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Constitutional Law I
UMKC School of Law
Cantu, Edward

Constitutional Law I – Spring 2013

Prof. Edward Cantu

1) Federal Judicial Power

a) Role of the Judiciary

i) Marbury v. Madison

(1) Established the authority for the judiciary to review the constitutionality of executive and legislative acts even though the Constitution is silent about this authority.

(2) The Constitution is the supreme law of the land

(3) The judiciary has the power to interpret the Constitution.

b) Justiciability limits

i) Prohibition of advisory opinions

(1) What is appropriate?

(2) Must be a case or controversy (actual dispute).

(3) Must be a substantial likelihood that a court decision in favor of the claimant will have some effect.

(a) Court would lose legitimacy if it was regularly ignored by the other branches.

(4) Declaratory judgment is justiciable as long as it deals with an actual case or controversy.

ii) Standing

(1) Doctrine rooted in the support for the separation of powers.

(2) Who is appropriate? Determination of whether a specific person is the proper party to bring matter to court.

(3) Constitutional standing

(a) Must allege an existing or imminent injury

(i) Allen v. Wright – IRS should deny tax exempt status to private schools because they are discriminatory.

1. Plaintiff doesn’t have standing because there is no provable injury.

2. Don’t allege that their children have been discriminated against by private schools

3. Social stigmatization only constitutes a cognizable injury to those personally denied equal treatment by challenged conduct.

(ii) City of LA v. Lyons – LAPD chokeholds

1. Standing to seek injunction depends on likelihood of plaintiff to suffer future injury.

2. There is no actual injury, and plaintiff would have to allege both an IMMINENT encounter with police and a substantial certainty of choking during said encounter.

3. Dissent

a. No one can meet this definition of imminent injury, so the police department’s flagrantly unconstitutional conduct goes unchecked by federal courts.

(iii) Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife – EPA funding for foreign projects that were endangering wildlife.

1. Claimant must show they were specifically harmed apart from their “special interest”

2. The fact that claimants “ intend to return someday” does not satisfy the “actual or imminent” injury requirement for standing

(iv) FEC v. Atkins – suit challenging exception of a political group from public reporting requirements

1. Congress created a right to information through the FECA, and the deprivation of that access is an appropriate injury

2. This is different than Lujan, where there was no public right created by the challenged act.

(v) Mass. v. EPA – Global warming suit. EPA sued for failing to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases.

1. Massachusetts surrendered some sovereign prerogatives, so is dependent on federal government for some protections.

2. Climate change harms are well-documented and in many cases specifically harmful to Massachusetts, so injury requirement is satisfied.

3. Dissent

a. Law in question does not afford special standing to the states

b. Provision of special standing simply indicates that the parties cannot establish standing in a traditional manner.

c. Proposed injury not distinct from injury to the “public at large”

(b) Must allege causation by defendant’s conduct

(i) Allen

1. Causation not satisfied because IRS grants have little or nothing to do with school desegregation legislation.

2. Claim of injury rests too much on actions of third parties.

3. Dissent:

a. Injury only needs to be “fairly traceable” to the conduct, and looking at the simple economics of the situation can easily provide that connection.

b. A subsidy for the withdrawal of white students from public schools has the same effect as a penalty for enrollment of black students in private schools.

(ii) Simon v. Eastern Kentucky – Plaintiff challenged IRS revision to law limiting amount of free care hospitals must provide to emergency care only.

1. No proof that revision resulted in denial of care.

(iii) Duke Power – Plaintiff claimed that act limiting liability of utility companies for reactor accidents violates due process by allowing injury without compensation

1. The act encourages construction of reactors, and construction of reactors results in injury. But for the act, reactors would not be built.

2. The causation element of standing is met in these circumstances.

(c) Must allege that a favorable decision will redress injury

(i) Causation v. redressability – redressability requires that remedy sought must specifically address the claimed injury.

(ii) Allen

1. Plaintiff makes no claim that the withdrawal of grants will have an appreciable impact on integration.

2. The Court is not responsible for the execution of laws. This is an executive function.

(iii) Lyons

1. An injunction is no more likely to benefit the plaintiff than any other citizen of LA

(iv) Lujan

1. Agencies responsible for funding projects are not bound by any action against the secretary of the EPA, so a favorable decision is not certain to redress claimed injuries

2. Agencies provide only limited funding to projects, so there is no assurance that a reduction in agency funding would have any effect on conditions.

(v) Mass v. EPA

1. Claims that EPA action would not substantially mitigate the problem assume that incremental steps cannot be judicially reviewed, but the fact that the regulation is incremental does not relieve it from eligibility for review.

2. Any reduction is U.S. emissions would slow the pace of global emissions.

(vi) Linda R.S. v. Richard D. – Child support suit.

1. No redressability, because requested relief would only result in jailing of the father, not in payment of child support.

(vii) Warth v. Seldin – plaintiff challenged zoning ordinances preventing construction of low-income housing.

1. No guarantee that low-income housing would be built if zoning allowed for it or that plaintiffs could/would live there, so no redressability.

(viii) Simon – No proof that care would be provided if revision was voided.

(4) Prudential standing

(a) Plaintiff may generally assert only his/her own rights (no third party standing)

(i) Gilmore v. Utah – Mother of convicted criminal sued for stay of execution on his behalf after he refused to do so (waived his right)

1. Standing not granted based on third party prohibition.

(ii) Exceptions

1. Relationship between litigant and third party is such that litigant is as effective an advocate as the third party

a. To what extent is plaintiff’s activity tied to third party’s right?

b. Singleton v. Wulff – Physicians filed suit for refusal t

f action persist through all stages of litigation?

(2) Connected to prohibition of advisory opinions.

(3) Exceptions to mootness doctrine

(a) Wrongs capable of repetition, but evading review

(i) Moore v. Ogilvie – Petition for new political party challenged, but not heard by SCOTUS until after election.

1. Election is over, but future elections will present the same issue, so issue is “capable of repetition, but evading review”.

(ii) Roe v. Wade – abortion

1. Due to limited gestation time, no pregnancy litigation would survive the trial phase.

2. If these cases are dismissed based on mootness, any appeal to a decision would be unavailable or denied.

(iii) DeFunis v. Odegaard – Student filed suit for reverse discrimination by law school. Received preliminary injunction, and by the time SCOTUS heard the case, student was a 3L and would be allowed to graduate.

1. Student won’t have to apply/attend law school again, so this particular case is not capable of repetition.

2. Subsequent causes of action may reach Court more quickly, so not evading review.

(b) Voluntary cessation, but defendant is free to recommence at any time

(i) Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw – Suit brought for non-compliance with NPDES permit. Prior to hearing, defendant came into compliance by closing discharging facility.

1. Party claiming mootness has burden of proving that conduct could not be reasonably expected to recur.

2. The analogy in standing is the plaintiff’s burden to prove that injurious conduct will continue or is imminent.

(c) Class action suits

(i) US Parole Comm. V. Geraghty – Named plaintiff released from prison while class action in which he was named was on appeal.

1. Even though named party’s case is moot, claimed injury may still persist against members of the class represented.

2. Even after becoming moot, named party still vigorously advocates to have class certified.

v) Political Question Doctrine

(1) This is a subject-matter question, unlike standing which is a party question.

(a) Doctrine is very amorphous

(b) Court rarely invokes

(c) Usually falls back on standing or cert denied

(2) The idea is that some constitutional provisions are best left to the political branches to interpret and enforce

(a) Pro

(i) The doctrine supports and preserves the separation of powers in accordance with the constitution.

(ii) The doctrine minimizes judicial intrusion into other branches of government

(b) Con

(i) The constitution is intended to insulate matters from the political process, and the corruption therein.

(3) SCOTUS holds that all cases under the Guarantee Clause” are always political questions, and never justiciable.