PERSONAL JURISDICTION – “nexus”
· First, if we get a case removed from state court to federal court, say that “removal was proper under §1441 because of complete diversity and amount in controversy under § 1332.”
STEP 1: FEDERAL STATUTORY
· Rule 4(k)(1)(a): Gives the Federal Court authority “over the person of the ∆ who could be subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state in which the district court is located.”
STEP 2: STATE STATUTORY
· Does the state’s statute (long arm, common law) grant jurisdiction? (Probably yes.) See if you can use quasi in rem or in rem to get around this. (page 11.)
· Check the wording of the long arm and try to squeeze the situation into it by going thru prongs
i. Every state has statutes covering traditional basis, J over people served with process, service of process on ∆’s agent, domiciled, consent. Those people are subject to general jurisdiction (traditional Pennoyer notions.) See page 12.
ii. Non-resident motorist statute: every state has one – gives specific jurisdiction – you can only be sued for the wreck. Implied Consent – state had the power to exclude.
iii. Long-Arm Statutes: Most are specific.
a. Either full extent of DPC or Laundry List type (transacts business, owns property, etc.)
b. Watch for TORTIOUS ACT – argue both ways – either where the product was made, or where the injury occurred.
STEP 3: STATE CONSTITUTIONAL – limits power of states to require out-of-state ∆s to defend in their own courts.
1. DPC (14): Jurisdiction has to fall within the DPC of the 14th Amendment.
2. General Jurisdiction: Does one of the traditional bases apply? Domicile, consent, transient J/presence (split in the court as to why), J based on property (Shoe standard must be applied even in in rem cases)
3. Sources of specific jurisdiction:
a. MINIMUM CONTACTS: of such quality and nature such that exercising J (in the state in which the federal court sits) is consistent w/ traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
· Shoe Test: Look at quality and nature of contacts and fairness (see below).
· No contact, or isolated contact = No J. Mere transactions may not be enough (see Helicopteros, page 14.)
· Single acts – look who initiated or reached in (McGee). Substantial connection – for ex, one insurance K did everything.
· Claims arising from activity outside the state where harmful effects are caused within the state – see above, remember there is a split.
· Tag J: Burnham: Split in the court as to why there was J…
1. Scalia: Presence is good by itself – service of process is enough w/o looking at Shoe minimum contacts. Look at history – this is always OK.
2. Brennan – doesn’t care about history – even if served in state, must satisfy contemporary DPC notions – must assess all claims under minimum contacts test. Apparently, 3 days was enough for general J.
· Contract: (business relationship) alone do not establish J, but other surrounding factors can demonstrate purposeful establishment of minimum contacts with the forum (unless a compelling case is made by ∆ that exercising J is unreasonable – this is hard.) Some courts say ∏ must show it’s reasonable.
· Continuous and systematic contacts do give rise to general J. AND…
b. PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws
· Unilateral activity is not enough (Hansen)
· WWVW: If no minimum contacts, and no purposeful availment, foreseeability is not determinative, nor is fairness or reasonableness.
· Keeton: Single publication rule: ask if ∆ could reasonably anticipate being haled me court in the forum.
· Stream of Commerce: Two views…ARGUE THEM BOTH ON EXAM
1. (O’Connor): Ask whether product was purposely directed to the forum state with the intent and purpose to serve other states, OR
2. (Brennan): Ask whether awareness of product being sold in the forum state is sufficient. You put the product in the stream of commerce and reasonably anticipate it will go to the state.
· AND… before we look at fairness, ∆ must have a relevant contact (BK).
c. REASONABLE/FAIR PLAY & SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE. Factors include…
· To the extent that a corporation exercises the privileges of conducting activity within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protections of the laws of the state, giving rise to the obligation, and so far as those obligations are connected with the activities within the state, it is not undue to require a corporation to respond to a suit to enforce them
· Relatedness: Does ∏’s claim arise from the ∆’s contact with the forum – if yes, you might find J (McGee.)
· Interest in the forum state in providing redress to its citizens
· State’s interest: interest in the forum state in providing redress to its citizens and enforcing their substantive law or policy.
· ∏’s interest: in obtaining relief in a convenient forum, availability of witnesses.
· Inconvenience to ∆: if forced to defend away from home. Can the ∆ travel? (Corporation is more able)
STEP 4: FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL
· Due Process 5: Jurisdiction has to fall within Due Process 5. Must have minimum contacts with the sovereign and if it has with the state (in step II
l and discretion, and 2) whether the agent’s position is such that service is likely to come to the attention of those responsible for protecting corporation’s interests in litigation.
· 4(i/j) – Service upon US/local govt as ∆
· 4(l) – Proof of service
· 4(m) – Time limits for service; service must be made within 120 days from filing the complaint, although court can extend that time at judge’s discretion.
GEOGRAPHIC LIMITS OF SERVICE – 4(k)(1)(a)
Keep in mind that service outside of a given Jurisdiction, whatever it’s source, must still meet the Constitutional demands of due process to have a valid exercise of PJ.
· 4(k): sets out territorial reach of federal service.
· 4(k)(1)(a): Allows federal courts to borrow state long arm statutes and thereby extend their jurisdiction to a degree exactly co-extensive with the courts of the state in which they sit.
o Thus a federal court in NYC can only serve process outside if a state court could.
· 4(k)(1)(b): Provides a rule for reaching parties brought into the action pursuant to 3rd party practice (rule 14) or compulsory joinder (rule 19); such parties may be served within a 100 mile radius of the courthouse.
· 4(k)(1)(c) and 4(k)(1)(d) authorizes service out of the state pursuant to certain federal statutes, including:
o 4(k)(1)(c): Under § 1335 (joined in an interpleader proceeding) to resolve conflicting claims on the same property
o 4(k)(1)(d): Incorporates into the rules special service of process provisions included in numerous federal substantive laws (securities exchange act.) Aggregate contacts test has been used by the Courts of Appeals for constitutional basis.
· 4(k)(2): Establishes a federal provision for extraterritorial reach in limited circumstances; it provides that, for claims arising under federal law, service is effective to establish jurisdiction if the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution and the ∆ is not subject to jurisdiction in any one state of the U.S.
· For State Service of Process Statutes, Immunity from Process, and Service of Process and SOLs, see page 34.
