Civil Procedure II
Jurisdiction is what type of power a court can exercise over an individual
We are concerned about making power both capable of being used, but not being abused
The question to ask is: is it fair to draw a person to another state for court?
Personal Jurisdiction: the power of a specific court to adjudicate the rights and duties of specific parties
Subject matter jurisdiction is the ability for a court to hear certain types of cases
Balance of personal jurisdiction: (1) ability for courts to protect/advance the public interest through application of law; with (2) the defendant’s right to a fairly located tribunal and (3) any federalism interests
Hypo: you punch someone in Missouri, then go home to PA. The fact that the defendant fled shouldn’t bar the state from protecting their state interest of providing justice for their citizen
The source of a courts personal jurisdiction power comes from the idea of due process-both substantive and procedural due process. PJ falls under procedural due process
Pennoyer v. Neff (1878) (this is now old law)
In order to have PJ under this case there must be either (1) personal service within the state; or (2) consent to suit in the forum state, including appearance in court there)-appearance in court constitutes consent
Plaintiff sues defendant in Oregon state court. Defendant is in California. Defendant doesn’t show up to the suit, plaintiff wins by default judgment. The plaintiff tried to execute the judgment by seeking a writ of execution against the defendant’s land in Oregon. The defendant came back and sued plaintiff for trespass on the land; defendant said the judgment was not legitimate and therefore the writ of execution was invalid. Defendant argued that the court did not have PJ so there could not be a case.
This is called a collateral attack—not defending during the case and outside the appellate process
Plaintiff said that they sent notice and service of process to the defendant in CA. The plaintiff also published notice of the suit in Oregon
PJ is not about actual notification of the suit. Notice and PJ are two different things. Just because notice is provided does not mean that the court has PJ
The court said that there was not PJ. The court said that what the plaintiff did was not enough for PJ
The court is saying you cannot reach outside of the state and bind someone. This is the territorial theory of jurisdiction. Each state has sovereignty over people within and under their borders only. The fifty states are independent sovereigns
PJ is a constitutional doctrine. The constitutional basis is due process. In Pennoyer, it was more of a federalism concern. One reason for this is that the 14th amendment had not been ratified when the case was decided.
PJ can be seen as ensuring fairness for the defendant
Courts would stick to territorial jurisdiction and try to make it work
Hess v. Pawloski (1927)
As time went on it was clear that the strict territorial theory did not work in the changing times of corporations and travel
Courts began to say that corporations had to appoint someone to be served in the state in order for corporations to operate in the state (i.e. the secretary of state)
Mass. Law states that operation of a vehicle in Mass. Appointed the state registrar as appointee should a suit be brought against a non-resident
The defendant was in PA; plaintiff sent service of process to the state official, and the state official was appointee of defendant for services of process in the state—now the defendant has been served in the state
Massachusetts law said that by driving on a Massachusetts highway, defendant had consented to the appointee.
The Supreme Court recognizes that in the modern world a law like this was needed to protect Massachusetts (all states really) citizens from an out of state driver to get justice
Actual notice is not the same as PJ!! It was the use of the registrar to get around the holding of Pennoyer
Pennoyer was referring to actual consent to be sued; Hess is referring to constructive consent
The court held that there is PJ. This is because cars are dangerous, and something is needed to let the people sue
This case represents the court sticking to Pennoyer, which was still good law; but the court wasn’t going to apply it in a dangerous situation. This case represents the pressure for change in the doctrine
Pennoyer means actual consent is needed; Hess is saying that you can’t get actual consent, so constructive consent will work
Pennoyer: in order to have PJ they have to have personal service in the state or consent to be sued in the forum state
Corporations presented a problem to this issue as they became increasingly national
The Pennoyer court said that states can make exceptions to this. The state can appoint a legal agent to be eligible for service of process
Ex. If someone wants to sue a Texas corporation, they go to “Bob” who is the agent and then the corporation can be sued. This created a dormant commerce clause problem and placed an undue burden on ICC
To get around this issue courts came up with a fiction for presence. The fiction was constructive presence. If the corporation does business in the state, they are deemed as constructively present. These fictions led to International Shoe to finally shift away from the fictions to a new test
International shoe represented the court’s understanding that the doctrine needed to shift to uphold the principle it is representing
The corporation was headquartered in St. Louis, but sold shoes around the country. They sold shoes in WA, and the state of Washington wanted to sue the corporation for unemployment compensation funds. International Shoe did not pay into the fund and the state sued to require the corporation to pay the taxes they impose
International Shoe specially appeared in court. This means that they appeared in court only to dispute the court’s jurisdiction. If International Shoe had actually appeared, then that would be seen as consent to the jurisdiction
In a special appearance you can’t be served while in the state. You can argue no PJ under special appearance, but can reserve it and ra
The actual pair was from Int’l Shoes directed action at Missouri, not WA. There are arguments that because defective shoes were also sold in Washington, International Shoe should be prepared to defend itself in WA. This comes from the definition of minimum contacts; claims arise out of or relate to contacts in the state
The defective shoe is the minimum contact
Ex. Washington Resident slips and falls in front of the International Shoe HQ in STL, she returns home and tries to sue in Washington
It would have to be general jurisdiction for this to work. There are not any facilities in Washington.
General jurisdiction probably is not satisfied, they have no facilities or offices there so they are probably not at home there
Having facilities beyond retail facilities is a good indicator of systematic and continuous contacts in the state
For PJ the difference between federal or state courts do not matter.
Federal courts can only exercise the same PJ as state courts. State courts establish PJ through the use of long-arm statutes.
The states want to empower citizens to have broad power to sue non-residents
They let the state courts hear issues using state law (i.e. Utah using Utah tort law) as opposed to having Nevada courts apply Utah law. A state court will likely be more vigilant in protecting the policy interests behind the law
Legislators want to maximize the reach to bring out of state residents to the state
The statutes parallel the maximum allowance under the Due Process Clause for PJ—Its ultimately the due process clause that answers the question of PJ (not what is in the statute)
Always start with the long-arm statute in the analysis. If the long-arm statute does not go as far as it constitutionally can, then you follow the long-arm statute
Remember to use the long-arm statute first on the exam!!
Ex. Read the LA statute and see what it says and apply it to the facts, then go into International Shoe analysis for DP clause
World-Wide Volkswagon Case
The Oklahoma statute said PJ existed if company derives substantial revenue from business in the state. This is an example of a statute going too far. (Another example is if the statute says that any harm caused by a product in the state, then you have PJ=that goes too far).
The plaintiff bought the car in NY from a dealer that did all business in NY, NJ, and CT. Plaintiff was in a crash in OK and tried to bring the claim in OK over the dealer and a part supplier for the dealer.
Oklahoma juries were very friendly to plaintiffs in cases in Oklahoma.