Professor Robbins, University of Akron, Fall 2013
Criminal Procedure Outline
I. Constitutional Principles
A. Bill of Rights-first 10 Amendments to Constitution
i. 4th Amendment—prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures
ii. 5th Amendment—prohibits double jeopardy, compelled self-incrimination, and deprivations of life, liberty, or property without due process
iii. 6th Amendment—requires a speedy trial and right to assistance of counsel
iv. applicable to states via Due Process Clause of 14th Amendment (fundamental fairness in state criminal proceedings)
a) not incorporated
• 5th Amendment right to indictment for capital and infamous crimes
• 8th Amendment prohibition against excessive bail may or may not apply
II. Right to Counsel—all persons have a 6th Amendment right to an attorney in criminal proceedings, regardless of ability to pay
A. Betts v. Brady—right to counsel is not so fundamental to fairness that it automatically extends to all crimes and all courts
i. Gideon v. Wainwright—overturns Betts: right to counsel is fundamental and essential to a fair trial, therefore it is made obligatory upon the States through the Due Process clause of 14th Amendment for felony trials
a) reason and reflection recognize the obvious truth that a lawyer is necessary for representation in criminal settings; lawyers are everywhere deemed necessary to protect public and governments spend huge amounts of money to create prosecutors offices to try criminals; this supports idea that lawyers are necessary not luxuries (adversarial system requires equal footing on both sides)
b) principles of fair and impartial trials which can't be achieved if poorer Ds are not afforded same rights as State and wealthier Ds; suggests lack of fairness in system
B. Actual Imprisonment—right to counsel exists in situations in which imprisonment is imposed—at any point—as a result of conviction. If a crime is punishable by fine or imprisonment, D's 6th Amendment right is not violated if D is denied counsel and only a fine is imposed
i. indigency—the Supreme Court has never defined indigency for purposes of appointment of counsel; should be based on financial inability to obtain adequate counsel without substantial hardship and ability to pay partially for counsel or family/friends paying for counsel, or fact that bond has been paid do not change indigency analysis
a) D's income while in custody
b) D's previous indebtedness
c) D's assets
d) D's dependents
e) nature of the charge against D
f) bond expenses
ii. Argersinger v. Hamlin—brightline rule about counsel instead of case by case determination by trial judge
a) no person, absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, may be imprisoned for any offense (petty, misdemeanor, or felony) unless represented by counsel at trial; does not matter if state law allows imprisonment under charged crime
• can still prosecute crimes that have potential for jail time, just can't be sentenced to jail time
iii. Alabama v. Shelton—D is denied assistance of counsel if counsel is not provided, and D receives a suspended sentence and probation (potential for imprisonment if probation is broken)
iv. D is entitled to counsel at any critical stage of the proceeding, any time when the absence of counsel might derogate from his right to a fair trial (initial appearance to set bail—Rothgery v. Gillespie County)
C. Waiver of Right to Counsel—D may waive right to counsel and represent self at trial
i. Faretta v. California
a) whether a D in a state criminal trial has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so
b) right to self-representation finds support in 6th Amendment as well as English and colonial jurisprudence
• accused is one who must be informed of indictment and accusation and who has right to confront accusers, not counsel; right to self-representation is implied in Amendment as D is suffers consequences if defense fails
• assistance of counsel implies assistance meaning D is still master of his defense
• choice to waive counsel must be honored out of that respect for the individual; must ensure Ds are made aware of dangers of self-representation
ii. Iowa v. Tovar
a) the extent to which a trial judge, before accepting a guilty plea from an uncounseled defendant, must elaborate on the right to representation
b) D's burden to prove that he did not competently and intelligently waive right to assistance of counsel
c) States are free to adopt by statute, rule, or decision any guides for uncounseled pleas they deem necessary
iii. Indiana v. Edwards—requirements for effective waiver of right to counsel
a) whether Constitution forbids a State from insisting that D proceed to trial with counsel, denying D right to defend himself
• Constitution does not forbid a State to insist on counsel in this situation
b) to waive the right to counsel, D must be advised of the right and be competent to intelligently and voluntarily abandon the right; D must also be competent to proceed pro se
• in determining competency—must carefully scrutinize the waiver to ensure that D has a rational and factual understanding of the proceeding; may be mentally competent to stand trial, but incompetent to represent self based on trial judge's consideration of D's emotional and psychological state
iv. McKaskle v. Wiggins—assistance in self-representation
a) what role standby counsel who is present at trial over D's objection may play consistent with protection of D's Faretta rights to self-representation
b) to avoid difficulties with regard to trial complexities, some courts appoint lawyers to assist a D who has waived counsel and unsolicited participation by standby counsel does not violate right to represent self as long as D has actual control over the case he chooses to present to the jury and jury has the perception that the D is representing self
D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel—defendant's constitutional right to counsel includes the right to effective assistance of counsel; no test to determine that definition
i. Strickland v. Washington—standard of reasonableness for ineffective assistance of counsel claims
a) purpose of assistance of counsel is to guarantee a fair trial; does the ineffective assistance here hinder the fairness? Proper standard is reasonably effective assistance; whether counsel's representation fell below objective standard of reasonableness
• deficient performance by counsel
• but for counsel's errors, the result would have been different; requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive D of a fair trial with a reliable result
b) US v. Cronic—extrinsic ineffective assistance of counsel b/c of lack of time to prepare, experience of counsel, complexity of possible defenses, etc cannot support ineffective assistance claim
ii. complete denial of counsel or when counsel is appointed so late as to be ineffective—2 times when Supreme Court has stated they will most amenable to finding ineffective assistance of counsel
iii. Florida v. Nixon—no violation found for ineffective assistance
a) concerns defense counsel's strategic decision to concede to D's commission of the murder and to concentrate the defense on establishing cause for sparing D's life
b) counsel's failure to obtain D's affirmative consent to the strategy presented at trial not violation of effective assistance of counsel
iv. Knowles v. Mirzayance—not found
a) D advised to withdraw NGI plea b/c medical testimony at trial failed to when he tried to get charge changed to second degree that he was insane and incapable of premeditation failed.
b) Held:Appellate Court used wrong standard when it determined counsel had “nothing to lose” in pursuing NGI. To find counsel ineffective, the defendant must show both “deficient performance”and”prejudice.”
c) The Court reasoned that D
ce of evidence that evidence would have inevitably been discovered by lawful means
• Nix v. Williams (D makes statement leading to discovery of little girl's body)
• Should evidence resulting in an arrest be excluded from trial because it was improperly obtained?
• No. The Court relied on the “inevitable discovery doctrine,” as it held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to the child's body as evidence since it was clear that the volunteer search teams would have discovered the body even absent Williams's statements.
C. The Good Faith Exception
i. Exclusionary Rule does not apply when police officers act in the objectively reasonable belief that their conduct is not violating the D's rights (facially valid law, defective search warrant, negligently maintained record)
ii. United States v. Leon (general purpose of Exclusionary Rule vs. remedy to individual in given case)
a) whether the Exclusionary Rule should be modified so as not to bar the use in the prosecution's case in chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant, but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause
b) 4th Amendment is harmed BY illegal search and seizure, not the use of evidence in trial, so Exclusionary Rule serves as judicial remedy designed to safeguard 4th Amendment through deterrent effect rather than as personal constitutional right
c) here, must weigh the costs and benefits of preventing State from using evidence found in search with reliance upon issued search warrant
• the notion that guilty Ds could go free even when police are acting in good faith and upon reliance, offends basic concepts of criminal justice system
iii. Groh v. Ramirez (sufficiency of warrant)
a) warrant—less specific than application and did not include alleged stockpile of weapons nor a reference to the itemized list in application (did state that magistrate was satisfied with details of affidavit and that it supported probable cause)
b) warrant was clearly invalid as it did not particularly describe the place to be searched, nor the persons or things to be seized
• fact that application was sufficient does not save warrant from facial invalidity
iv. Herring v. United States (negligent police record keeping)
a) whether the 4th Amendment requires exclusion of evidence when an officer reasonably believes there is an outstanding arrest warrant which turns out to be wrong b/c of negligent bookkeeping by another police employee?
b) Suppression is not an automatic consequence of a 4th Amendment violation, must look to culpability of police and potential of exclusion to deter future wrongful police conduct
• here, error was isolated instance of negligence; evidence is admitted
c) analysis of deterrence and culpability is objective based on what reasonably well-trained officer would have known that search was illegal in light of circumstances
D. The Scope of the Exclusionary Rules
i. Standing—limits rule's application; 4th Amendment seen as personal rights and evidence illegally search and seized can be used against 3rd party not injured by illegal search and seizure
ii. Rakas v. Illinois (no automatic standing)
