I. Unprotected Speech
A. Incitement
● Speech that incites people to violence
● True threats of violence are unprotected no matter what
● Early cases use “clear and present danger” standard and “reasonableness” test
● Schenck, Frohwerk, Debs
○ tendency and intent
○ clear and present danger
● Loose test- “little breath would be enough to kindle a flame”
● Abrams v. U.S.: Justice Holmes dissent advocates for a stricter standard
○ Government should only curb speech when there is a serious threat
○ “imminent threat’
○ “present danger of immediate evil”
B. Criminal Syndicalism
● Whitney, Dennis
● Freedom of speech AND assembly
● Whitney- rational basis test
● Dennis
○ Risk formula- based on Hand formula- gravity of the evil, discounted by improbability
C. Modern Rule/ Fighting Words
● Brandenburg v. Ohio
○ KKK leader arrested after videos of the group making speeches are shown on the local news
○ Rule:
1. Imminent lawless action
2. Speech must be directed to inciting imminent lawless action (intent)
3. AND likely to produce such violence
○ Definition of “imminent” is up to the discretion of the court
● Cantwell v. Conn.
○ Jehova’s witness playing record on the street and advocating for the religion
○ Court overturned JW conviction under state breach of the peace act
○ JW was not trying to incite anyone to violence- expressing his view of religion
● Chaplinsky v. N. H.
○ JW was distributing literature on the street and a disturbance broke out
○ As JW was being escorted away by a police officer he called the city marshal a “racketeer” and “Fascist”
○ SC upheld his conviction under breach of peace law
○ Justice Murphy’s unprotected categories:
■ lewd and obscene
■ profane
■ Libelous
■ insulting
■ fighting words
○ Name calling was seen as fighting words
○ “narrowly defined words that by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace”
○ Wholly excludes fighting words from free speech protection
○ Also somewhat of a balancing test- do the words have social value?
● Cohen v. C.A.
○ Protester wore a jacket in the county courthouse with the phrase “fuck the draft” on it
○ The location did not matter (courthouse)
○ Revises the Chaplinsky list by eliminating profanity and the “by their very utterance” provision
○ Narrows the application to instances when the words would actually provoke violence
○ The profanity was not directed at a particular listener to incite them to violence- also listeners could avert their eyes if offended
● Gooding v. Wilson
○ Statute was interpreted too broadly; swept in protected speech not covered by fighting words under Chaplinsky
● Chaplinsky- some categories MUST be unprotected- some speech has such slight social value so the infringement on constitutional rights is justified
D.Hostile Audiences
● Teminiello v. Chicago
○ Court reversed breach of peace conviction for an abrasive speaker
○ Constitutionally protected speech often invites dissent and anger among listeners
○ has to be
● Feiner v. New York
○ Court upheld conviction under breach of peace, disorderly conduct
○ J. Black Dissent: Police have a duty to first protect speakers who are expressing unpopular views to a large crowd, before suppressing the speech
● Trend in modern cases is to protect the speaker
○ Court’s view changes in the 60’s with increase in civil protest
○ Edwards v. South Carolina; Cox v. Louisiana; Gregory v. Chicago
II. Libel
● Beauharnais v. Illinois
○ Allows state laws against group libel- libel is not within Constitutional protection
○ group libel- statements made against a particular racial, ethnic or minority group
○ Broad expansion of traditional libel
○ Never formally overruled
● New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
○ Black civil rights groups took out an ad which claimed that the police forces in the South were engaged in a “wave of terror” against nonviolent civil rights protesters in the South
○ Sullivan- AL police commissioner sued for libel
○ Issue: Do Constitutional protections on free speech limit state power to award damages in libel cases
○ AL libel statute put burden of proof on the defendant and presumed compensatory damages
○ SC holds AL statute unconstitutional
○ Plaintiff/public official must prove actual malice to recover damages
■ Knowledge that statements were reckless or false
■ Clear and convincing evidence
○ Makes libel partially protected- if it is unintentional, no actual malice
○ Court does not want to risk chilling free speech
Libel Chart
Liability Truth/ falsity Presumed Dam Punitive Dam
Political official. Actual malice. P- burden.
Public figure. AM. P-burden.
Priv. fig/Pub mat. At least neg. P-burden. N. Unless AM N unless AM
Priv. Fig/ Priv mat. Y. Y
● Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts/ Associated Press v. Walker: extended the NY TImes rule to “public figures”
○ Court has construed the definition of “public figure” narrowly- must be someone of widespread notoriety, has an influence or prominence in affairs of society, thrust themselves or their views onto society
● Gertz. v Robert Welch Inc.- overruled Rosenbloom- private figure involved in a public matter can recover for libel
●
III. Hate Speech
A. Early Cases
● Skokie Cases: held unconstitutional a number of ordinances that would have prohibited Neo Nazis from holding a demonstration in Chicago
○ Did not formally overrule Beauharnais ruling permitting state statutes against group libel
B. Modern Rules
● R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul
○ Held ordinance unconstitutional because it was content-based
○ Content-based = presumptively invali
juvenile themes” and vitual child pornography
C. Subordination of Women
● American Booksellers Assoc. v. Hudnut
○ Held unconstitutional a statute that defined pornography as discriminatory against women
○ Court viewed it as a content based regulation
○ Court cannot enforce a particular moral view on society
D. Nudity Bans
● Erznoznik v. Jacksonville
○ Allowed films that had nudity in them to be shown on drive-in movie theater screens
○ Court determined the regulation was content based
○ Nudity cannot be singled out- all nudity is not obscene
● Schad v Mount Ephraim: reiterated that total ban on nudity is impermissable
C. Erogenous Zoning Laws
● Young v. American Mini Theaters
○ Erogenous Zoning laws are permissable
○ Even though they are content based the regulations do not violate the government’s duty to neutrality
○ Because the speech is of a “lower value” than “core political speech” it can be regulated
● Renton v. Playtime Theaters Inc.
○ Upheld permissability of erogenous zoning laws
○ Aimed at secondary effects of pornography not the content of the speech
● City of LA v. Alameda Books Inc.
○ City can present any evidence that is “reasonably believed to be relevant” to justify erogenous zoning laws
○ Burden is on the challenger to cast doubt on the government data
○ City must present some justification though
V. Bans in the Media
A. Non-Obscene, Indecent, and Sexually Explicit Material
● Rowan v. Post Office
○ Upheld a law permitting citizens to submit a request to be taken off mailing lists of mailers distributing sexually explicit material
● FCC v. Pacifica Foundation
○ George Carlin monologue aired on the radio
○ Court found the monologue “indecent” but not “obscene”
■ Making an exception to protected speech because of the content of the material and pervasiveness of TV/Radio
○ Upheld the right of FCC to create sanctions and rules to limit exposure to unwilling audiences
○ Limitations proposed by FCC were reasonable- time,place, manner
● Consolidated Edison v. Public Service Commission
○ Upheld the right of utility companies to include inserts concerning political issues in customers bills- PSC cannot ban them from doing so
○ Customers may be offended by Con Ed views temporarily but can easily and quickly remove the insert and dispose of it