CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OUTLINE
I. INTRODUCTION – 5th AND 14TH AMEND’S, DUE PROCESS CLAUSE (DPC):
A. Exam Prep:
1.Essay ?’s are traditional. Prof will give us an issue that has not been decided by the S-Ct and we will write the opinion discussing the precedent; where appropriate, use history; effect on the next case; and apply the precedent. We will have to write the majority and the dissent. Remember to address the issues on both sides of the argument. If you are writing the majority and change your mind, keep writing and save what you have for the dissent b/c it won’t matter as long as you get them both out there.
B. Constitution (C) Basics:
1.Art. I –Congress
2.Art II – President
3.Art. III – Judiciary
4.Have amended the C only 17 times.
C. S-Ct Basics:
1.Takes 4 justices to grant a cert.
2. Doesn’t correct errors…it makes law. So, if they have already decided an issue, it isn’t going to hear that same issue again unless they feel they need to develop upon the issue.
D. Caperton V. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S.Ct. 2252 (2009)
1. Facts: Caperton sued Massey and JV was for Caperton for $50mil. While case was awaiting appeal by Massey, Blankenship (the CEO & Pres) made HUGE contributions ($1k directly, $2.5mil to his political org & $500k for mailings & ads) to Justice Benjamin’s election campaign. Benjamin was running for the seat on the ct that would be hearing Massey’s appeal (WV Supreme Ct). Caperton made a motion for recusal of Benjamin but Benjamin denied and by vote of 2-3, tr ct’s verdict was rev’d. There was a re-hrg and both parties made motions for recusals of 3 of the justices. Two did and Brennan did not (1 was vacationing w/Blankenship in the French Riveria & the other had made public criticism of Blankenship). Brennan than became the Chief Justice and again by 2-3 vote, the JV was rev’d. Caperton appealed and writ was granted.
2. Issue: Whether the DPC (right to fair trial) was violated when one of the justices in the majority denied a recusal motion.
3. Rule(s):
a. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) [leading case and 1 of 2 cases requiring recusal that was not discussed at common law] – held that the DPC incorp’d the common-law rule that a judge must recuse himself when he had a “direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest” in a case. [Mayor was also judge and his judge salary was pd from the funds rcvd from the fines assessed. These fines also went into fund to be used for the city. So, the more fines he assessed, the more he could make and the more money his city rcvd.]
b. Ward v. Monroeville (1972) – Similar to Tumey except Mayor did not receive money but the fines he assessed went to the town’s general fund. Ct held that “possible temptation” was a fx to std.
c. Aenta v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986) – Held that the inquiry was not to decide whether or not the justice was influenced but rather, the proper constit’l inquiry is whether sitting on the case “would offer a possible temptation to the average…judge”.
d. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) [the other leading case requiring recusal] – criminal case where judge that found accused in contempt then heard his case. Held that having been a part of the process, a judge cannot be in the very nature of things, wholly disinterested in the conviction or acquittal of those accused.
e. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971) – A D in criminal contempt proceedings should be given a public trial before a judge other than the one ordering the contempt. The Ct asks not whether the judge is actually biased but whether the average judge in his position is likely to be neutral or whether there is an unconstit’l potential for bias.
4. Arguments:
a. P’s Arg – Benjamin would have to feel a debt of gratitude to Blankenship for his extraordinary efforts to get him elected. That temptation is as strong and inherent in human nature as was the conflict the Ct confronted in Tumey and Monroeville and well as Murchison and Mayberry.
b. D’s Arg – Benjamin conducted a probing search into his actual motives & inclinations and found none to be improper. Besides, Benjamin won fair & square b/c the opponent lost by giving a really bad speech.
5. Application:
a. Applying Tumey – Due process requires an objective inquiry into whether the contributor’s influence on the election under all the circumstances would offer a possible temptation to the average judge.
b. Just as no man is allowed to be a judge in his own coz, similar fears arise when, w/out the consent of the other party, a man chooses the judge in his own coz.
c. Blankenship’s significant and disproportionate influence, coupled w/the temporal relationship btn the election and the pending case, offer a possible temptation to the average judge to lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true.
6. Holding:
a. Due Process right to a fair trail
b. Probability of bias
c. A serious risk of actual bias, based on obj’tive and reasonable perceptions
d. Re: election contributions: significant & disproportionate influence; when case was pending or imminent; contribution’s relative size in comparison to the total amt of money contributed; total amt spent in the election; apparent effect on the outcome.
7.Conclusion: J’ment of the Supreme COA of WV is rev’d and case is remanded.
8.Dissent (Roberts, Scalia): The ct’s new rule provides no guidance to judges and litigants about when recusal will be constitutionally req’d. This will inevitably lead to an increase in allegations that judges are biased, however groundless those charges may be. Many state statutes require recusal based on probability or appearance of bias, but that alone would not be sufficient basis for imposing a constit’l req’ment under DPC. Ct should not repeat the mistake in made in Halper (8 yrs after the ct’s ruling, it granted cert b/c of the wide variety of novel double-jeopardy claims awd’d in the wake of Halper. They assured litigants that it was only announcing a rule for the rare case. As they saw in the following 8 yrs, it wasn’t so rare).
E. Some Themes of S-Ct:
1.Ct’s cases making Con Law
2.Ct’s pwr as arbiter of the meaning of the Const (i.e. hypo’s to explore b4 making a decision)
3.Indeterminacy of CL issues
4.? of whether an issue should be a constit’l one
5.Fed ? v. State authority
6.Use of precedents and diff ways to interpret them
7.Use of history (and diff ways to interpret)
8.Prevalence of flexible stds v. bright line rules
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW & AUTHORITY
A. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) – case where S-Ct asserts its power.
1. Facts: On his last day in office, President John Adams named forty-two justices of the peace and sixteen new circuit court justices for the District of Columbia under the Organic Act. The Organic Act was an attempt by the Federalists to take control of the federal judiciary before Thomas Jefferson took office. The commissions were signed and sealed by acting secretary of state John Marshall (who later became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and author of this opinion), but they were not delivered by the end of the day. Thomas Jefferson refused to deliver the commissions, claiming that they were invalid because they had not been delivered by the end of Adams’ term. William Marbury (P) was an intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the peace. Marbury applied directly to the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel Jefferson’s secretary of state, James Madison (D), to deliver the commissions. The Judiciary Act of 1783 had granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus “…to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.”
2. Issues:
a. Does Marbury have a right to the commission? Yes.
b. Is the failure to deliver a commission the kind of act by an Executive branch official that can be reviewed by a ct, or not? Yes.
c. Is delivering a signed and sealed commission the kind of act that a ct can order an executive branch official to perform? Yes.
d. Does the Supreme Court have the authority in this case to issue a writ of mandamus ordering an executive branch official to deliver the commission? No.
i. Has the Congress authorized the Supreme Court to do so? (p. 4) Yes.
ii. If the Congress has authorized the Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus in this case, does the Congress have the authority under the U.S. Constitution to authorize the Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus in this case? (pp. 5-7) No.
iii. Does the Congress or the Supreme Court have the authority to determine the answer to question dii? (pp. 7-top of 9) S-Ct.
3.Holding/Rule (Marshall):
a. Yes. Marbury has a right to the commission. The order granting the commission takes effect when president’s constitutional power of appointment has been exercised, and the power has been exercised when the last act required from the person possessing the power has been performed. This last act is the signature of the commission.
b. Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void. It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Court must decide on the operation of each. If courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.
c. Yes. A ct (not necessarily the S-Ct) can order an executive branch to perform.
d. No. The Supreme Court does not have origina
upervisory authority over the federal cts, and may use that auth to prescribe rules of evidence and procedures that are not required by the Const and are therefore binding. Congress may not legislatively supercede the S-Ct’s decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution.
4.Application: In Miranda the ct opined that the Const would not preclude legislative solutions that differed from the warning, but which were at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence. The additional remedies within §3501 were insuff to meet the const’l minimums. § 3501 abandons the requirement of pre-interrogation warnings. Congress may not legislatively supercede judicial decisions that are in line with the Const w/out violating the Const itself.
5. Dissent: Disputed that Miranda had announced a const’l rule and concluded that it is possible for the police to violate Miranda w/out also violating the Const. Felt the majority decision expanded the power of the Court.
6. Notes: Congress felt that the warning in Miranda were not constitutionally req’d, just that a confession has to be voluntary is const’ly req’d. So, they passed a law saying that and here, the S-Ct is saying, “Nooooo…it is not just a ROE, it’s what the const guarantees and you cannot legislatively overrule a const’l decision of this ct”.
III. LIMITS ON ADJUDICATION, STANDING
A. Article III, Section 2:
1. The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Const, the laws of the U.S., and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority…to controversies to which the U.S. shall be a party; –to controversies btn 2 or more states; –btn a state and a citizen of another state; –btn citizens of different states…
B. Standing:
1. There are const’l req’ments (injury in fact; causal connection to D; & redressability).
2. Injury-in-fact: an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized…& (b) “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”.
3. Causal connection – connection btn the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be fairly…traceable to the challenged action of the D.
4.Redressability – it must be LIKELY, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury WILL BE REDRESSED by a favorable decision.
5. Sometimes, even when the const’l req’ments are met, the Ct may not hear the case for “prudential” reasons.
C. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) – p32
1. Facts/PP: In 1978, a joint reg was promulgated by Secretary of Interior stating that the obligations imposed by § 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act (to wit: insure protection of endangered species “after consultation as appropriate with affected States..”) extend to actions taken in foreign nations. In 1986, the Interior Dept revised to require consultation only for actions taken in the U.S. or the high seas. Ps (Defenders of Wildlife) challenge of rule interpreting ESA as applicable to only the U.S. or on the high seas. Ps claim the new reg is in error as to geographic scope and seeks an injunction to require the Secretary to publish a revised reg to go back to the 1978 reg. Dist Ct denied Secretary of Interior’s (Lujan) Summary Motion, and ordered Secretary to publish a revised regulation. Eighth Ct. of Appeals affirmed. Rev’d here.
2. P’s Arg: An injury in fact is an injury whether procedural or physical; Art III doesn’t distinguish. One of the P’s (Ms. Skilbred went to Sri Lanka to observe Asian elephant & the leopard; she alleges harm was that under revised reg, she cannot return as planned. Ms. Kelly alleges the same harm w/regard to her trip to Egypt to study the nile crocodile.).
3. D’s Arg: Public interest viol’s are not concrete injuries & public interest injuries cannot be conveyed to 3rd party interveners.
4. Issue: Whether each of the Ps, in raising a general grievance about govt, has standing to sue, when only asserting a procedural injury? No, the Ps do not have standing to sue.