Shaw, ConlawI, Fall 2016
JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL COURTS
[Always start analysis here – Can the case even be heard in Federal Court?]Justiciability [Cases and Controversy]
Art. III §2: The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases [and] Controversies
Determines which matters federal courts can hear and decide, and which must be dismissed [even when court has jurisdiction]
Rule: To be suitable for review by a federal court, the case must be presented in an adversarial context, and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process
Five instances where judicial review is not appropriate: [Flast v. Cohen]
Parties are seeking advisory opinion
Parties do not have standing
The question sought to be adjudicated is moot
The question sought to be adjudicated is not ripe
When the Court is faced with a political question alone
Case and Controversy:
Standing
Determination of whether a specific person is the proper party to bring a matter to the court for adjudication
Constitutional Standing Requirements:
þ Injury in Fact
þ Causation traceable to defendant’s conduct
þ Redressability of injury through Court decision
Plaintiff must allege that he has suffered or immediately will suffer an injury [injury in fact]
Injury must be actual, imminent or threatened
Injury must be specific, concrete and particularized (i.e., cannot be the same harm that is suffered by an extremely large group)
But: Requirement can be met even with a large group suffering the same harm, BUT you still must have suffered a personal injury
Injury must be non-economic
Plaintiff must allege that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct [causation] Plaintiff must allege that a favorable federal court decision is likely to redress the injury [SLJRR: Substantial Likelihood that Judicial Relief Requested will prevent or redress the injury] Warth v. Seldin: Individuals and corporations sued town of Penfield alleging discrimination as a result of the town’s zoning laws, which apparently prevented them from living/building low-income houses
SCt found: None of the plaintiffs had standing because they could not establish injury in fact. Even individual plaintiffs could not show that they would have been able to afford and move to Penfield
Cf. Village of Arlington Heights v. MHDC: MHDC, builder of low and moderate income housing, contracted to purchase a 15-acre site in the Village of Arlington. Contract was contingent upon MHDC securing zoning clearances and federal approval. MHDC submitted detailed plans to the Village, which refused to rezone the property. MHDC and three individuals sued MHDC alleging that denial was racially discriminatory
SCt held: Plaintiffs had standing because, although MHDC has no racial identity and under Warth would have had no standing, at least one of the individual plaintiffs demonstrated standing to assert these rights
SCt found: Ransom, a Negro, had standing because he seeks and would qualify for housing MHDC wanted to build, and he would have move there because it was closer to his job è þ Injury in Fact þ Causation þ SLJRR
Third-Party Standing
General Rule: Doctrine of Third-Party Standing: A party has no ability to assert 3P standing in federal court [You can only vindicate for your own rights]
Ex. Green ran a stop sign and crashed with Red. Red didn’t sue, but eventually needed the money. Blue said he would sue for Red = NOT allowed. Blue cannot plead someone’s injury for standing.
Cf. Craig v. Borden: State passed a law that allowed 18-20yo women to purchase beer, but not men. Craig, bartender, sued for the men and himself, stating he was injured by this law because of loss of sales.
HERE, Although Craig was a 3P, SCt found she had standing. Craig had to assert injury to the men and assert that her rights were dependent on the men’s rights
Exception to General Rule: Where rights of the 3P are integrally entwined with the plaintiff’s action and the decision of the plaintiff’s action has the possibility of affecting the 3P, then 3P may have standing to sue
General Grievance
Rule: General grievances, without asserting that claimant has suffered concrete and particularized injury, does not establish standing
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Defenders of Wildlife (“DOW”) wanted ESA to be expanded to foreign waters/nations. DOW argued that even if they were 3Ps, they were injured because they study wildlife. SCt found that there was no injury-in-fact asserted here because this was just a general grievance
General Grievance: Are grievances of the sort that are better resolved through political means not judicial [affects all citizens]
Reasoning: Separation of Powers à Allowing lawsuits for general grievances without sufficient concrete injury would allow the judiciary to engage in overseeing executive and legislative branch
Proper Remedy: Lobby or through legislation
Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence: [Article III creates a boundary] Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where there is none. . .BUT in exercising this power, Congress must at the very least identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit. A citizens-suit does not meet these minimal requirements. . . .The statute, by its own force, does not establish that there is an injury in any person by virtue of any violation
Cf. Massachusetts v. EPA: Massachusetts and other states petitioned the EPA, asking it to regulate emissions of carbon dioxide and other gasses that contribute to global warming. Massachusetts cla
issed so long as one member of the class has an ongoing injury
Defunis v. Odegard: DeFunis was denied admission to the University of Washington Law School despite test scores that were higher than some of the minorities admitted. DeFunis then successfully asked a trial court to require the school to admit him. On appeal, Washington Supreme Court reversed, upholding the school’s decision to deny him admission. The US SCt considered the case as DeFunis was entering his final year of law school
SCt held: The case was moot because the school had agreed to allow DeFunis to enroll and earn his diploma. Because DeFunis would be able to complete his legal studies irrespective of the SCt decision, the controversy between the parties has clearly ceased.
Cf. Roe v. Wade: Roe sought to terminate her pregnancy by abortion. Texas law prohibited abortions except to save a pregnant woman’s life. Roe sued the State, claiming it was unconstitutional for States to preclude abortion. By the time the case reached the SCt, the baby was already born [conflict has been resolved]
SCt held: Conclusion of the pregnancy did not moot a challenge to the statute prohibiting abortions without any showing that the plaintiff was likely to suffer another unwanted pregnancy
Case Comparison:
DeFunis = He completed his legal studies and would likely not go back to law school again. Plaintiff must show that he, rather than simply anyone, would be subjected to the same alleged illegality
Roe = She fell within the exception because: (1) Having a baby takes 9 months, and the case would never reach the SCt within that time; and (2) She could be subjected to the same illegality should she have another unwanted pregnancy
Settlements. Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez: Jose Gomez received an unsolicited text advertising from the US Navy. He sued, arguing that Campbell-Ewald violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act by allowing a 3P vendor to send a text message on their behalf. Campbell-Ewald then offered Gomez a settlement, which Gomez rejected
SCt held: An unaccepted settlement offer does not make a claim moot because it has no force and does not affect whether the case presents an actual case or controversy over which the court has jurisdiction under Article III.