. Leonard

Facts: ∆, a cab driver, is accused of aiding and abetting Williams who is alleged to have embezzled chicken wire from the civil defense office where he works. Issue: Did Williams have lawful possession of the chicken wire?
Holding: It is not sufficient that Williams knew where the key was to the storage shed. Access ≠ being entrusted with property.
Key facts: Multiple low level positions in office were aware of the location of the key. He did not abuse his position but rather “came like a thief in the night.”

United States v. Whitlock

Facts: ∆ is manager in bank. She has key to vault and knows where the combination is kept in a paper envelope. She uses both to enter bank and take $85,000. She is charged with embezzlement.
Holding: ∆ had control over money because of her “position of trust.”
Dissent: She was, at most, entrusted with the envelope– not everything in the vault. Guilty anyway because statute includes “misapplied.”

United States v. Selwyn

Facts: ∆ handles paperwork in post office maintenance office. No authority or responsibility for mail. Enters loading dock and takes package with dress which he tries to return for $$$. Charged with embezzlement of mail.
Holding: ∆ was not entrusted with mail merely by having some access to loading dock. Should have been charged with larceny.

False Pretenses

Elements: (1) A false representation of a material present or past fact (2) which causes the victim (3) to voluntarily pass title to (4) his property to the wrongdoer (5) who (a) knows his representation to be false and (b) intends thereby to defraud the victim.
Chaplin v. United States

Facts: ∆s essentially borrows money from victim saying that they will use it to buy liquor stamps. Then they don’t buy stamps or pay back money.
Holding: A false pretense must relate to a past event or existing fact. Any representation with regard to a future transaction is excluded.
Dissent: A promise made without an intention to perform is a false statement about a present fact.

MPC follows dissent’s approach

Nelson v. United States

Facts: ∆ (salesman) owed TV distributor money for past sales. In order to get additional credit, he misrepresents how much he owes on his car which he uses as collateral.
Holding: Misrepresentation of value of collateral was sufficiently material. Guilty of false pretenses.

Locks v. United States

Facts: ∆s convince woman to write ch

ollins

Facts: ∆ sneaks to house where inebriated girl sleeps. He gets up to window naked (except for socks)—unclear if he crosses threshold — she awakens and, thinking he is her boyfriend, brings him in and has sex with him.
Holding: If ∆ is not reckless in his belief that he has permission to enter the room then not guilty of burglary.

Regina v. Jones

Facts: ∆ goes to father’s house and steals TV. Charged with burglary. ∆ says he had permission to enter.
Holding: Father’s general permission contained an implied limitation: no permission is given to enter for the purpose of stealing.
Note: Taken to its extreme– every planned grand larceny is now also a burglary. Perhaps one explanation for the decision is how like a burglary this looked (sneaking in home at night).

People v. Davis

Facts: ∆ passes bad check through bank chute.
Holding: While a hook or a drill will physically trespass and thus establish a burglary, the check does not. A forged check does not violate the possessory interest in the building.
Dissent: Passage through window is enough, the check is like a paper hook.

HOMICIDE & RAPE

Murder vs. Involuntary Manslaughter

CL definition of murder: The unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.
States of mind for malice aforethought:

Intent to kill (including knowledge that death would result even if not specific goal)
Intent to cause grievous bodily harm
Depraved heart murder: extreme recklessness that shows wanton disregard for human life
Intent to commit a felony

State v. Olsen

Facts: ∆ driving a truck to pick up soldiers. Gets drowsy, unrolls window, falls asleep and goes on sidewalk and kills child. Found guilty of involuntary manslaughter by jury. ∆ argues mens rea not satisfied.
Holding: Guilty. An ordinarily prudent man would have known it was dangerous and that it was negligence to keep driving. There is a rebuttable presumption that if you fell asleep that you were negligent absent some proof otherwise.

Forbes v. Commonwealth

Facts: ∆ had a diabetes-induced blackout without warning which caused him to crash his car into another car, killing an occupant. ∆ had experienced a low blood sugar reaction prior to driving but had taken precautionary measures and felt fine before he drove.
Holding: ∆’s conduct did not constitute negligence so gross, wanton, and culpable as to show a reckless disregard of human life.