Civil Procedure 2
Personal Jurisdiction: Limits on Pj arise from DP of 14th amendment and limits powers of states to require out-of-state defendants to defend suits in their courts.
In order to establish PJ, a plaintiff must satisfy the following three requirements. Personal jurisdiction requires (1) notice, (2) state’s long arm statute authorizing exercise of pj, and within the rights afforded by DP in the constitution. Do we have notice? Yes. Is long arm statute to full extent allowed by constitution? That is, the state legislature must enable the courts to exercise their power over nonresident defendants. Further, the state legislature can constrict the constitutional limits, if it chooses to do (this is rarely the case). State statutes that authorized jurisdiction over nonresident defendants are called “long arm statutes.” For the purpose of this analysis, we are to assume that each of the five state’s long arm statute extends the court’s reach to the limits of the constitution. Thus, our analysis for each of the five states will center on the constitutionality of personal jurisdiction over TreeCo.
General jurisdiction: 3 easy basis OR jurisdiction based on ANY of the defendant’s contact with the state that are systematic and continuous.
Tag: Serve them in state, even if flying over state.
Consent: Appearance, forum selection clauses (agreeing in advance), “special appearance: appears just to say no → not consent.
Domicile: Intent to reside “indefinitely”, no intent to make definite home elsewhere. To change: Old remains until new is established 1) intent, 2) live there
Corporation: where incorporated, or PPB (Nerve center). GP anywhere they live
Systematic and continuous: Defendants contacts are so sufficiently continuous, systematic and substantial such that there is fair notice as to render them “at home” in the forum state. (international shoe / Goodyear) Question is how much contacts are enough?
Goodyear v. Brown: France bus crash. Tires that were subject of crash in france were different than tires sold, shipped, used in NC. SoC theory does not apply to GJ.
Helicopteros v. Hall: One trip to Houston by Helicol’s CEO for purpose of negotiating the contract cannot be regarded as a contact of a continuous and systematic nature.
Daimler v. Bauman: Significant sales in forum state is not enough. Only 2.4% of sales in California for Diamler’s world-wide sales. Must look at totality of the busines activity of the business in question to determine whether they are considered at home. Concurrence: good analysis for exam; ask, To what degree is the business in question taking advantage of or imposing their presence in the forum state.
Specific Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction based on contacts with the state when the claim ARISES OUT OF those contacts/activities.
Law now: Defendant must have such minimum contacts with the forum state that the exercise of jx will not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. (International Shoe)
Minimum contacts: Claim has to arise out of or relate to contacts in forum.
Purposeful availment: Contacts must result from purposeful availment: Defendant must purposely avail or, create the contact by its conduct to reap the benefits and services of doing business in that state (WWV).
Stream of Commerce (for products liability) (Asahi):
Brennan’s foreseeability standard: MC with forum so long as D purposely injected it’s product into the stream of commerce and could have foreseen that its product would be used in the forum.
Arise out of or relate is broad, so that P’s can have power to sue big corporations.
O’Connor’s foreseeability + standard: A D has MC with the forum if D delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum.
Practical foreseeability in these, with Brennans standard unilateral activity of a customer and corp could be subject to PJ.
WWV: Respondents seek to base jx on one, isolated occurrence and whatever inferences can be drawn therefrom: the fortuitous circumstance that a single Audi automobile, sold in NY to NY residents, happened to suffer an accident while passing through OK. BUT the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum state. Rather, it is that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum state are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.
Did not arise from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve directly or indirectly the market for its product in other states. SoC → if had, different story. This was unilateral activity. Brennan’s dissent would use foreseeability here to say it is enough.
Asahi: (bad valve) Substantial connection between the defendant and forum state necessary for MC must come about by action of the D purposefully directed toward the forum state. Even if established Asahi’s awareness that some valves sold to Cheng Shin would be incorporated into tubes sold in CA, Respondents have not demonstrated any action by Asahi to purposely avail itself to CA market.
Facts to argue: Asahi does not do business in CA, no offices, agents, employees, or property in CA. Does not advertise or solicit business there. DId not create, control, or employ the distribution system that brought valves into CA. No evidence designed product in anticipation of sales there.
Brennan Forseeability argue: As long as participant in process is aware that final product is being marketed in forum state, the possibility of a lawsuit therre cannot come as a surprise,. D who has placed goods in SoC benefits economically from retail sale of final product, indirectly benefits from laws that regulate and facilitate commercial activity, benefit accrues either way. Agrees w/conclusion because offends traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Nicastro: (fingers chopped off by machine) Independent distributor agreement to sell McIntyre’s product in US. Only three Machines at most were sent to NJ.
Kennedy SoC Forseeability +: Need something more like intentional targeting, just because had shows in other states doesn’t mean purposely availed.
Ginsburg Dissent: Points out elephant in room, NJ is largest distributor of scrap metal in country, of course is targeting NJ if wanting to do business. Doctrine can’t be right because leads to absurd results.
If allow to escape jx of US by getting a national distributor it seems to prevent states from invoking rights for their citizens.
International insurance v. McGee: an insurer sent an offer to re-insure a policy-holder in California. The Supreme court held that this was a deliberate reaching in that supported jx over the insurer. That one contract is enough to demonstrate intent to be bound by plaintiff. Knew from application they lived there and would likely continue to.
Hanson v. Denkla: no PJ because “unilateral activity” moving to Florida on part of plaintiff does not amount to “purposeful availment”
Fairness Reasonableness Prong: “No PJ if offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice”
Fairness to P
a. Walden v. Fiore 1983 claim: Has to go from Nevada to GA when improperly seized his money.
Burden on D
. Asahi: Have to traverse the distance from Japan to CA, submit to a foreign nation’s judicial system.
a. WWV: substantially relaxed because modern transportation and communication have made it less burdensome.
b. Denkla: orderly administration of the laws; gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential D’s to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to the suit.
. WWV: OK is where accident was and closer to P’s new home.
a. McGee: It was where they lived, where the contract was marketed and arose out of.
Where witness are (WWV) accident was in OK, witnesses were there.
Forum State’s interest
. Asahi: P is not a CA resident, California’s legitimate interest in dispute is considerably diminished.
a. WWV: Neither are residents of OK
State Substantive Policies
. WWV: Happened on their streets in their state.
ott under labor relations act and 2) state law tort claim for violent acts. Jurisdiction. Assuming substantiality of federal issue, there is power in fed court to hear whole when both claims derive from CNOF. Court had power to hear whole at the outset, so doesn’t matter ct granted union’s motion for summ judg on fed.
Rule: 28 USC § 1367 B)
If P’s added to suit destroy complete diversity then Supp Jx cannot be used over additional claims.
If however, the conflict is pertaining to Amt. in controversy (not § 1332 CD issue), then Supp jx can be used over the additional claims.
Exxon Mobile v. Allapattah: P’s sneak around limitation found in b) and use supp jx. As a result, 1367 was ammended as above. (no longer have problem)
Rule: 28 USC § 1367 D): SAVINGS STATUTE: Issue of SMJ is a ticking time bomb and what this is doing is saying the federal court can dictate a hold over period (30 days) of the statute of limitations of the state. No one has yet struck down the constitutionality of this statute, but would imagine if it came up it may b/c imposes on state cts..
Rule: 28 USC § 1367 C) District court can decline Supp J over a claim under subsection a if
I. claim raises novel or complex issue of state law
II. claim substantially predominates over claim or claims over which dist court had original jx.
III. the district cour has dismissed all claims over which it had original jx
IV. exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jx.
Traditional rule in american courts: plaintiff chooses the forum in which to bring a suit, subject to limitations of PJ, SMJ, and venue.
File petition in Fed ct.
Notice of removal then filed in state ct.
Fed judge decides if removal is appropriate (state court has no say)
Removal is the exception to this rule. Federal removal statutes allow the defendant, after the plaintiff has chosen a state court, to second-guess that choice by “removing” some types of cases from the state court to the federal court. Once properly removed the case becomes a federal case, and the state court loses jx. Only one court can host a removed action: the fed district court “for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” Thus removal only partially displaces the P’s choice of forum he still gets to choose the state where the action will be litigated, even if he ends up in fed court in the state due to removal by D.
*Usual fed venue rules do not apply in removed actions.
Policy: Defendants as well as plaintiffs should have the option to choose federal courts for cases within federal jx.
Defendant may suffer prejudice from litigating in state court, should have same right as out of state plaintiff to avoid that prejudice by invoking fed jx.
28 USC § 1441 a): Removal jx should be available to the D only in cases that the P could have commenced in fed court. (fed courts have OG jx).
Exception: 28 USC § 1441 b) If a D is sued in his home state, he may not remove on the basis of diversity. Also precludes remove of a diversity case if ANY D is from the state court where action is brought. Rational: D has no need to be protected from local prejudice, since he has been sued in his home state.
28 USC § 1441 f) Federal court is not precluded from hearing the case simply because the state court lacked jx over it.